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Abstract
This PhD by project entitled A Clinic for the Exhausted will examine a method of inventing in the 
present an architectural practice concomitant to the realisation of an architecture grounded in an im-
mutable unknown; an architecture that departs from the fi nite architectural object, the imposition of an 
architect or the illusory status of a fi ctional community.  Traversing a fi eld of research comprised of ar-
chitectural, cinematic, literary, and philosophic intensities (to name but a few), this project will minister 
to the open and uncloseable implications of an impersonal architecture that is faithful to a community 
whose arrival is not simply overlooked, but is preserved without negation. 
 A Clinic for the Exhausted argues that by fostering an architecture without foreclosure and of unfore-
seeable eff ect, a community in the present could minister to the practices of an unknowable constituent, 
thereby entrusting the unknowable with a share in our contemporary condition. By asking after a com-
munity that is dispossessed of an accountable presence, this research attempts to ascertain the degree to 
which one can act on behalf of the unknowable. In establishing the ethical dimensions that the funda-
mental question of an unaccountable life proposes, this research engages with an aoristical sense of the 
question of a life in the univocity of a propositional space that assumes the surfeit of excess: exhaustion. 
The diffi  culty posed by a community without omission appeals to the indelible space of the Clinic, a 
space that confronts in excess of any particular place or any particular person, the no-where that is par-
ticular to no-one. The research submits that the task of those who claim the specularity of the Clinic, 
that is an audience from whom no-one is exempt, lies in extending the practice and the procedures that 
the irreducible question of a life harbors. Thus, the realisation of an architecture that claims the ques-
tion of a life must also claim the dimensions of the Clinic, a scale that cannot overlook the unevidenced. 
Hence, the manner in which the project is undertaken is a radical methodology that affi  rms the 
contemporary suffi  ciency to abstain from that which is already known. The PhD will propagate the 
momentum of a single encounter between two architects - a letter from Howard Raggatt to Peter Cor-
rigan - displacing the fi eld of thought that gave rise to it in such a way that the interminable persistence 
of an unevidenced event - a building that takes fl ight in the image of an ocean liner - can never be held 
to account. Typifying this attempt to admit the unknowable will be an arsenal of lucid moves, uncanny 
conjunctions and casual assertions that will continually avow the eff usiveness by which the research sets 
out to meet the unmeetable. This method off ers more than an alleged impractical epistemic impasse, a 
claim that would fail to realise that the very suggestion of unassailable proof; a demand to explain, ex-
cuse or account for instances of interpretive indecipherability, remains untenable and is conditional on 
withdrawing from the question of a life. It is via the felicitous incisiveness of the prose, drawings, and 
images that compose this research that an atemporal experience of an unaccountable experience will be 
perpetuated.
A Clinic for the Exhausted is off ered as an exemplary architecture amidst the mass of existence, an 
enveloping reticence that evokes the relations of those who remain nameless.
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Thinking provokes general indiff erence. It is a dangerous 
exercise nevertheless. Indeed, it is only when the dangers be-
come obvious that indiff erence ceases, but they often remain 
hidden and barely perceptible, inherent in the enterprise. Pre-
cisely because the plane of immanence is prephilosophical and 
does not immediately take eff ect with concepts, it implies a sort 
of groping experimentation and its layout resorts to measures 
that are not very respectable, rational, or reasonable. These 
measures belong to the order of dreams, of pathological pro-
cesses, esoteric experiences, drunkeness, and excess. We head 
for the horizon, on the plane of immanence, and we return 
with bloodshot eyes, yet they are the eyes of the mind.
Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari, What is Philosophy? 1
With a gasp I saw revealed to my stare a pair of feet, the long 
legs, the broad livid back immersed right up to the neck in a 
greenish cadaverous glow.
Joseph Conrad, The Secret Sharer 2
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In 1990, the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology (RMIT) would begin
the procurement process for a new building to complete a gap in the university’s 
Melbourne city campus between Swanston Street and Bowen Lane. The commission for the proposed 
building, eventually to be known as ‘Building Eight’, would be appointed to the Melbourne architectural 
practice of Edmond & Corrigan working in conjunction with Demaine Partnership.1 
The university’s brief required Edmond & Corrigan’s proposal to address a short fall of some 
40% in space, contingent on accommodating the School of Architecture and Design, the School of 
Business, and School of Planning as well as provide a home for a new university library and café. 
More importantly, the building was to present a public face for the university along Swanston Street, 
Melbourne’s civic spine, that would, “make overt its cultural contribution to the community,”2 
completing a task that had stalled some seventeen years before with the Australian architect John 
Andrews’ unfi nished Student Union Building. Andrews’ building marked a gap between the incomplete 
fortress of the Casey Wing (1967-75) by Bates Smart McCuthcen, which had initially intended to 
extend the full length of RMIT’s Swanston Street frontage but of which only three of the proposed 
blocks were built, and the much earlier Storey Hall (1884-87) subsequently renovated and extended by 
the Australian architectural practice Ashton Raggatt McDougall,3 (known by the acronym ARM), in 
1  Demaine Partnership is a Melbourne based practice founded in 1938. Peter Corrigan had gone through the University of Melbourne Architecture course with a 
director of Demaine, Dominic Kelly during the early 1960s.
2   Leon van Schaik, “Building Eight: The Appointment Process” in, Building Eight: Edmond and Corrigan at RMIT, eds. Leon van Schaik & Nigel Bertram, 
3 Volumes, (Melbourne: SchwarzTransition Monographs, 1996), Vol. 1, 92.
3  Howard Raggatt, Ian McDougall and Stephen Ashton are the founding members of the Melbourne architecture practice of Ashton Raggatt McDougall. ARM 
came about in 1988, and was the result of the various early partnerships between the respective directors. ARM has produced some of the most controversial 
public buildings in Australia, most notably Storey Hall at RMIT University in Melbourne, The National Museum of Australia in Canberra, and most recently, 
the Melbourne Recital Hall. Both Raggatt and McDougall completed their Masters of Architecture in the initial Masters by Invitation program inaugurated by 
Professor Leon van Schaik at RMIT to facilitate a critical review of work undertaken in practice. This was a major turning point in architectural education in 
Australia, but also, directed an emerging stream of architectural practices to engage and prospect the causes of their respective practices. Both Raggatt and 
McDougall were instrumental in furthering the early architectural culture in Melbourne. Most notably, McDougall and Richard Munday founded the Australian 
Architectural journal, Transition, published from 1979-2000. Transition was named after the eleventh chapter of J.M. Freeland’s Architecture in Australia: A 
History. As van Schaik tells us, the early editions of Transition were put together in a house in St. Kilda where both McDougall and Munday were, “forced 
to wash up in order to work on it, all the while taking phone call messages from Peter Corrigan [who featured on the editorial board] relayed as often as 
not by Norman Day, from some more salubrious spot. (The house in St Kilda belonged to Peter Corrigan’s mother, a territorial fact which has given rise to 
debate about the genesis of ‘Australia’s Journal of Architectural Discourse’).” While the role of Peter Corrigan’s mother in the advent of Transition and the 
discourse on architecture in Australia from the mid-seventies remains circumspect, there can be no less a conspiratorial plot for A Clinic for the Exhausted 
PREAMBLE
Epigraph:
1  Gilles Deleuze, & Félix Guattari, What is Philosophy?, trans. Hugh Tomlinson & Graham Burchill, (London & New York: Verso, 1994), 41.
2  Joseph Conrad, “The Secret Sharer,” in The Nigger of the ‘Narcissus’ and other stories, (London: Penguin, 2007), 178.
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1996. In 1990, Andrew’s building sat truncated, with only three of its intended ten stories completed, 
the seventeen year lapse in its completion softening none of its diffi  cult circulation and harsh street 
presence. Subsequently, the scale, height and depth of Edmond and Corrigan’s proposal would be 
largely driven by these other buildings: the Casey Wing, with its own tightly stacked fl oor plates, would 
determine the new building’s fl oor stacks, while Andrews’ building, with its structural limitations and 
awkward diagonal layout would determine the new building’s height and entry circulation. During 
the development of the brief an inevitable increase in the building programme meant an increasingly 
larger fl oor plate would need to be accommodated within the fi nal building.  Any proposal by Edmond 
and Corrigan would have to meet not only the heavy expectations of the university and its prominent 
site, but would have to do so within the diffi  cult constraints of assimilating the incomplete accretions 
of past architectural endeavours. 
Towards the closing stages of Building Eight’s construction, the university’s commissioning process 
and Edmond & Corrigan’s design development along with the building’s general sense of civic place in 
the sphere of Melbourne architecture was richly detailed in historian Conrad Hamann’s monograph 
on the fi rm of Edmond & Corrigan entitled Cities of Hope (1993), followed by Leon van Schaik and 
Nigel Bertram’s Building Eight: Edmond and Corrigan at RMIT (1996), a three volume monograph 
composed of a volume on Building Eight’s design development, a volume of essays on Building Eight 
commissioned  for the publication, and a volume that collected the writings of both Peter Corrigan and 
Maggie Edmond,  all housed in a gold or silver lucite slip-cover.  It is the intention of this preamble to 
concisely attend to the episodic historical development of Building Eight, so as not to off er a knowingly 
elucidated  examination of the given architecture that can be read back into some general indictment of 
by reiterating McDougall in an interview: “At least the fi rst cover [of Transition] was also inspired by those of the medical journal Lancet.” Raggatt’s thesis 
is published as: “NOTNESS: Operations and Strategies for the Fringe” in, Fin de Siecle? and the Twenty-fi rst Century, ed. Leon van Schaik, (Melbourne: 38South 
Publications,1993). McDougall’s thesis is published as: “The Autistic Ogler” in, Transfi guring the Ordinary, ed. Leon van Schaik, (Melbourne: 38South Publications, 
1995). For notes regarding Transition see, Leon van Schaik, “Ten Years of Transition,” Transition, No. 29, (1989), 29-33; Melinda Payne, “Reading the Journal: 
Moments in the History of Transition, Transition, No. 59/60, (1998), 6-27.
Fig 2 
diagram of historical conditions
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the broader examinations of Building Eight plumbed by Schaik, Bertram, and Hamann. This research 
will endeavour to illuminate what is best described as the proliferation of images and architectural turns 
that make Building Eight a diffi  cult endeavour to ‘pin down’.  The rhetoric of the preceeding paragraph 
arises because Building Eight can, simply, be read as a collision of citations from various architectural, 
literary and fi ne art heritages. Every instance of Edmond & Corrigan’s brazen sampling fi nds itself 
loosened from the original contexts which gave rise to it,  and are thrown into a social, economic and 
cultural economy that presents itself as Australian. However irrefutable an assertion of what is or is not 
‘Australian’ that attaches itself to a discussion of a prominent example of ‘Australian Architecture’, it 
is necessary to realise that Edmond & Corrigan’s oeuvre makes no claim to an authentically Australian 
Architecture. Instead, their work suggests a lengthy discourse on Australian myth making; the tenuous 
readability of the traces and inscriptions of the various fragment in Building Eight suggesting an 
awareness of a less-than-certain path through a less-than-certain territory. As Schaik writes in his 
foreword to his and Bertram’s edited monograph, Building Eight proceeds by,  “plundering fi elds of 
cultural provenance.”4  As a consequence of Schaik’s statement, our investigation of Building Eight 
could be implicated in an inventory recording the many ‘thefts’ with which it might be charged.  But, 
an unsuspecting audience should not allow themselves to become an unwitting historian of Building 
Eight,  preoccupied with the building’s objective historical narratives as a means to determine the extents 
of how we come to advocate for or against its architecture.  It is necessary that the doubt that is present 
in any interpretation must articulate and further enable our passage through what Peter Corrigan,  the 
architect,  foregrounds in his architecture and teaching as “diffi  cult coded knowledge.”5  Every fragment 
hence arises as the topos of the struggle between disassociation and recognition; a measure of the void 
between an audiences reluctance to follow, and their inability to bring themselves to discredit the 
architecture that confronts them.
The architecture that prevails in Building Eight attends to Corrigan’s argument for a place-based 
knowledge that refuses the demands of explication that would systematically determine the extents 
of his architecture based on an inventory of historical motifs and narratives. Such an approach would 
eff ectively and problematically orientate Building Eight toward a refl ection on the past, and fail to 
discern the tenuous claim of an Australian Architecture to be just that,  Australian.  Instead Building 
Eight, by the insistence and extent of Corrigan’s infringements, what belongs to his own palatable 
impudence, gathers the artefacts of a past, stages them in a present, and assumes the position of an 
architecture that has yet to emerge. This does not surmise the naivety of utopic ideas of architectural 
progress or determine an origin for, or a conclusion to, Australian authenticity.  It is the anticipatory 
4   Schaik & Bertram, Building Eight: Edmond and Corrigan at RMIT,  Vol. 1, 10. 
5   The full paragraph reads: “If an art work aspires to an embodiment of a social organisation, a community, it needs to establish connections between the rules 
(underlying) and their manifestations in the real world. It is necessary for an audience to be able to make comparative inferences with their own lives. The potential 
audience will more readily attend if it sees its won preoccupations dealt with in the art work. This is not to be misunderstood as kitsch. Diffi cult coded knowledge, 
not taste, is involved.” Peter Corrigan quoted in Richard Munday, “Passion in the Suburbs”, Architecture Australia, (Feb/March, 1977), 52.  This paragraph also sits at 
the front of Conrad Hamann’s monograph on the fi rm of Edmond and Corrigan, Cities of Hope. A re-issue and update of this publication entitled,  “Cities of Hope 
Revisited” and “Cities of Hope Rehearsed” is currently being prepared by Edmond and Corrigan.
 Sanford Kwinter argues similarly that: “As every thoughtful architect knows, an object is never other than an object in disposition. When musical 
composition emancipated itself from its prison-house within the acoustically generated spectrum of the classical chromatic scale, it allowed one to rewrite the rules for 
controlling tones and sounds and combining them into structural relationships. One of the most important things that we learned is that we cant always or initially 
hear these relationships, and yet we know that they both exist and serve a critical (audible or supra-audible) function. What we don’t access literally with out ears, 
we can actually lean to access through a transformation in the organisation of our human apparatus – a new posture or attitude, a new distribution of attention, a 
new form of physical listening. Concepts were then, and remain today, the primary walking sticks with which we navigate new space and reshape ourselves. There is 
no reason to deny architect the power of this extraordinary transformative engine. Concepts are the architecture of hope.” Sanford Kwinter,  “Concepts: The Architecture 
of Hope,” Harvard Design Magazine, No. 19 (Fall 2003/Winter 2004), 1-4; 4.
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Fig 3 
Conrad Hamann, 
Cities of Hope
play of ablation, substitution and quotation, as Corrigan meanders across the entire edifi ce of culture 
that advances the unruly nature of his disjunctions.  Which determines what holds what together in 
an architecture of continual displacement further entrenched in Corrigan’s autobiographical apparatus 
is of little relevance to the speculations of this preamble and the proceeding undertaking. In order for 
an audience to realise the conditions by which Corrigan’s architecture operates across the extent of the 
whole of a potential architecture requires knowing what any such method divests itself of in the cutting 
out and into of another; of the space it carves from itself for itself. That is, to recognise that Building 
Eight generates interpretations that advance far beyond what one interpretive dimension could fathom; 
it is an architecture that opens the surface coherence of its edifi ce by enfolding through the dimensions 
of itself, never closing one space off , but prospecting  space from within the enveloping impasse of its 
own excessive gestures: a space “commensurate with our capacity for dreaming.”6
Building Eight is an architecture that exhibits a complex narrative structure, involving diffi  cult 
histories which are apt to being disrupted. From the repertoire of Building Eight’s architectural 
transmogrifi cations can be derived an aff ective atlas that is characterised by a confl ation, expenditure and 
displacement of meaning across an open surface of cultural references. The methodology that pertains 
to this architectural accretion examines how a proliferating series of  images continues to elucidate how 
Building Eight can refute being known and conscripted by a  collection of frozen  historical events. It 
is this attitude that informs the proceeding introduction and, the opening out of this PhD as it traverses 
a contemporary re-imagining of Building Eight and architect Peter Corrigan that was presented as the 
winning entry to the journal Architecture Australia and its inaugural Unbuilt Prize.
6   Project statement by Peter Corrigan. Peter Corrigan with Michael Spooner, Edmond and Corrigan: A City of Hope, Now + When, Venice Biennale 2010.  Corrigan’s 
thesis is founded in the fi gure given form in Ernst Bloch’s The Principle of Hope as that of a man who is not content, the dreamer. For Bloch,  day-dreaming is not a 
discontent by which what is lacking can be wholly fi lled through an indiscriminate material wealth. For Bloch, this discontent is a challenge to the present conditions 
in which any person whatever may fi nd him or herself; discontent has as its core foundation the dignity of life, a refusal to accept one’s social deprivation and a 
preparedness to go against the grain. Bloch’s dreaming is an excursion into ones’ passing shadow. It confi rms Corrigan’s ‘dreaming’ not as an acute mystifi cation, but, 
as a vital epistemic process; what opens life to the latency of a utopianism by which the dreamer is who can never fi nally be content. As Bloch states, it is a model 
of utopia which is “transcendent, without transcendence.”cf Geoghegan, 149.  See Principle 33, “A dreamer always wants even more”, in Ernst Bloch, The Principle of 
Hope, Volume Two, trans. Neville Plaice, Stephen Plaice & Paul Knight (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 451.
Fig 4
Leon van Schaik & Nigel Bertram,
 Building Eight: Edmond and Corrigan at RMIT
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In 2007, the journal Architecture Australia commenced the publication of a
series of features considering the role of important works of architecture from 
both international  and Australian architects that had fallen short of being built, but had contributed 
to the dialogue on Australian Architecture. It also re-established, in a new format, a competition 
program that had fi rst been initiated in the 1990s for unbuilt works of Architecture. The inaugural 
fi rst prize of the reinstated Unbuilt Prize was awarded to a project entitled A Clinic for the Exhausted. 
The jury commented that they were torn between the project’s “last-century picaresque roman-a-clef 
tongue-in-check cockamaine self indulgent absurdist magic-so-called-realism” that raised the spectre of 
post-modern irony, and its appearance as “a painstakingly referenced and aff ectionate homage to that 
remarkable architect – Peter Corrigan” that was presented via the project’s appropriation of Building 
Eight.1 Most telling were the judge’s examination of whether an entry to the Unbuilt Prize could be 
entirely improbable in terms of buildability or whether the competition should only consider those 
projects that had intended to become concrete realities but had failed to make it off  the drawing board. 
Preceding the competition, Architecture Australia had published, as part of its unbuilt series, a review by 
the Australian architectural historian Peter Goad of Edmond & Corrigan’s Australian Pavilion for the 
Giardini delle Biennale, commissioned in 1979 by Franco Belgiorno-Nettis, Transfi eld founder and also 
the founder of Sydney’s Art Biennale, with the backing of Venetian authorities. This was a project that 
had subsequently failed to materialise, stalled by the lack of support from Australian authorities.2 It was 
hard to tell how to take the winning entry of the Unbuilt Prize seriously against the background of this 
and other,  perhaps more serious work featured in the competition: was the winning project only a wild 
imaginary extrapolation of Corrigan’s Building Eight? Or was it something more hopeful, like Venice, 
a city bourne afl oat?
The winning project for the re-inaugurated AA Unbuilt award, A Clinic for the Exhausted drew out 
what was called a ‘discontinuous genealogy’ that traversed the architectural conditions of Building Eight 
through  John Andrews’ Student Union and Bates Smart McCuthen’s Casey Wing but exaggerated a sense 
of the unfi nished, the fragmented and the unbuilt through an identifi cation of Building Eight with the 
mythical Ship of Theseus, whose timbers were progressively replaced as they rotted away. The ship presents 
a paradox, that is the question of identifi cation and meaning with which Building Eight concerns itself. 
The term ‘discontinuous genealogy’ is a reference to the same procedure, the ‘dis|continuous genealogy’, 
1   Jury citation in, “2007 AA Unbuilt Prize for Unbuilt Work”, Architecture Australia, Vol. 97, No. 1 (Jan/Feb, 2008), 86.
2   Philip Goad, “Unbuilt Australia: Venetian ‘City of Hope’,” Architecture Australia, Vol. 96, No. 6,(November/December, 2007), 27. See also, Nicholas Baume, “Guests in 
Venice: Australia’s Biennale Pavillion,” Transition, No. 29 (Winter, 1989), 65-67.
PROLOGUE Fig 5A Clinic for the Exhausted, 
AA Unbuilt Entry »
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. . . . I  h a v e  t h r o w n  a  t w i g
i n t o  t h e  o c e a n  f o r  t h e
d r o w n i n g  s a i l o r
W i t h  L o v e ,
T h e  A u t h o r
r h i n o c e r o s  e n c l o s u r et h e a t r e
A n  o b s e r v a t i o n  d e c k  a n d  r o o m s  f o r  c a r t o g r a p h e r s  a r e  p r o v i d e d  t o  m a p
C o r r i g a n ’ s  d i r e c t i o n s .  B u t  t h e  m e c h a n i s m s  o f  C o r r i g a n  w o r k  h e r e  t o ,
a n d  t h e r e  i s  o n l y  w a l l s  e n o u g h  f o r  o n e  r o o m  a t  a  t i m e ,  b e c a u s e  a s
K a f k a  r e m a r k e d  t h a t ’ s  a l l  w e  e v e r  r e a l l y  n e e d .
F r o m  a  t o w e r  I c a r u s  f o u n d  e n t r y  i n t o  t h e  v o i d ,  t h e  m o m e n t  c a p t u r e d  a s
a  l e g  p r o t r u d i n g  f r o m  t h e  s u r f a c e  o f  t h e  w a t e r .  T h i s  t o w e r  i s  m o r e
l a s c i v i o u s  i n  i t s  g a z e  t h a n  t h e  o t h e r ,  t h o u g h  p r e c e d e n t  h a s  b e e n  s e t  i n
t h e  g y n e c o l o g i c a l  a r c h i t e c t u r e  o f  L e q u e u ,  a n d  i n  t h e  g a z e  f r o m  t h e
c r o s s e d  h a i r s  o f  a  d r a u g h t s m a n  ( n o t  t o  m e n t i o n  t h e  c o n t r a c t ) .  A l l  t h a t
i s  l e f t  t o  d o  i s  j u m p  u p  a n d  d o w n  t o  m a k e  t h e  l e g s  f l a p .
We  d e s c e n d  t o  t h e  r e m a i n s  o f  t h e  g r e a t  d e l u g e .  N o a h ’ s  a r k  h a s  l o n g
s i n c e  b e e n  l e f t  t o  r o t ,  t h o u g h  G e h r y ’ s  b u i l d i n g  w o u l d  s u r e l y  b e
a d v a n t a g e o u s  i f  t h e  n e e d  e v e r  a r o s e .   G e h r y ’ s  d o n k e y ,  b e i n g  t h e  g o l d e n
a s s  t h a t  i t  i s  f l o a t e d  a w a y  a n d  w e  h a v e  b e e n  l e f t  w i t h  o n l y  a  R h i n o c e r o s
-  F e l l i n i ’ s  l o v e s i c k  o n e  a t  t h a t .   B e n e a t h  h i s  i c e b e r g  r o o f ,  t h e  R h i n o
e n d u r e s  h i s  w a i t ,  f o r  w h i l e  a n  i c e b e r g  n e v e r  r e v e a l s  i t s  d e p t h s  o n  t h e
s u r f a c e ,  t h e  R h i n o  i s  c a p t u r e d  i n  a  s u r f a c e  o f  d e p t h ,  t h e  r e f l e c t i o n  o f  a n
i c e b e r g .
W h a t  t h i s  p r o j e c t  f o l l o w s  i s  m e r e l y  a  s e n s e  o f  l o g i c ,   t h a t  t h e  l o g i c  o f
n o n s e n s e  t a k e s  c a r e  o f  t h e  m i d d l e  a n d  h o p e s  t h a t  t h e  r e s t  w i l l  t a k e  c a r e
o f  i t s e l f .
T h e  s t a g e  i s  a  s e t  f o r  a n  a c t  a p a r t ,  t h e  r e c o n s t r u c t i n g  o f  B u i l d i n g  E i g h t  b y
E d m o n d  a n d  C o r r i g a n  a s  a  b o a t  d i s e n c h a n t e d  w i t h  i t s  o c e a n  h o m e ,  a  g e n e a l o g y
t h a t  r e v e a l s  a  s h i p  a s  t h e  g r e a t e s t  r e s e r v e  o f  i m a g i n a t i o n .
A m o n g s t  b r o k e n  c h a n d e l i e r s ,  o u r  p a t h  r e a c h e s  a  l i f e  b o a t .  T h i s  b o a t  a l l u d e s  t o
t h e  a b i l i t y  o f  S t a r l i n g ’ s  s h e d  t o  b e c o m e  a  b o a t  a n d  b a c k  a g a i n ,  o r  t o  h a v e
a l w a y s  b e e n  a  b o a t .  T h i s  o n e  r a i s e s  b o d i e s  f r o m  t h e  w a t e r s  o f  G r e e n a w a y ’ s
S e i n e ,  o n l y  t o  e m e r g e  f r o m  t h e  o c e a n .   A  b o a t - b a r r o w - b o a t .
A t o p ,  a  r e a d i n g  r o o m  a n d  w r i t i n g  r o o m  e x p r e s s  P e t e r  C o r r i g a n ’ s  l o v e  o f  J e a n
G e n e t .  T h e  c e n t r a l  m a s t  h o l d s  t h e  r e m a i n s  o f  h i s  l e t t e r s .  T a u t ’ s  g l a s s  p a v i l i o n ,
t h e  E d d y s t o n e  l i g h t  h o u s e  a n d  L e d e o u x ’ s  w a n d e r i n g  e y e  c o l l i d e  i n  a n  a c t  t h a t
r e v e a l s  A a l t o ’ s  s a n a t o r i u m  a s  t h e  o n l y  a n s w e r  t o  m a d n e s s .
G r e t a  G a r b o  w a s  t o l d  t o  t h i n k  a b o u t  n o t h i n g ,  a s  s h e  s t o o d  i n  t h e  g u i s e  o f
Q u e e n  C h r i s t i n a ,  t h e  c a m e r a  d r a w n  t o  h e r  f a c e .  L i k e  t h e  f i r s t  n o t e s  o f
F e l l l i n i ’ s   o p e r a  s i n g e r ,  t o  t h e  h e a d   o f  t h e  m a n - b r i d e  b e n e a t h  S a t y r i c o n ’ s
w a t e r ,  C o r r i g a n  i s  w e d  t o  t h i s  b o a t  a s  a  m a l e  t r a n s v e s t i t e ,  d r e s s e d  i n  t h e
c o s t u m e  o f  t h e a t r e .
T h e  a c t ?  P e t e r  C o r r i g a n  i n  a n  o v e r s i z e d  b a t h ,  a d m i r a l s  h a t  o n  a n d  p l a y i n g ,
l i k e  S h a k e s p e a r e ’ s  P r o s p e r o ,  w i t h  a  t o y  b o a t .  B e n e a t h ,  F e l l i n i ’ s  s l a v e s  p u s h ,
p u l l  a n d  t w i s t  t h e  c o g s  a n d  w h e e l s ,  f o r c i n g  t h e  b a t h t u b  t o  r o l l ,  p i t c h  a n d
s w i v e l .  C o r r i g a n  c a n  p o i n t  h i s  b a t h  a n y w h e r e  h e  w a n t s  o n  t h e  i m a g i n a r y
h o r i z o n  l i n e  i n  t h e  k n o w l e d g e  t h a t  h i s  e v e r y  m o v e m e n t  d r i v e s  t h e  p r o p e l l e r  o f
t h e  c i t y  b e n e a t h  h i m .
B K 1 | 7
by which the architect and academic Douglas Darden would conceive of his own theoretical architectural 
projects.3 Darden would superimpose a series of images, imbued with their own radical identities and 
fi gures, to create a dense montage which he termed the ‘composite ideogram’. In the ‘composite ideogram’ 
some areas of the original images would remain discernible, while other areas would become a dense black. 
Darden’s resulting architecture could not in any one way be grasped from the constellation of fi gures in 
the composed image, nor was it systematically built up from each of the fi gures contained within each 
of the images used. It was as if each of the images shared a voice, and as though the ‘composite ideogram’ 
was a snapshot of the detritus at the foundations of the fallen Babel. The procedure of the ‘dis/continuous 
genealogy’ permitted Darden to build a labyrinth up around himself, the ‘composite image’ only a 
precariously maintained tower from which he may take a measure of no one position across an unclear path.
This may, to an audience of this text, suggest that it remains unclear what path the lineage of A Clinic 
for the Exhausted takes. Certainly, the self-portrait of the eighteenth-century French draughtsman  Jean-
Jacques Lequeu in the guise of a hysterical bare breasted women labelled as ‘Peter Corrigan’, perhaps in 
reference to Corrigan’s thefts of Lequeu’s studies for Peter King’s Mahoney Masques,4 confi rms a less than 
direct sense of logic in the project. It has been contended that Lequeu’s appearance in history is nothing 
more than the sly reckonings of the surrealist Marcel Duchamp, who slipped into the Bibliothèque 
Nationale de France all that we know of him; an eighteenth-century architect conceived by the zeitgeist 
of the early twentieth century.5 (Perhaps not, some would say, though as many as who would deny 
this argument would hope it true, not least because of Duchamp’s own penchant for female attire). 
The same impetus to invent Peter Corrigan as a lady, (if we could imagine a bare breasted Corrigan a 
‘lady’ not least as the same image of an ‘architect’), is what is conceived by the text beneath the portrait 
3   Refer to, Douglas Darden, Condemned Buildings, (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1993). Darden died from Leukemia in 1990 aged 42. He 
previously taught at Columbia University and the University of Colorado Denver.
4   Jean Jacque Lequeu’s work is illustrated in Corrigan’s initial collages for the Mahoney Masques by Peter King. Refer to, Frank Lowe, “Frank Lowe interviews 
Peter Corrigan” in, Schaik & Bertram, Building Eight: Edmond and Corrigan at RMIT, Vol. 3, 114-118.
5   Refer to, Philippe Duboy, Lequeu, An Architectural Enigma, (Cambridge, Mass. The MIT Press, 1986)
Fig 6
Douglas Darden, 
Dis/continuous Geneaology of the project Melvilla
Fig 7
Douglas Darden, 
Frontispiece, self-portrait
Image removed due to copyright
  
Douglas Darden, detail of ‘Melvilla’. Reproduced from  Douglas Darden, Condemned 
Buildings, (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1993), 78-79.
Image removed due to copyright
Douglas Darden Self-portrait. 
Reproduced from Douglas Darden, 
Condemned Buildings, (New York: 
Princeton Architectural Press, 1993), 
frontispiece.
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as that which has already been written, irrelevant of this author.  It is also perhaps no coincidence that 
Darden uses a similar though no less aff ronting image of Lequeu’s bare breasted nun to conceive of his 
own self-portrait.6 The beautifully conceived frontispiece to his monograph portrays a moustached and 
bespecked Darden framed by an architecturally conceived capital ‘D’ (also drawn from a Lequeu image, 
this one originally the frame of an opening from which a female nude almost tumbles from in her 
pursuit of a small bird) dressed in a nun’s habit exposing two perfectly round breasts, the nipples peaking 
just over the top of his blouse.  Across Darden’s Duchampian procedures,  Duchamp’s Lequeu, Lequeu’s 
nun now labelled Peter Corrigan, we traverse a complicated citing that envisages Peter Corrigan as the 
potential rather than any deducible Peter Corrigan; but which in all cases, is an architect, as evidenced 
by a swag of fabric that decisively informs us in Darden’s case that this is indeed ‘Douglas Darden, 
Architect’. It is this resistance to a nominalisation, wherever nominal, that exaggerates the paradox of 
the Ship of Theseus so that it can not be excluded from Building Eights architectural imaginary. It is the 
paradox of the ship in which resides this PhD undertaking, as both the site of a vivid naming and as a 
revolutionary turning through of a voice.
A Clinic for the Exhausted presents Theseus’ ship morphed into a collage that depicts Building Eight as 
the stern of an ocean liner, “in readiness to depart its concrete foundations and sail the urban oceans of 
the world.”7 This ‘composite image’ appears at fi rst simply too obvious to amend itself to Darden’s own 
thinking.  But what this building-boat composite realises is the vision of an infi nitely rapid movement 
through the innumerable images that compose A Clinic for the Exhausted, rather than the circumscribed 
number off ered by Darden’s own accounts. In comparison to Darden, A Clinic for the Exhausted makes 
further demands on its audience,  because every digression from one image to the next, marked by the 
exertion necessary to discern each and every image across the grotesque excess of images, sustains the 
genesis of this one image.  That is, rather than being hampered by the excessive density of images, the 
building-boat makes evident at the outset the encirclement of references from which it diff ers, as though 
its realisation can only be sought from the tossing sea of images from which it distinguishes itself.
The accompanying AA Unbuilt project text points to “the ship as the greatest reserve of imagination,”8 
reiterating the French philosopher Michel Foucault’s assertion that the boat is a “heterotopia par excellence.”9 
The ship and by extension Building Eight is presumably considered as neither a utopia nor a dystopia, but an 
other place, or ‘heterotopia’, located just beyond our habitual architectural preconceptions. From the outset, 
A Clinic for the Exhausted, perhaps unknowingly, exaggerates a claim on the spectacle of an ocean liner made 
in a letter published in Schaik and Bertram’s monograph on Building Eight. The letter, dated 22 December 
1993, is addressed to Peter Corrigan from Howard Raggatt, who as director of ARM was commencing the 
redesign of Storey Hall adjacent to Building Eight. It outlines Raggatt’s hopes for the proposed renovation 
of Storey Hall against the backdrop of the adjacent Building Eight. Raggatt, who admits in the letter to the 
possible infl uence of alcohol, tenders, on taking note of Building Eight’s illuminated interior, the image of 
Building Eight as it “began to lift off  as though released from its anchors, or set free from its foundations, 
now departing like a P&O liner.”10 
6  An examination of this frontispiece is presented in: Michael Chapman and Michael J. Ostwald, “The Underbelly of an Architect: Discursive Practices in the Architec-
ture of Douglas Darden,” Limits: The 21st annual conference of the society of Architectural Historians, Australia and New Zealand, Melbourne 2004, 93-98.
7   As quoted in “2007 AA Unbuilt Prize for Unbuilt Work,” Architecture Australia, Vol. 97, No. 1, (Jan/Feb, 2008), 87.
8   As quoted in “2007 AA Unbuilt Prize for Unbuilt Work,” Architecture Australia, Vol. 97, No. 1, (Jan/Feb, 2008), 87.
9   Michel Foucault, “Of Other Spaces,” trans. J. Miskowiec, Diacritics, 16:1 Spring (1986), 27.
10   Schaik & Bertram, Building Eight: Edmond and Corrigan at RMIT,  Vol. 2, 10-11.
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Fig 9
Howard Raggatt to Peter Corrigan, 
22 December 1993
                                         22 12 93
Dear Peter
 On walking past your 
building the other night - it 
must have been after the Butlers 
Lunch - I propped against the 
Oxford wall and realised that
you have indeed make a building 
after the heart of Nathaniel 
(I think it was)  of whom our 
Lord referred as a man without 
guile.  Your building seems to 
stand without guile.
I began to see it as a segment 
of a new City wall, a pretty 
wall, the wall of a new Jerusalem, 
sparkling, inexplicable and yet
 gritty; hopeful as though hope 
could still be so easily achieved.
And indeed a joyful wall no 
longer seemingly concerned with mere 
seriousness; a wall that cries out 
yes yes, like Molly instead of No, 
or Not. In that light I found
ye
s J
oh
n 
1:
20
it moving that here was
a little bit of that great city
 we shall someday see. Your 
building is a lovely vision of that 
blessed city 
Hopefully our little building down the
street can be a gate for that 
same wonderful city. But I 
suspect if theres going to be 
a dozen gates to this city, 
our little gate will not
be for the pure and simpleminded, 
but more likely for the dreadfully 
earnest, for the doubtful 
or for those ashamed of their 
silent joy. And its certainly 
a gate thats lost its single pearl 
or will it be reinstated on 
that day.
Anyhow as I watched your building, 
your wall, lit up inside with
lots of lights, it began to 
lift off  as though released 
from its anchors, or set free
from its foundations, now departing
but these are not hopes 
to interest many{              }
like a P&O liner,
streamers
bells and whistles,
never to return but waiving
to everyone and calling
yes yes yes
but
Perhaps I was merely drunk,
or still dreaming under a 
Nathaniel like fi g tree.
Anyhow it was nice to walk 
past pretending to discuss these
matters with a close companion
imagining them dressed in white
and longing for that new City
for the guileless, and buildings
no longer saddened by the 
necessity of secret joy.
I’m looking forward to the party 
when we’re in. 
Best Regards for Christmas
Howard R. 
How I can see 
it as a
city of Hope.
Fig 8
transcription of letter from Howard Raggatt to Peter Corrigan
Image removed due to copyright
 
Letter from Howard Raggatt to Peter Corrigan, 22 December 1993. Reproduced from Building Eight: Edmond and Corrigan at RMIT, eds. Leon 
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Thus, what was initially an unattributable sleight of hand in 
A Clinic for the Exhausted is ordained by Raggatt’s conspiratorial 
wink. It establishes his letter as a sort of instruction and his vision as evidence of an intoxicating malady. 
Both construe a space wherein Building Eight and Raggatt can not help but indulge each other a little 
further. That is, A Clinic for the Exhausted is not without reserve to any and all of the circumstantial evidence 
that might be traced across the dispersion of its images, but neither does it surrender its logic to Raggatt’s 
letter or any other. At the same time, Raggatt’s vision becomes but another subtle deceit sustaining the 
gestures of A Clinic for the Exhausted that place Building Eight and ocean liner on the same page.  In some 
sense, the impeding ocean is both the cause and result of the transfi guration of Raggatt’s conceptual 
Oedema; it is his liquid intake that exceeds him: it is his intoxication that keeps the narrative afl oat and 
what spills out into the street, picking up Building Eight in his ensuing depiction of an ocean liner launch.
What will become apparent in the reading of the textual component of this PhD, and in a review 
of the architectural drawings that are presented as the outcome of another kind of research, will be 
the references and allusions, interwoven with false paths, to a myriad of artifacts and images drawn 
from this project’s association with architectural, literary, cinematic and philosophic heritages.   At best, 
what is evidenced by the preamble and prologue and by the text and drawings of the AA Unbuilt 
entry, hints at what is yet to be interpreted – the scrap of a hull, a well-known architectural landmark 
– the composite image that is imagined describes them as vividly as possible. But, from the outset 
any examination would fail to unravel the narrative and off er one or other as unassailable proof of a 
measured outcome. What is off ered, by way of the textual and drawn description here in this project, are 
multiple bifurcating or forking paths along which any ensuing conjecture can be orientated, sustaining 
the irresolvable polyvalent accents of an appropriated boat and an appropriated building without any 
approach approaching an end. 
Raggatt’s letter masks the considerable instability of his vision, and his gestures.  Our task presently is 
to survey the conjunctions of his letter with the text in this thesis without either becoming conditioned 
and thus would expose both projects as an ally of the other. To do so without conceiving of this text 
as a copy of that letter or as what renders the letter understandable, the audience of this text must 
understand what Paul Zumthor has posited as the provisional territory of a text’s mouvance. Zumthor 
situates his term within the scholarship of troubadour poetry, emphasising that mouvance displaces the 
intentions of any scholarship that would subordinate a particular mode of individual lyrical identity to 
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the production of a text produced after the event of the troubadour’s voice that it resembles. The lyrics of 
troubadour song come down to us across multifarious translations by diff erent scribes who collated their 
own transcriptions of lyrical works in song-books. It is the scribe who, through their own historicising 
interpretations, prospect the lyrics of the troubadour in such a way that it establishes each version of the 
transcribed song, every resulting composition, as their own, but which through the impetus of scholarly 
examination collects and collates into groups based on each composition’s digressions from or towards 
a constellation of possible variants that might compose a named troubadour’s voice. By some degree of 
coherence, any one collection is therefore able to be attributed and said to be the work of a single scribe 
and a single troubadour.  Mouvance exemplifi es the drifting of the troubadour’s voice as it is poised on the 
threshold of any number of translations, at once scholarly but also, that conjoin with the possibilities of 
being over come by a Medieval voice that eludes closure. At the tip of the scribe’s pen:
[...] an element of spontaneity is generated and projected in the text through what we 
wrongly take to be rigidly fi xed forms, providing an exuberance with which both reciter and 
listener are associated. This particular characteristic predominates over all that has been referred 
to, not with anachronism, as the symbolism and moralism of medieval works; it excludes from 
the text any suggestion based on the specifi c duration of an existence. The text is a consumer 
article, which, as a result, is intended to fl ood the world on which it imposes its own order.1
The sense of mouvance in Raggatt’s correspondence is obvious. His letter is not a mirror to which A Clinic for 
the Exhausted can be held up to, and from which can be drawn a referential correlation between boat and building 
that is materialised in his vision. The letter as it is, allows the audience the satisfaction of knowing how Raggatt 
permitted himself to be deceived.  To any closed narration corresponds, and what will henceforth encumber this 
text, the incongruity of a litany of like structures, the modulations of his textual mouvance moving through the 
work in such a way that the malevolence of the innumerable shifts and the density of associations, dissolves into 
Raggatt’s watery advance. That is, through a continual appropriation and repeated re-assemblage of Raggatt’s 
text this PhD is want to burst the very margins that confi ne his confession to a letter.
To expand our claim that Raggatt’s letter off ers itself as a page from a song book we must further 
examine the portrait that Raggatt off ers against the traits of the troubadour. The troubadour was a lyricist, 
active from the twelfth to mid-fi fteenth century, who composed courtly love poetry on the back of 
another text, from the texts of autors, or authorities such as well known ancient texts. The troubadour’s 
song adhered not literally to these text but  procured the authorial text on the basis that the troubadour’s 
themselves were not the author of their song, and that their voice was hence appropriated from somewhere 
else, sung on behalf of some other cultivated paternity solicited from the unobservable and atemporal 
something that confi rm the depth of tradition that harangued their language. As Zumthor contends,  “the 
“work” fl oats, off ering not a fi xed shape of fi rm boundaries but a constantly shifting nimbus.”2 
The ethos of mouvance recognises, by way of soliciting the troubadours own endlessly deferred lyrical gait, 
how any one song comes to be linked to a provisional authority whilst also considering the litany of cumulative 
digressions by which any variant of song makes as its tradition:
The work spreads both temporally and spatially beyond the time needed to absorb it aurally. 
This comes about not merely by virtue of the text’s physical movements as it circulates in 
1   Paul Zumthor, Towards a Medieval Poetics, trans. Philip Bennett, (Minneapolis & Oxford, London: University of Minnesota Press, 1992), 45.
2   Zumthor, Towards a Medieval Poetics, 46. See also, Simon Gaunt, “Orality and writing: the text of the troubadour poem” in, The Troubadours: An Introduction, 
eds. Simon Gaunt & Sarah Kay, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999)
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manuscript or in the mouths of reciters and is handed down to posterity, but also as a result 
of an essential instability in medieval texts themselves. The mobility this implies is of a more 
fundamental order than that due to mere circulation.3 
Troubadours sing of and in the voice of a man who believes himself to be the one true lover of a 
lady that cannot be named, except through various pseudonyms. The troubadour’s goal is to be the best 
singer amongst the many who also claim the same, that they are the lady’s one true love, contending, 
as does all the others, that each rival singer are all lauzengers, or fl atterers, false lovers intent on making 
good with the lady, without any intention of truly loving her. Laura Kendrick informs us that the 
troubadour tradition of competitive imitation as a way of distinguishing their voice amongst the many 
others emerged in some circles as a game whereby a messenger who read, mimed or sang the verse, 
brought about a series of incessant interpretations as to the meaning of the song:
Sometimes this wrapping up comprised a whole series of interpretations, each more ingenious 
than the last, as each interpreter competed in demonstrating his prowess at entendre and dire, 
at understanding and explaining the verse. The game of interpretation did not always proceed 
soberly and reasonably. By using and abusing the techniques for interpreting Latin poetry and 
Scripture taught in religious schools – exegetical techniques of etymologising and fi gurative 
interpretation as well as grammatical analysis of the inscribed letters – the facetious troubadours 
dissected their won vernacular texts in order to discover (trobar) as many meanings as possible in 
the verbal matter, by various combinations of its letters and sounds into words and phrases and by 
various constructions of the literal and fi gurative meanings of these. During the course of these 
interpretive games, the troubadours fabricated a literary language; they treated words as matter 
and used artisinal metaphors – planning, polishing, soldering, refi ning, weaving and interlacing, 
colouring – to describe their labor on the forms, sounds, and sense of the vernacular.4
The open and variegated tongue which troubadours used meant that one interpretation always 
beget another diff erent interpretation  and that the richness of the possibilities assured that the one rule 
of the game was that no one game could come to completion. Ambiguous liaisons, such as  Building 
Eight and ocean liner constituted by Raggatt’s letter, proliferated everywhere in troubadour verse, 
and constitute here, in this project, not so much the carnivalesque body of the Medieval period but a 
corriganseque body; Raggatt’s letter is accompanied by the lewd gestures of the nun, briefl y exalting not 
an abstinence, an architectural Asceticism, but the opposite, a claim to the over indulgent, terrifi cally 
lusty, and perhaps profoundly accommodating of any and all egregious excesses which may befall 
the architect Peter Corrigan. A Clinic for the Exhausted draws comparisons with the reported founding 
of “a mock monastery of prostitutes, complete with abbes and liturgical song”  by the troubadour 
Guillaume IX at Niort, in Western France, “a real place that also means “no where” according to a 
playful etymology (ni-ort).”5 
The thesis and the projects which compose the extents of A Clinic for the Exhausted are a seemingly 
haphazard archive of architectural, fi lmic, fi ne art and literary references that manage a perpetual 
displacement from one point of reference to the next, rapid digressions side stepping a seemingly linear 
path of description. It is a narrative that will mobilise blocks of bewildering connections entailing a 
3   Zumthor, Towards a Medieval Poetics, 45-46.
4   Laura Kendrick, The Game of Love: Troubadour Wordplay, (Berkley, Los Angeles & London: University of California Press, 1988), 17.
5   Kendrick, The Game of Love: Troubadour Wordplay, 15-16.
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number of returns, backtracks and  double-backs, forever taking leave of  a place in-place of another. 
Marked by a method of appropriation that proliferates throughout, Foucault’s ship is thrown to the 
very precipices of the space that it encloses. A Clinic for the Exhausted is an architecture of spontaneous 
improvisation; its circumference is what passes through everything, and what casts a ship forward in 
its wake, approximating both building and boat in the penumbral light – the illuminated windows of 
the awakening ship and the cover of darkness that tends to Raggatt’s vision –  of a no-where that is 
particular to no-one.
Covertly, under the guise of another’s authority, this project ventures forward, the illicit implication 
of Corrigan’s passing silhouette capturing the attention of all who wish to delineate themselves. The 
function of the introduction shifts as a consequence, from detailing the many ways one could approach 
the work of this PhD, through appropriation or any other form of description, to narrating the 
conditions by which Raggatt’s associative powers gives way to the free play of the contraband bestowed 
in a letter back to Corrigan, the key testimonial as to the incarnational powers of Raggatt’s convergence 
with the swell. Raggatt warns you from the outset that it is his inebriation that spills everywhere.  But, 
let me preempt those who would understand Raggatt’s moment of enthusiastic complicity with a 
liquid excess, or the humour that derives from it, as the result, quite literally of one too many drinks. 
No amount of liquor, however strong, would be, purely on its own, enough to push Building Eight 
from its foundations. It is as if he has excessively borrowed, too frequently appropriated, his incipit to 
the prologue, an honest invitation to an exigent audience to join him, to partake of the same excess, 
to reappropriate his aesthetic, his voice, his uneven gait, his gestures, with the same, if not similar 
confl icting sense accorded to a man impartial to the conviviality of an alcoholic beverage.6 
It will be apparent to an audience that, thus far, A Clinic for the Exhausted does fi nd its port of 
departure in Building Eight by Edmond and Corrigan and its transgressive resemblance to an anonymous 
ocean liner. Nevertheless, this PhD project is not only about Building Eight, though Building Eight 
does remain readily available by its mis-en-scene with Australian and particularly Melbourne centered 
architectural discourse. The argument of the thesis does not concern itself with attesting to the built 
legacy of motifs that may account for Building Eight’s resemblance to an ocean liner.  
 A Clinic for the Exhausted  draws on the protean transfi guration of the detritus on the horizon, the 
remains of all that is left from the sudden collision of Building Eight and ocean liner, for the furtherance 
of Raggatt’s canticle. The content of Raggatt’s letter are to be read aloud, a voice that bears you aloft 
only to throw you back into the tumult of that night.  Furthermore, it is this detritus that underscores 
the development of the four projects, each identifi ed as a component of a ‘clinic’ - a term that will be 
returned to at a latter stage –  that compose this PhD by project. Three architectural investigations 
compose the project as a whole, under the title of A Clinic for the Exhausted:  The Unbuilt Project that 
serves, by some measure, as a precursor to this PhD,  and the architectural explorations completed 
6   As  Deborah N. Losse points out, Medieval writers found ways of outlining to the reader their relationship to authorial fi gures, and to their appropriation in the 
text. In the prologue to Gargantua & Patagruel, Rabelais makes clear that he addresses and dedicates his writing to his friends, “Most noble boozers” parodying the 
traditional dedication to the lords of the land. Further into Gargantua & Patagruel,  there is the suggestion that: “Every honest boozer, every decent gouty gentlemen, 
everyone who is dry, may come to this barrel of mine, but need drink only if he wishes. If they wish, and the wine is to the taste of their worshipful worships, let 
them drink frankly, freely, boldly, and with stint or payment.” The author Guillaume Bouchet, in the prologue to his compilation of dinner conversations believed that 
there was enough in the title of the publication, Les Serées, “to suggest why this book smells more of wine than of oil.” For an examination of the shift in authorship 
from Medieval to Renaissance texts see, Deborah N. Loose, Sampling the Book: Renaissance Prologues and the French Conteurs, (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 
London & Toronto: Associated University Presses, 1994), 22, 65, 70.
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during the tenure of the PhD: The Swimming Pool Library and The Landscape Room; along with this thesis, 
textual in form, and the fi nal public exhibition and presentation, that will place them all into adjacency. 
As a consequence of the suspicion that The Swimming Pool Library and The Landscape Room will be met 
with from the audience, due in part to a perceived impenetrability, this thesis is off ered as a lifeboat. 
As you, the audience,  will come to understand, A Clinic for the Exhausted asks the audience how 
much they are willing to risk so that boat and building may share a life. 
The philosopher Gilles Deleuze commenting on the originality of Nietzsche, explains how the 
moment of sharing, in this case between patient and psychiatrist, though it is no diff erent than anyone 
who confesses all to the page,  must distinguish itself from the simple and prosaic contract between two 
people. Deleuze states:  
There comes a point where it is no longer about translating, or interpreting … There 
comes a point where you will have to share, have to put yourself in the patient’s shoes, go all 
the way, and share his experience. Is it about a kind of sympathy, or empathy, or identifi cation? 
But surely it’s more complicated than that. What we feel is rather the necessity of a relation 
that would be neither legal, nor contractual, nor institutional… Perhaps, the only conceivable 
equivalent is something like “being in the same boat”… We’re in the same boat: a sort of 
lifeboat, bombs falling on every side, the lifeboat drifts toward subterranean rivers of ice or 
towards rivers of fi re, the Oronoco, the Amazon, everyone is pulling an oar, and we’re not 
even supposed to like one another, we fi ght, we eat each other. Everyone pulling an oar is 
sharing, sharing something beyond any law, any contract, any institution. Drifting, a drifting 
movement...7 
The thesis suggests that it is not a question of stopping said violence, fl eeing some incomprehensible 
danger, or  of starting again, taking leave of what has already been promised by the very undertaking 
of a PhD. Rather, this thesis contemplates how to take up a univocal call for A Clinic for the Exhausted’s 
escape into the world without divulging what occurs off -screen, terminating the very mechanism of its 
approach, and breaking the almost essential trust that is necessary for  author and an audience to share.
The Prologue set off  with the intention of off ering a way of suspending the familiar landscape of 
refl ection that would arise as a result of the appearance of Building Eight in A Clinic for the Exhausted, 
by permitting a path through the detritus of its own historically determined limits, before opening 
into the clear ocean expanse envisaged by this introduction. This introduction clarifi es the intentions 
of the PhD and presents the audience with an outline of the proceeding chapters that continue across 
the unfettered contours of Raggatt’s inebriation, tangling up everything and everyone in the same 
improvisation. It gathers his letter as a conceptual force indistinguishable from the generosity of its 
audience and the curiously wide arcs of the author. It does so by extending an invitation to the audience 
outlining how they should realise a share in the thesis.
The fi rst chapter, An Epidemiology of Illness, serves to make the audience aware of the fast 
approaching task of an author apprehending an unthinkable audience which has informed this author’s 
writing practice. It does so by playing back and forth between Plato’s conception of the pharmakon as 
7   Gilles Deleuze, “Nomadic Thought” in, Desert Islands and Other Texts: 1953-74, ed. D. Lapoujade, trans. M. Taormina ( Los Angeles, CA: Semiotext(e), 2004), 255.
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explored by Jacques Derrida, in his essay, Plato’s Pharmakon and the hypochondriac character of  Argan, 
who features in Molière’s play La Malade imaginaire.  The pharmakon contemplates the conceptual hinge, 
an epidemiology of illness, by which Argan’s and Socrates’ illness throws open the possibility for further 
improvisations across the text. An Epidemiology of Illness is compelled to turn the audience, and in 
turn the author, out onto the street as giddy conspirators in an unfathomable act.
Roussel’s Epigenetic Landscape suggests how other practitioners and how other approaches 
and methodologies – particularly those of the French playwright, author, poet and one time actor, 
Raymond Roussel – situate this thesis’ proposition that a life is implicated in any practice, architectural 
or otherwise. This second chapter puts to the audience that the practice of a life threads through this 
exegesis. Furthermore, it deploys Roussel’s procedures to cumulative eff ect,  producing more and more 
parallel images, such that an infi nite number of conceptual lens are made available where by an audience 
may observe the uninterrupted movement that keeps life afl oat. In doing so, it makes a claim to the 
generosity of the audience, suggesting that the audience’s task lies in extending the life, the practice and 
the procedures it harbours, even when the ability to keep one’s head above the water remains uncertain.
For What it’s Worth, the third and fi nal chapter of Book 1, off ers the audience the means by 
which they could verify what is conveyed in the undertaking of this exegesis by both author and 
audience, through an allusion to another’s worth. The text argues that a value that might promise 
a resolute explication of a consistent ambivalence to each and every audience remains always out of 
reach, by the very fact that the emergence of a life astonishes all parties involved, and furthermore, 
always surprises itself. It contributes to the thesis’ ongoing argument, by theorising a conceptual 
equivalence that does not locate a life in either coherent  or incoherent manifestations that would in 
turn allow a demand on its worth to be made and therefore include or exclude it from any such claim 
to a life. This chapter argues that there is no prototype of knowledge production, hence it is framed 
by the philosopher Gilles Deleuze’s conception of a life born on its back – not a life unable to valorise 
its existence, a life born on the back foot –  but admitting to being unwilling to answer either way. 
Most notably, this chapter fi nds a correlation between the concept of kairos, or the will-to-invent, and 
the teaching methodologies framed by the early nineteenth century fi gure of Joseph Jacotot, who, via 
the philosopher Jacques Rancière’s book length examination of his life, solicits the audience’s and his 
own desire to interpret, without recourse to a concentration of knowledge. This chapter puts forward 
that ‘knowing’ is always a futile attempt to exploit the accents of appropriation and that the lacuna of 
‘not-knowing’ remains an irreducible amplifi cation of Corrigan’s ‘diffi  cult coded knowledge’ that lets 
everything and everyone go out to sea.
A Clinic is an intermediary passage between Book 1 and Book 2, marked out in this publication 
by a sudden appearance of an elephant. It presents the two projects completed during the tenure of the 
PhD, The Swimming Pool Library and The Landscape Room through a series of loose documents comprised 
of plans, sections and images. It should be stated up front, that the purpose of this exegesis is not to 
superfi cially register every digression, or unravel each loosely connected analogy, or for that matter to 
frame each project by the number of references. The purpose of this PhD has always been to conceive 
of a space in which every digression may tumble over each other, distributing the audience in turn 
and allowing them to share in some of Raggatt’s characteristics by confusing the biographical with the 
circumstances of A Clinic for the Exhausted’s composition. 
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The audience is encouraged to explore the two projects as they undertake the reading of Book 2, 
composing The Pathology of Excess and An Emerald Sepulchre.
The Pathology of Excess returns to the question of the opening line of this project, A Clinic for 
the Exhausted, in particular to the terms ‘Clinic’ and ‘Exhausted’ that act as a cornerstone for the PhD. 
It accomplishes the task of exploring how the two terms have come to name the venture thus far, and 
how, as they are deployed through out the text, they can account for the vertiginous impulses of the 
PhD composition as a nebulous whole.
An Emerald Sepulchre is a conclusion of sorts, for it does not resist the urge to maker further 
demands on the audience. It sets about reiterating the journey made by the audience up to this point, but 
it does so through the constellation of the discursive practice accomplished by A Clinic for the Exhausted. 
This conclusion assails the mise-en-abyme of the horizon, throwing the audience into a sea of songlike 
sickness.  It is this chapter where the return voice becomes unmistakably that of a swimmer.
But, my dear audience, before you embark let alone drown, this might be an 
opportune moment to off er a more formal invitation in the guise of a letter....
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I nv i t a t i o n
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You, the audience, will be forgiven if you were to only seek out every manner of possible 
relationship between this boat and that building. An audience that conceives of such a mirror, 
comes to fi nd itself as all that separates one from the other, because, it is only you who are able 
to distinguish what  respective position  boat or building take on either side of the refl ective 
surface. The presence of boat or building is not one of the mobility of an exchange, of each 
having made the acquaintance of the other. In the knowledge that they risk anonymity, both 
remain partially out of focus, to the centre of the periphery where no virtue of resemblances 
could pin-point the face of the other. However, the line of social capital shared between ship 
and building does mean that each could in turn perceive a purpose for the other. This is not 
a matter of composing a list that documents the evidence at hand, that Building Eight or 
ocean liner are merely idol-chatter, or worse are not incorporated into the concerns of this 
thesis. Building Eight and ocean liner do remain, at once between the lines, and, as a trace, an 
impression on the page, ( not as text, but one may imagine as though a green carnation, picked 
by a long lost lover, is found to have once been pressed in a favourite tome) since without 
either the confounding glance of the text from one to the other could not be perceived. 
By what instrument would it be possible to determine  the sensations felt by every 
sailor who fi nds another sailor beautiful? The answer is presented with a certain 
uniqueness beyond the indignity of claiming an ocean liner and Building Eight as objects 
of their desire for one another.  While neither boat nor building can shy away from this 
desire, each must recognise a confounding uncertainty as a condition of their desires 
extraordinary escape: a measure of the immeasurable. It is a question of approximate 
distances, a matter of duration determining in such a way, the certainty of a periplus.1 It 
should be noted that the periplus was a type of maritime log-book, a very early technique 
to navigate trade routes. The book recorded the coast through the textual description of 
its features and the approximate distance between them. Because the method relied on land 
features viewable from the position of the ship, it could not be used to navigate the open 
ocean without the risk of becoming disorientated. Subsequently, the periplus is not a world 
view; it hugs the coast and does not venture much further. But, neither does it privilege 
this edge, for the objects on its list, their description and the duration between – that is 
the spatio-temporal experience of the passage of the ship –  is determined by the fi rst hand 
accounts of those on board. The periplus is a measure, but one that lies beneath your feet, 
or in the embrace of a fellow shipmate.
Within what terms do the exaltations that premise the outline of a city, anticipate 
the aff airs of an ocean going theatre? 2 Sailors have always understood that the crossing 
of the line eff ects an alchemical transformation,  a rite of passage for those on board, 
1  Periplus, n. OED Online. Sept. 2009. Oxford University Press. 29 Nov. 2010 < http://dictionary.oed.com /cgi/entry/50175680 >
2  It is the same belief that allows Cavakier to exclaim to Kayerts  on entering a jungle clearing that: “In a hundred years, there will be perhaps 
a town here. Quays, and warehouses, and barracks, and – and – billard-rooms. Civilisation, my boy, and virtue – and all.” in Joseph Conrad, “An 
Outpost of Progress” in, The Nigger of the ‘Narcissus’ and other stories, (London: Penguin, 2007), 240.
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heralded by a feverish King in disguise.3  This ritual, the crossing of a line, understands 
that any crew can only be comprehended in the hysterical laughter which manifests itself 
around his name. And it is in his name that a declaration, once made, asserts the crews 
belief that a city can and will be built, foundations for which will be born in the hollow of 
the ocean.4  This answer should not be met with admonishment, and accusations that the 
author of this text pursues an easy evasiveness. On the contrary, laughter is what estimates 
the distance covered on a single tack; it submits a life to a single common event, this ships 
slow advance to the shore.  
Who must off er an explanation if the audience remains incomprehensible to those 
on stage? Of course, the theatre, even an ocean going one,5 is a borrowed life, for it is 
distinguished only by those generous enough to take part;6 the audience, practically all 
of whom will matter, and those on stage, for whom it does matter.  It might be suggested 
that in reading a theatre takes shape, not least in the steepness of its pews which force 
every member of the audience to look down upon what is acted out in the text. Looking 
up from the page, every actor is, subsequently a victim of its audience, whom, “stronger 
than alcohol,” is the reason for one too many improvisations and one too many borrowed 
scenes, “carrying away both rudder and anchor.” As written in a previous letter, a drunken 
man stumbles on, but a “dreaming drowned man sometimes goes down.”  This text “dead-
drunk and sodden with water,” discloses an I,7 will admit into the theatre those with a 
particular symptom, an accursed numbness of the legs…
3  The ‘crossing of the line’, is a ceremony held on a ship to mark the crossing of the equator. Various versions of the ceremony are present 
in maritime history, though its undertaking continues, particularly in the Navy’s of the world. The general procession of events begins the night 
before the ceremony, when a mysterious fi gure comes aboard and who declares himself an emissary of Neptune. He reads a proclamation warn-
ing everyone on board that they are entering Neptune’s domain. The following morning, those for whom the journey marks their fi rst equator 
crossing, are collected and brought forth to stand in front of a court. The court is made up of various senior members of the ship, with the 
Captain dressed up as Neptune, and the remaining staff as various familiars such as mermaids. Each would-be-victim is charged with the crime 
of entering Neptune’s domain without permission. Humiliating punishments are dished out to the offending parties, who, on completion of said 
humiliation are given a certifi cate signed by Neptune that gives them leave to enter his ocean domain.
4  Neptune and Apollo, punished for rebelling against Zeus were ordered to serve as mortals for a year. Disguised as builders they were given 
the commission to construct the walls of Troy. 
5  “though if ever there was a continual theatre in the world, playing by night and by day, and without intervals between the acts, a man-of-war is 
that theatre, and her planks are the boards indeed.” Herman Melville, White Jacket or The World in a Man-of-War, (London: John Lehmann, 1952), 97.
6 Melville recounts after having witnessed a theatre production aboard the man-of-war, the Neversink, the emotive spectacle of the, “offi cers 
mingling with the people in applauding a mere seaman like Jack Chase”, one of the characters of Melville’s journey. He felt that the suspension 
of the normal hierarchal structure during the plays performance may continue after the event, but was witness, the following day, to a return 
of the uncompromising attitudes of the offi cers, having “shipped their quarter-deck faces again,” a term “expressive of the facility with which a 
sea-offi cer falls back upon all the severity of his dignity, after a temporary suspension of it.” Melville, White Jacket, 101.
7   “carrying away both rudder and anchor”, “Stronger than alcohol, vaster than music”, “dreaming drowned man sometimes goes down” and “I 
whose wreck, dead-drunk and sodden with water” whole and in parts are derived from Rimbaud’s poem, The Drunken Boat. The poem is narrated 
by a boat that, lost to the sea, recounts, or thinks out loud to the reader, the slow and evocative passage of its drowning. Barthes positions 
Rimbaud’s drunken boat as the opposite of Jules Verne’s ship as house or enclosure. Barthes writes of Rimbaud’s boat: “the boat which says ‘I’ 
and, freed from its concavity, can make man proceed from a psycho-analysis of the cave to a genuine poetics of exploration.” Roland Barthes, 
Mythologies, trans. A. Lavers (London: Vintage, 2000), 67. For Rimbaud’s poem see, Arthur Rimbaud, A Season in Hell and The Drunken Boat, trans. 
Louise Varè se, (New York: New Directions, 1961)
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Plato’s imaginaire Or Socrates’ Pharmacy?
In the Phaedrus1, the  philosopher Socrates compares writing to a pharmakon. He believed that writing 
undermined speech by allowing the speaker to imitate control over a discourse. The term pharmakon is 
here used by Socrates to mean poison, but it can paradoxically also mean remedy. Socrates supports his 
thesis by recounting the myth of King Thamus who is presented with the gift of writing by Theuth. 
Theuth off ers writing as a cure for his people’s forgetting, but Thamus accuses him of off ering a poison 
for the memory. Theuth is another name for the Egyptian god Thoth.
Thoth is the son of Ammon-Ra, the Egyptian sun-god that remains hidden from view by the sheer 
brilliance of his name. Thoth is Ra’s scribe, and so stands near him on his solar-ship. But he also executes 
his will, for he is what puts Ra’s speech into words. He is consequently the origin of the plurality of 
languages. Thoth as god of writing is also the god of death, for he is required to keep account of the dead. 
He not only records the weight of their souls but also counts out the life that has been led by the soul. 
As Ra’s messenger, he is a substitute for Ra’s absence. The moon is often ascribed to him, as the place 
holder and reminder of the luminance of the sun. Subsequently his position is marked with a certain 
ambivalence that on more than one occasion causes him to go against his father. In the course of one such 
fortuitous moment Thoth is able to give more time to Nout so that she may give birth, having previously 
been denied this by Ra. But his role as the place holder of Ra means that he is often also involved in plots 
to usurp the throne. Thus Thoth helps Nout’s son Osiris to the throne, only to conspire with Seth, Osiris’ 
brother to put him on the throne. In the ensuing trickery Osiris is dismembered, but is sewn together 
by Thoth and returned back to power, but only when Thoth turns against Seth. Thoth is at once a god, 
doctor, pharmacist and magician, but his claims on trickery and contingent allegiances make him also the 
inventor of games of chance. As Jacques Derrida writes:
Th oth extends or opposes by repeating or replacing. By the same token, the fi gure of Th oth takes 
shape and takes its shape from the very thing it resists and substitutes for. But it thereby opposes itself, 
passes into its other [he is] the god of non identity […] He is thus the father’s other, the father and 
the subversive movement of replacement. Th e god of writing is thus at once his father, his son, and 
himself. He cannot be assigned a fi xed spot in the play of diff erences. Sly, slippery, and masked, an 
intriguer and a card, like Hermes, he is neither a king nor a jack, but rather a sort of joker, a fl oating 
signifi er, a wild card, one who puts play into play.2 
1   I have referred to the translation of the Phaedrus in: Plato, The Last Days of Socartes, trans. H. Tredennick & H. Tarrant, (London: Penguin Books Ltd, 2003)
2   Jacques Derrida, “Plato’s Pharmacy” in, Dissemination, trans. B. Johnson, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1981), 93.
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Thoth’s recording of Ra’s conduct may be thought of as the origin for the periplus, for Thoth makes a 
map from every word, a map which paradoxically becomes the means for a successor to claim Ra’s role. 
As recounted by Plato in the Phaedrus, Socrates’ diatribe on the poison of writing begins with him 
asking his fellow protagonist  to reveal what is beneath his coat. This character, named Phaedo, having not 
learnt his speech by heart is hiding a text written for him by another named Lysias.  Phaedo is asked by 
Plato to turn his coat out. A turn coat is someone who hides his allegiance by concealing telling signs or 
badges.3  The pharmakon could be construed as a sleight-of-hand that attempts to turn Phaedo’s cloak into 
a forlorn uniform for a ‘battalion of hope’ drawing a comparison of signatures and handwriting, that, if 
found to be a forgery, could rather tell against someone.4 
Socrates is condemned to death for speaking out against the Athenian gods. In the last passages of the 
Phaedrus, Socrates is given a deadly tincture of hemlock to drink. 5 He is instructed to walk around till 
his legs get heavy. When they feel so, Socrates returns to his bed where, on having his feet pinched, he 
admits to no longer feeling his legs. He dies soon after. Socrates death is an example of the inconclusive 
meaning of the word pharmakon,  for the word, contrary to Socrates condemning of writing, does not 
distinguish between good and bad, as it fi nds a meaning as both poison and cure.  Socrates is forced 
to take the poison, but only because the remedy he speaks of for the failings of the Athenian state is 
itself seen as a poison by the authorities who identify what Socrates has said with the same mechanical 
properties of a poison that damages the body – he is charged with corrupting the youth of Athens. 
Socrates understands the means of his death, not as a poison – though it will certainly kill him – but as 
a cure, or respite for the soul as it continues into the afterlife.  Socrates’ death reveals how a pharmakon 
is what is brought to bear against a pharmakon, and in all cases, allegiances are never confi rmed: the 
pharmakon, like Phaedo’s concealing cloak, merely “turns its surface over.”6
Socrates is a healthy man who welcomes death. But in the pursuit of both sides of Phaedo’s cloak, 
we must observe the metamorphosis of Socrates’ pharmakon. The ‘other side’, is not what is exposed in 
the actual gesture of the cloak being turned, because the cloak always re-establishes the same side when 
presented to the observer; the pharmakon always slips away in broad daylight. It always presents a side to 
be seen, and a side to be obscured, but it does not enable both sides to be concurrently hidden or exposed. 
This is not to suggest that if Phaedo consecutively exposed the coat’s interior and exterior over and over 
again, that he would reveal the same side previously observed only moments before. The pharmakon 
makes an audience aware that the cloak’s observed side which perfectly imitates the side previously seen 
and now hidden, is not the same; that is, the same is the same only in so far as what separates one from 
the other. The side that would relieve the observer of their failure to know the side presented to them 
in the recourse to past knowledge of a side understands this newly observed side, not on its own terms, 
3   For the reading of turn-coats in relation to Thoth,  I am indebted to:  Michael Roth, The Poetics of Resistance: Heidegger’s Line, (Evanston, Illinois: Northwest-
ern University Press,1996), 171.
4   Stendhal, in his autobiography, recounts how as a child he forged a letter and its authorizing signature, inviting his Grandfather to enroll his son into the battalion 
of Hope. The Battalion of Hope, was a paramilitary organisation that taught young boys to bear arms, installing in them the political aims of the French revolution 
that marked the end of the Eighteenth Century in France. Stendhal’s poor attempt is discovered, and he is forced to confront his dead mother’s sister-come-fathers-
lover, Séraphie,  whom he has no qualms in letting us know his hatred of, and Monsieur Torte, the copy clerk installed in the family home whom uncovered Stendahl’s 
forgery. There is a brief exchange, during which Monsieur Torte is reproached by Stendahl for speaking to him in a manner reserved for family. On initially being 
found out Stendhal observes: “ I was in the moral situation of a young deserter about to be shot. The act of committing a forgery rather told against me.” Stendhal, 
The life of Henry Brulard, trans. J. Sturrock, (New York:New York Review Books, 2002), 131-135.
5   Phaedo 115a-118a, see also Derrida, “Plato’s Pharmacy,” 93-128. 
6   Derrida, “Plato’s Pharmacy,” 93.
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but through a curative regression. The side previously observed and now thought of as a precedent can 
only off er itself in comparison to the observed side, in such a way that they are conceptually placed side 
by side, edge to edge for assessment. But, paradoxically, a side still escapes the other side of this cloak 
patched together from so many sides: a side still remains unobserved. To the observer Phaedo’s cloak is 
irreversible, because a side will always remain hidden.
Socrates owes his life to the pharmakon but his death is not a formula; the pharmakon is not simply 
a choice between the many combinations of symptoms that distinguish a healthy or sick man relative 
to their acceptance of or perseverance in the face of death. While Socrates’ corporeal state relents and 
gives way, any exception to choosing between life and death necessitates  acknowledging the seeming 
irrationality that allows a cure and a remedy to pass through each other.  The pharmakon is donned as a 
disguise so that its wearer can convince themselves that they have succeeded in passing the pharmakon 
off  unnoticed. It must operate as a palimpsest, a double system of language; below and above, under 
and over, erasing and inscribing, so that no dispute could resolve which side is the side, and therefore 
the side that is commensurable with the arguments in support of or in opposition to it. An increment 
is the scale by which a text is liberated from another and, that which describes how voices escape from 
the noise of the world. The pharmakon is the transformation of this common measure.  The pharmakon 
always off ers a cure and a remedy, and a precedent for each in turn; the palimpsest is composed of an 
exposed and obscured language and for each a comparison. If only for the reason of the irreversibility 
of the pharmakon, speech and writing must also be placed side by side so that every edge - an edge only 
in name, as every edge constitutes another side - touches. That is, the pharmakon gathers every side that 
has come before as evidence; every facet of Phaedo’s cloak is extended and stretched out, ideologically 
composing a cloak par excellence. It is a surface, like a sheet of beaten gold, of inimitable thinness 
allowing one to see straight through to the other side, and yet still remain hidden. It is as though it had 
two authors, who under a diff erent light come to the conclusion that they occupy the one surface and 
the other author is merely their refl ection. Of course each is certain of their ascendancy beyond mere 
refl ection, and this could be construed as though both authors are divided. But each author in silent 
solidarity with the other embraces the pharmakon’s gestures in the most intimate of betrayals, exposing 
every side to the other.
Socrates is not a pharmakon: he is only served one. If a healthy man is of no use, then an ill man can 
also off er no resolution. What of an ill man who believes himself to be healthy, or a healthy man who 
believes himself to be ill? By both measures the hypochondriac is found to be the closest fi gure, more so 
than the knowing sick man, or the knowing dying man, or the dead man, because a hypochondriac, by 
their conceptual effi  cacy, is always a man dying in either case. This conclusion anticipates the evidence 
that an ill man and a healthy man, who convince themselves otherwise, fi nd themselves sharing a language. 
It should be stated that a hypochondriac is preoccupied not by a physical malformation or a disease, but 
by an illness, and that illness, as such, confi rms its presence in every gesture of a life.7 Invariably the ill 
man suff ers from no disease, while the well man does, but each refuses to acknowledge it.  The gesture’s 
7   Arthur Kleinman, a medical anthropologist, differentiates disease as physical malfunction from illness, which “includes secondary personal and social responses 
to a primary malfunctioning (disease) in the individual’s physiological or physiological status (or both). Illness involves processes of attention, perception, affective 
response, cognition, and valuation directed at the disease and its manifestation (i.e., symptoms, role impairment, etc.). But also included in the idea of illness are 
communication and interpersonal interaction, particularly within the context of the family and social network. Viewed from this perspective, illness is the shaping 
of disease into behavior and experience.” Arthur Kleinman as quoted in, Mary Burgan, Illness, Gender and Writing: The Case of Katherine Mansfi eld, (Baltimore & 
London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1994), xiv.
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of the ill man and the well man, marked by the appearance of the illness, argued as real or imaginary in 
either case, borrow all of their resources from their illness. Their illness is invariably not a fi ction: the 
hypochondriac leads an exemplary life, because his is a life that goes by no other name than his illness. 
The hypochondriac presents life as a perpetual sickroom. There can be no stepping out of this room 
because any outside must be observed on the hypochondriac’s terms. That is, every turning out merely 
displays another complication, is proof of another malady, incrementally diff erent than the last, but 
always the same is confi rmed: hypochondria. There is nothing outside or beyond the cloak of illness 
that could be observed without it becoming, inevitably, lost to the shadows of this space. But, do not 
think that the hypochondriac is an innocent victim – such a life requires cunning to negotiate between 
the absolutes of health and illness, without ever being caught up in either. The hypochondriac is always 
reticent to explain their illness, but when off ered to comment, the surplus of their domain, allows 
the hypochondria to make of incessant medical intervention and curative powers their recourse to 
a legitimate illness. The hypochondriac undertakes the epidemiology of illness itself, of the rarefi ed 
sensations that constitute the aff ective walls of the sickroom as a life.
Molière’s pharmakon: Le Malade imaginaire
Let us scrutinise the role of Argan the hypochondriac in the play by Molière,  Le Malade 
imaginaire(1673).8 It has been suggested that Molière’s play was a response to a script by Boulanger 
de Chalissay, entitled,  Élomire Hypochondre, ou les Médicins Vengés, that had caricatured him as a 
hypochondriac, Élomire’s name  being an anagram of ‘Molière’. The play presents Élomire as a poet 
and comedian who believes that he suff ers from every disease and avarice, and that they are the result 
of his ridiculing of the medical profession in his plays. Every doctor he visits, in the disguise of a Turk 
or Spaniard so that he may not be known, though his imitation of them is such that the doctors see 
through his ruse, seek their revenge by off ering diff ering opinions, so that Élomire has no hope of 
fi nding an agreed, and therefore shared opinion which he could follow, or else the doctors declare him 
completely incurable. The fi nal consultation concludes by the doctor committing every disease and 
trouble imaginable on to him, so that he falls to his knees and begs pardon from the doctors for ever 
having made fun of them. Pardoned by the doctors, a celebration ensues, that leads Élomire, still in 
disguise, to be mistaken by a wandering policeman for a Spanish assassin. He is forced to escape through 
an open window, followed by howls of laughter from the amused profession.9 The frontispiece to the 
play shows Molière miming the posture, gestures and expressions of his Italian teacher Tiberior Fiorilli, 
who had been Molière’s master in the art of Scaramouche, the roguish clown of the Italian commedia 
dell’arte.10  Specifi c moments of the play further reveal its target as Molière.  Élomire, is charged with 
marrying his own daughter, a reference to Molière’s marriage at age 42 to Armande Béjart, aged 18, who 
claimed to be the sister of his former mistress Madeline Béjart,11  though was suspiciously thought to 
8   I have refereed to the script of Le Malade imaginaire as provided by: Molière, The Misathrope and other plays, trans. J.Wood, (London: Penguin Books Ltd, 
1959). All quotations drawn from this script will refer to the act and scenes within which it takes place, and not the page number so as to allow, as the case 
maybe for different translations of the play to be referred to.
9   A.M. Brown, Molière and his Medical Association, (London: The Cotton Press, 1897), 239-240. Virginia Scott, Molière: A Theatrical Life, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), 239-240.
10   The commedia dell’arte would become integral to the development of Molière’s own theatre.  His French acting company would share with an Italian company 
the Salle du Petit-Bourdon up to its sudden demolition to make way for extensions to the Louvre in 1660. Refer, H. Gaston Hall, “Molière’s roles written for himself,” 
Australian Journal of French Studies, Vol. 33, (1996), 418; and, Cordelia Gundolf, “Molière and the commedia dell’arte,”AUMLA, Vol. 39, (1973), 25-26; 22.
11   His mistress was notorious, both for her acting on stage, and for her amorous actions off stage with members of the elite, and as such would make an appear-
ance in the colourful  and tawdry  collection of biographies the Historiettes of Gédéon Tallemant de Réaux a contemporary of Molière. As Howarth points out, there 
was some confusion surrounding Armande Béjart’s relation to Madeline Béjart due to the apparent difference in age between them which led to speculation that they 
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be Béjart and Molière’s daughter; and Élomire’s cough12 a reference to the tuberculosis Molière suff ered 
from, and which was the source in 1667 of rumors of Molière’s death when he was forced to close his 
theatre due to the severity of his illnesses. 
Le Malade imaginaire was to be the last play Molière would write and play in, and would also frame 
the last moments of his public life.13  As the principle playwright, producer and director of Le Malade 
imaginaire, Molière planned to occupy the role of Argan, the perpetually ill protagonist. But, during 
the plays fourth performance, Molière was taken ill on stage, and would later succumb to his illness.14 
Commenting on the perceived focus on Molière’s death after the fourth performance, Barnwell states 
that such texts “have tended to obscure its [Le Malade imaginaire] nature and conception as a divertiseement 
and to encourage the most somber and bitter interpretations, as though the playwright foresaw exactly 
what his fate would be and as though its hero were, like himself, really a sick and perhaps dying man.”15  
My intention in this exegesis is not to take sides. Whether Molière knew or did not know does not 
interest me. Arguments for or against Molière’s knowing or not knowing are in turn, the language of 
prophets, because both arguments argue for a point of view that can only ever be that of Molière. Any 
evidence for or against the relationship between Molière’s illness and his illness on stage must remain 
circumstantial.  Accusations that I have interfered with the truth for my own argument, and that I 
have not been rigorous in my scholarship, would fail to see that my interest lies not in writing after 
Molière, but in how within the conceptual framework of his writing and theatrical practice his illness 
can function and what, if any, allegiances can then be made to my own writing practice. I do not intend 
to become, nor do I wish myself to appear here as a ‘Molière scholar’. My intention is to speculate that, 
every writer, philosopher or artist is infected by, and suff ers the same ailment, whatever that may be at 
the time, as Molière. Furthermore it is my contention that an audience to what is produced partakes of 
the same epistemological sickness, and that this is the cause of the audience who take to the stage. My 
argument is clarifi ed in the conceptual space forged in the théâtre, the seating on stage made available for 
an exclusively male breed of noblemen, an audience who themselves wished to be seen by the audience, 
and shared the same visual promenade as the actors.16 This does not exclude the audience who do not 
were not sisters, but mother and daughter. See,  W. D. Howarth, Molière: A playwright and his audience, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 9, 20 note 40.
12   Scott, Molière: A Theatrical Life, 239.
13  Le Malade imaginaire was written during a period in which professional competition had taken its toll on Molière’s career at the Royal court. His position, in 
comparison with earlier years, had been drastically exhausted by 1672, when Louis XIV’s new favourite Jean-Baptiste de Lulli, who had also been a collaborator with 
Molière writing music for several of his plays, was given the opera privilege that initially forbade plays with music being produced without permission of Lulli, but 
would eventually also come to restrict the number of singers and musicians that could perform in rival theatres, including Molière’s own. Scott, Molière: A Theatrical 
Life, 236-237. After Molière’s death in 1673, Lulli  as director of the  Academie Royale de Musique, would dispose Molière’s Troupe de roy from the Theatre du Palais-
Royal. The theatre had initially been renovated by the King for Molière’s use following the demolition of the Salle du Petit-Bourdon. Howarth, Molière: A playwright 
and his audience, 19-20; Scott, Molière: A Theatrical Life, 261. The prologue to Le Malade Imaginaire, however praises the King and his military success. This was at 
the beginning of the Dutch Wars. Their aim was to expand the Louis XIV’s empire and remove the Dutch competition to French trade. The Dutch would reply to his 
invasion by opening their dykes and fl ooding the low lands. The costly war would not end till 1678, when a treaty forced France to give back to the Dutch land from 
its northern most conquests. However, the end of the war remains the pinnacle of French military and economic expansions during the reign of Louis XIV. This praise 
demonstrated that Molière was still hopeful of capturing his patron’s eye, a patron who still held Molière in admiration, as can be seen by his mediation of Molière’s 
burial.  As an actor Molière was not permitted to be buried in consecrated ground. However, on Molière’s death Armande petitioned the King, who, while deferring 
the question of his burial to the archbishop, had made sure the archbishop knew of his wishes. Molière would, subsequently be buried at night, without pomp and 
ceremony so as to avoid a scandal. Scott, Molière: A Theatrical Life, 258-259. It was Molière’s teacher, the actor Tiberior Fiorilli who was said to have provoked Louis’ 
interest in the theatre. An anecdote tells of  Fiorilli picking up a crying Dauphin so as to amuse and distract him to such an extent that the Dauphon was reduced 
to laughter, which caused the child to wet the actor’s suit. (Gundolf, Molière and the commedia dell’arte, 25)  Le Malade imaginaire would not, however, have an 
opportunity to play at court till after Molière’s death. H. T. Barnwell, Le Malade imaginaire, (London: Grant & Cutler Ltd, 1982), 10.
14   For the different accounts and details pertaining to Molière’s last performance refer to: Henry Phillips, “Molière: The Empty Chair” in ed. Martin Crowley, 
Dying Words: The last moments of Writers and Philosophers, (Amsterdam:Rodopi, 2000), 23-38. For an account of the reaction following Molière’s death, and to his 
subsequent inclusion into the myth of French nationhood see: Scott, Molière: A Theatrical Life, 256-266.
15   Barnwell, Le Malade imaginaire, 10.
16   Herzel offers us a description of these men and how their presence was treated by Molière: “the presence on the stage of spectators, seated in straw-bottomed 
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wish to appear on stage. Athena Vrettos relates the story  of a particular performance of La dam aux 
camellias, with the actress Sarah Bernhardt  in the lead role:
In the fi fth act, at the most dramatic moment, when the entire audience was so silent that you 
could have heard a pin drop, Margueritte Gautier, dying of consumption, coughed. Immediately 
an epidemic of coughing fi lled the auditorium, and during several minutes, no one was able to 
hear the words of the great actress.17
During the nineteenth century medical discourse included the susceptibility of the reader to be 
aff ected by what they were reading. It was argued that women as the gender cursed with the more 
sympathetic traits, were particularly vulnerable to the pathology of the visual and textual spectacles 
they were privy to. The profession also argued that if texts could impinge on the reader’s health, then 
certainly other texts, more appropriate to the moral and bodily make up of the community, might 
ascertain the well-being of its audience.18 The arousal of an illness by the exposure to the symptoms 
through visual or textual spectacles was summarized by Sir James Paget in 1875 as neuromimesis, or 
nervous mimicry.19  This belief would also be applied to the sociology of the crowd that emerged 
during the nineteenth century. The adjacency of the diff erent classes, on top of the growing textual 
and visual spectacles on off er meant that a greater number of individuals were at risk, and that exposure 
could become epidemic if individuals did not curate what they saw and read so as to preserve the 
integrity of their moral and bodily selves.20 However, it was not unusual for carnivals, and their ensuing 
urban spectacle to celebrate the end of extended periods of disease such as the plague and for them to 
subsequently become fi xed events on the social calendar.21 
Thus, any further comment on Le Malade Imaginaire must not only acknowledge, but also have 
permission to be deformed by the play’s notoriety.  
Argan’s imaginaire
An audience of Le Malade imaginaire fi nds that at the end of the play, the hypochondria Argan agrees 
to allow his daughter Angélique to marry her lover Cléante, but only if Cléante becomes a doctor. From 
the very beginning of the play Argan  has sought to marry Angélique to a doctor with the clear aim 
of providing a ready excuse for his maladies.  Argan’s brother-in-law Béralde proposes that it would be 
chairs at either side, downstage of the wings. These were notoriously rude and unruly young men whom we would regard as an unmitigated nuisance, and no doubt 
the actors who had to share the stage with them felt the same way; but for better or worse they were part of the spectacle, and in L’Ecole des maris Molière used 
them as a way of defi ning in visual terms the degree to which the principal characters in the play were ridiculous. The play begins with Sganarelle arguing with his 
elderly brother Ariste about styles of dress.  Ariste, with slight absurdity, insists on dressing indistinguishably from the young dandies sitting a few feet away from 
him, who could be his grandsons. But Sganarelle insists on dressing in the style of an earlier generation; his position is even more absurd than Ariste’s and is hostile 
to the audience to boot. Thus when Valere, Sganarelle’s young, fashionable rival for the love of Isabelle, appears on stage, his suit-ability is immediately ratifi ed by 
the visual harmony between him and the members of the audience who serve as frame to the stage picture.”  Roger W. Herzel, “The Decor of Molière’s Stage: The 
Testimony of Brissart and Chauveau,” PMLA, Vol. 93, No. 5 (Oct., 1978), 928; see also Howarth, Molière: A playwright and his audience, 35-37. 
17   Athena Vrettos, Somantic Fictions: Imagining Illness in Victorian Culture, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1995), 81.
18   This point is clarifi ed further in the arguments of the following publications: Vrettos, Somantic Fictions: Imagining Illness in Victorian Culture; Miriam Bailin, The 
Sickroom in Victorian Fiction: The Art of Being Ill, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994);  Allan Conrad Christensen, Nineteenth-Century Narratives of Contagion: 
Our feverish contact, (London & New York: Routledge, 2005).
19   Vrettos, Somantic Fictions: Imagining Illness in Victorian Culture, 83.
20   Allan Conrad Christensen, Nineteenth-Century Narratives of Contagion: Our Feverish Contact, (London & New York: Routledge, 2005), 12-13.
21   Christensen in a footnote points out the ‘feste di ringraziamento’ that celebrated as annual recurrences the end of plagues. Christensen, Nineteenth-Century 
Narratives of Contagion: Our feverish contact, 296, note 38. He also puts forth  Edgar Allan Poe’s ‘The Masque of the Red Death’ as an example of a literary Dance 
of Death: “The thousand guests of the Prince who live in barricaded isolation from the plague raging outside the castle believe that their wild dancing is exorcising 
the plague. Ironically the dance instead mimics the spread of the contagion which is present amongst them, until ‘one by one dropped the revelers in the blood-
bedewed halls of their revel, and died each in the despairing posture of his fall’.” Christensen, Nineteenth-Century Narratives of Contagion: Our feverish contact, 15.
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more convenient if Argan were to become a doctor, but Argan responds by lamenting his age and the 
prospect of study. Béralde suggests that knowing Latin and Greek is merely the result of the garments 
doctors wear when they are conferred, and that he professes to know of some Doctors who may be able 
to perform the ceremony immediately. The play ends with a troupe of Doctors, Apothecaries and the 
like fi ling onto stage, so that they may examine, in song composed of macaronic latin, Argan’s knowledge 
of medicine, parodying the conferring ceremony for doctors at the time.  The ceremony’s atmosphere is 
rowdy and carnivalesque, and moves to extend the action on stage to the Carnival festivities of the street 
held during its performance in part, returning the actions of the comedy to a traditional arena while still 
remaining congenial to the socio-spatial expectations of the audience. 22 
Molière’s comedy appears at fi rst, as a macabre medical pantomime interspersed with musical musings.  
But it must also be understood that throughout Le Malade imaginaire the double is being played. Argan is 
both ill and not ill, at once imitating illness, and yet so wholly believes in the cures and remedies that sustain 
him that it is only his health that could send him to his death. As such his illness is construed as an “illness 
of the imagination.”23 Argan is an imaginaire, someone whose “behaviour is governed not by empirical 
reactions of the real world in which they live, but by the preconceived notions, the intellectual abstractions, 
which they constantly substitute for the direct experience of reality.”24  This makes Argan an apt target for 
those who wish to take advantage of him; to collect money from him such as Béline, (the step mother to 
Argan’s two daughters), the apothecary Monsieur Fleurant and the physician Monsieur Purgon; to reveal 
his own duplicity, (as when  his opinionated maidservant Toinette impersonates a doctor); or to reveal the 
intentions of those who take advantage of him, (such as when he plays dead so as to reveal Béline and 
Angélique’s true feelings for him). So concerned by and obsessed with his illness that confi nes him to his 
sick-room, an opulent Parisian bourgeois cell, that it determines the extent of the directionless space he fi nds 
himself confi ned to: “Mr Purgon said I was to walk up and down my bedroom twelve times each way on 
a morning but I forgot to ask him whether he meant crosswise or lengthwise...”25 His obsession is further 
confi rmed through the less and less convincing nature of the impersonations that he allows himself to be 
coerced by.26 When no amount of persuasive argument will change his mind on his health, his wife’s deceit 
or his daughter’s marriage, Béralde and Toinette have no other way but to resort to using Argan’s obsessions 
against him. Béralde tries his best to convince Argan of his superstitions and goes so far as to take the extreme 
opinion that he should let nature takes its course and he will be cured. This may or may not be Béralde’s 
true opinion as his intention from the very beginning of the play is to convince Argan to allow Angélique 
to marry Cléante and not to treat Argan’s ideas on medicine and doctors.27 Whatever contradictions are 
22   Barnwell informs us this was the Carnival held three weeks immediately preceding Lent. Barnwell, Le Malade imaginaire, 9. Howarth’s remarks on the setting of 
Molière’s play recall that: “previous writers of comedy had observed the convention, dating from the theatre of the ancient world, according to which the social life 
of the characters portrayed, their arguing, bargaining, quarrelling and love-making, had all been carried on in the open street.” Molière had kept to this convention 
for much of his early plays, with some exceptions,  but had largely sought to move the characters indoors so that may acquire a certain social identity affable to 
the audience of the time. Refer to Howarth, Molière: A playwright and his audience, 123.
23   Howarth quoting J. M. Pelous in, Howarth, Molière: A playwright and his audience, 91.
24   Howarth, Molière: A playwright and his audience, 25-26.
25   Molière, Le Malade imaginaire,  Act 2, Scene 2.
26   Barnwell, Le Malade imaginaire, 34.
27   For a detailed scene-by-scene analysis of the role Béralde as raisonneur plays in Le Malade imaginaire, refer to Chapter 6 of Michael Hawcroft, Molière: Reasoning 
with Fools, (London: Oxford University Press, 2007). It is also worth noting that while Béralde offers an extreme position to that of Argan’s own, this opinion should 
not be construed as Molière’s own.  As Hawcroft asserts: “As far as Molière himself is concerned, we know that one of his best friends was a doctor, Mauvillain, and 
that he petitioned the king on his behalf; we also know that he followed his doctor’s advice for treating his tuberculosis: the fresh air of Auteuil, where Molière rented 
a house, and a milk diet. But we have no statements made by Molière giving his general views on doctors or medicine.” Hawcroft, Molière: Reasoning with Fools, 
191-192. Scott also takes this position, noting that Molière had himself undergone bleeding, was good friends with two other doctors beside Mauvillain, and Molière’s 
writing was drawn to doctors because of the ease by which they could be ridiculed: they spoke a mysterious jargon, wore funny clothing, rode mules, they were not 
over all very effective in curing people, and that only 110 of them were present in Paris. Virginia Scott, Molière: A Theatrical Life, 241-242. Gundolf points out that 
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apparent  –  in the image of a doctor who looks exactly like Toinette, (who only moment ago had left the 
room) and where now a doctor stands where she had once stood– they are not only ignored by Argan, but 
are actively avoided through the logic of the imaginaire: sudden changes in dialogue when he foresees he will 
not get his own way.28 These swift and multiple movements, dispersed through out the scenes of the play, 
have a powerful cumulative eff ect that culminates in the mock ceremony that accepts Argan into the medical 
profession, and his delusions into the street.
Molière’s imaginaire or Argan’s Pharmacy?
Molière, severely suff ering from tuberculosis of the lung, in playing the role of Argan doubles the 
dichotomies that establish the play’s themes of appearance and reality: he is an ill actor playing at being a 
healthy man who is playing at being ill. Throughout the  play Molière must be as convinced as Argan of his 
illness. But Argan’s illness is sustained by his reliance on the medical profession that discourages Argan from 
fi nding a sustained health.  Molière imitates Argan so well that it is an extraordinary moment when Argan 
invites Molière to die a painful death for his blasphemous portrayal of the medical profession. For these “roles-
within-a-role,”29 Molière must play two roles, that of the ill actor on stage playing well and that of Argan the 
healthy bourgeois gentlemen playing at being ill, and a third, as the playwright who is condemned by his own 
words. In turn, he must use three diff erent voices: as ill actor, as hypochondriac Argan, and as the playwright 
who provides the voices and commentary on all the actors on stage and in his own audience. Subsequently, 
he not only speaks to the audience in his role as playwright, but his voice, suggestive of a contagion, moves 
quickly through the various characters he gives voice to. As Allan Conrad Christensen points out, a reader 
is not a passive vessel for the text to inhabit, that they may themselves come to “contaminate the text,”30 the 
reader surprisingly infecting the authors voice, and in the case of the actors in their performance and in the 
case of Molière as Argan, via a ventriloquist act that displaces his voice, the playwright’s voice, for his own. 
Language is invested with mythic or occult powers throughout the play.31 From Argan’s willingness to 
pay Fleurant’s bill due to the politeness of the language he uses to describe the treatments in the opening 
act; an enema, described as an “emollient to lubricate, loosen and stimulate the gentlemen’s bowels”32 to 
Purgon’s curse on Argan when his assigned treatment is indefi nitely delayed. Purgon goes on to advise 
Argan that he will be incurable in four days, during which he will pass through a genealogy of diseases 
up to his death: from bradypepsia to dyspepsia to apepsy to lientery to dysentery to dropsy. Physicians 
have the power over life, death, and purse through their use of language. Instructions are given to Argan 
and further dominate his every thought; from the number of steps he must take and in which direction, 
to the number of salt grains on a meal, to the frequency of his bowel movements, nothing escapes his 
rapt attention, everything is measured or accounted for. But the doctors also fi nd that they must conduct 
themselves in a particular manner, under the direction and duress of the medical profession which they 
all follow without fault. The soon to be doctor, Thomas, Argan’s candidate to marry Angélique, is also 
the great French farceur Gillaut-Gorju, who had been the fi rst French dottore, a  commedia dell’arte stock character that caricatured a Doctor, was also said to have 
been in real life, the dean of the Paris Faculty of Medicine.  Gundolf, “Molière and the commedia dell’arte,” 22.
28   Barnwell, Le Malade imaginaire, 45.
29   The plurality of the roles Molière undertakes is suggested by Albert Bermel whom notes the similarity, in some cases complete, of a number of Toinettes lines 
to that of Scapin’s in Molière’s Les Fourberies de Scapin, while Argan’s responses also aligns with that of Argnate from this earlier play. Bernel suggests that the 
origin of the similarity between the names of Argan and Argante, is found in the actions of the characters who are antagonistic towards family and servants. This is 
emphasised by the term ‘aĝon’ or ‘contest’ that invariably appears in their name. See,  Albert Bermel, Molière’s Theatrical Bounty, (Cabondale & Edwardsville: Southern 
Illinois University Press, 1990), note 1, 182.
30   Christensen, Nineteenth-Century Narratives of Contagion: Our Feverish Contact, 201.
31   Hubert, Molière & The Comedy of Intellect, 256-260.
32   Molière, Le Malade imaginaire,  Act 1, Scene 1
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obedient to his father, Dr. Daifoirius,  from whom he asks permission for every conversation. However, 
this position of authority is constantly under threat. Toinette, instead of rebelling against Argan’s self-
motivated choice of Thomas, usurps his role as head of the household. She will also assume the authority 
of the doctors when she successfully imitates one, including the use of their privileged language. These 
incidents continually reinforce throughout the play the authority of the theatre;33 Angélique and Cléante 
met at a play, and are able to declare their love for one another via a small opera; Béralde, Argan and 
Toinette perform a small scene so as to reveal Béline and Angélique’s true feelings and even dissection 
become as a spectacle to witness, as Thomas invites Angélique to observe on.  
Every action opens onto another which replicates the discourse of Molière’s own sickroom. The 
sickroom is where Argan’s illness is forged on stage, but it is also from where Argan threatens to 
evoke in the members of the audience the same legitimacy as his hypochondriac.  Reminders of the 
illusory presence of the sickroom are presented in a series of theatrical and musical interludes that are 
interspersed with the action of the play. Each interlude is conceived as a performance-within-a-play, 
which in a variety of ways is used to highlight Argan’s sick-room as a space harmonious with the themes 
of appearance and reality envisaged by his illness, themes which are confi rmed through out the play’s 
length.34 The fi rst is the prologue that places Molière’s praise of the King’s military success as an eclogue 
that tells of a singing competition between two shepherds to decide who can compose the best story of 
Louis’ victory. Both shepherds are crowned winners, and given a crown of fl owers and thorns, a gesture 
that is taken up again in Argan’s own conferring ceremony at the end of the play. The competition ends 
by off ering Le Malade imaginaire as a play-within-the-prologue. Argan’s world is subsequently caught 
up in the conventions of the rural fête in which this competition takes place. Argan  does not know 
this at the beginning, too focused on his bills and bowels he is unaware of his presence in the middle of 
the fête.  He becomes more and more attuned to the conventions of the competition as he masters the 
arrangement of the fête’s theatrical instruments. Argan‘s mastery of the fête’s conventions is revealed in 
the fi nale that admits the carnival in the street onto the stage.
Act I ends with Toinette suggesting her lover Polichinelle as a possible messenger to deliver to 
Cléante knowledge of Angélique’s impending engagement. The stage is cleared, and  Polichinelle 
appears, serenading an unseen lover all the while battling violin music that keeps interrupting him 
from an unknown source. As the lover of Toinette, Polichinelle is connected with the spoken world 
of Le Malade imaginaire, but he communicates through the language of the prologue’s pastoral scene. 
Punchinello’s advances are ridiculed as ‘cunning’ and ‘false’, meant to deceive his lover, who is warned 
that only someone who is mad trusts the word of a lover. For Punchinello, his advances are a symptom of 
the lovesickness he suff ers from. His lovesickness is a variation of Argan’s hypochondria. Furthermore, 
the violins, which are considered a very real threat by Punchinello, appear to him as if there was another 
unseen character on stage ridiculing him. This character is constituted in the musicality of its voice, and 
through Punchinello’s angry conversation with them – fi rst through shouting at it, and then through 
the playing of the lute he has been using to accompany his serenade.  Eventually the Nightwatch come 
upon him, and arrest him for his impertinence, continuing the violins’ own musical interrogation 
through their chorus. Punchinello, unable to pay the bribe money necessary for him to be released, 
is instead forced to undergo the humiliating punishment of having his nose tweaked and his backside 
33   Hubert, Molière & The Comedy of Intellect, 267.
34   For an extended and erudite analysis of the musical interludes and their importance to the structure of the play refer to: John S. Powell, Music, “Fantasy and 
Illusion in Molière’s ‘Le Malade Imaginaire,” Music & Letters, Vol. 73, No. 2 (May, 1992), 222-243.
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struck by each Nightwatch. Punchinello, counting time with each tweak and stroke, in eff ect takes up 
the musical language of those who have thus far condemned him.  He fi nally off ers up the payment for 
his punishment to stop and is released. Like all patients, unable to bear the unnecessary treatments they 
must undergo, he is still forced to part with his money. 
In addition to the play and its interludes, there is an impromptu chorus between Cléante and 
Angélique. Cléante, in the guise of music teacher is asked alongside Angélique to entertain the guests 
of Argan. Cléante proposes a short pastoral opera that evidently presents, via the story of a shepherd 
recounting his love for a shepherdess, an opportunity for Cléante and Angélique to declare their love 
for each other. The singing of the initial pastoral scene at the beginning of Le Malade imaginaire enters 
into the spoken language of the play, and going further still, off ers a brief window by which the initial 
pastoral scene may be played out in Argan’s cell.35 Cléante prepares Argan for what he is about to hear, 
describing the impending duet as a “rhythmical prose or a sort of free verse such as their feelings and the 
occasion might suggest to two people conversing together and speaking impromptu.”36 But the play is 
interrupted by Argan who notices that the sheets of music before Cléante and Angélique have no words 
on them, and then suspects the reality of this so-called impromptu performance.
Act 2 ends with a troop of male Gypsies, who appear dressed in costume as female Moors, being invited 
on stage to entertain and calm Argan with songs that praise young love, instructing Argan, as though they 
off ered a prescription or musical cure for him from Mr. Purgon. The scene is important, for it is at this 
moment that the pastoral scene that initially announced Le Malade imaginaire bursts through to inhabit 
Argan’s closed world.37 The extent of the imitation present in the interlude – males playing females, Gypsies 
playing Moors, Moors singing in French and dancing in French style, alongside the overall presence of 
actors doing so, is still not enough to cure Argan, though it does appear at least to have the same eff ect as 
a laxative, forcing Argan off  stage in such a hurry he forgets his walking stick. The extreme measures by 
which it will be necessary to confront Argan will lead to the absurd conferring ceremony at the end of the 
play. Béralde advocates for the ceremony, in part because each of the players may also take part, as a form of 
divertissement for each other, and because it is the time of the Carnival. Moments before the stage is fl ooded 
by the carnival performers Béralde asserts: “We can each take a part and so give the play for each others 
amusement. After all, it’s carnival time.”38 Molière’s symptoms take an unforeseen turn as Argan’s space of 
captivity is transformed into a theatre and the extent of the stage is swelled by the carnival.
The audience at the beginning of the play is not aware of how Molière intends to compose the play. 
Like Argan they are forced to follow the diff erent rhythms of spoken word and operatic voice, across 
very diff erent imitations, whereby each note, and each scene, postulates some form of deception.39 The 
35   For an account of the different linguistic registers – musical and spoken word - and their employment by Molière within La Malade imaginaire, refer Nicholas 
Cronk, “The Play of Words and Music in Molière-Charpentier’s La Malade imaginaire,” French Studies, Vol. 47, (1993), 6-19.
36   Molière, Le Malade imaginaire,  Act 3, Scene 5.
37   Cronk, “The Play of Words and Music in Molière-Charpentier’s La Malade imaginaire,” 9.
38   Molière, Le Malade imaginaire,  Act 3, Scene 14.
39   The spatial and temporal shift from a romantic rural mythological scene fi lled with the sounds of elated singing to that of a bourgeois interior that echoes with 
the description of bodily affl ictions and cures; a street scene with a fi gure absurdly duelling with a musical enemy and then a confrontation between Cléante as music 
teacher and Argan; and the dramatic shift from spoken to operatic language, has often caused Le Malade imaginaire to be understood as an incoherent performance. 
Contemporary performances of the play often omit the pastoral prologue and the Polichinelle performance, while translations of the play, if not wholly omitting these 
passages, only provide a brief synopsis, or downplay their relevance. For my own part, it took an extensive search to fi nd a copy of Molière’s play that included the 
actions and words to these interludes. Most copies omitted them, others labeled their appearance or at best provided a few sentences summarizing what should take 
place.  However, as Moore has concluded,  it is clear that far from being incoherent, an audience in seventeenth century France would have been perfectly capable of 
following the arrangement and reconciling each part with the play as a whole.  This should not and does not exclude a contemporary audience from understanding 
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fi nal reunifi cation of Angélique with Cléante, and Argan’s illness with the medical profession, is not a 
universal conclusion to the gestures apparent in the play.  Béralde and Toinette get their way, but then, 
this is all they set out to do. At no point was the purpose of the play to reveal to Argan his malady. Argan 
is never able to master his illness; he is only ever caught up in it. That is, his illness is not enough to sustain 
every scene. Certainly, it is able to function in them, so that in each his illness is taken up using a diff erent 
approach. His illness is what is dispersed across both the space and time of Le Malade imaginaire; it is what 
is continually encountered. We may believe that the repetition of  his symptoms amount to, or at least 
establish a singular illness that is called hypochondria. It is true that his illness is what functions between 
the musical parentheses, but is also what puts in place these interludes. While the cérémonie des médecins 
may share some of its attributes with the opening prologue, this serves only to show that there is no fi nal 
unity that could characterise Argan’s malady. Argan is able to deploy his illness so that he may validate 
his aberrant behaviour, to himself and everyone else; but there is nothing that would expose Argan. At 
best the cérémonie des médecins off ers a glimpse of this madness, but this is quickly obscured by Béralde 
who attributes the reason for the performance not to Argan, but to the carnival that catches everyone, 
including the audience, unaware.  The audience is coerced into displacing a reason for Argan’s illness, and 
the interruption produced by the carnival continues this displacement. Beralde’s comment establishes 
the necessary disruption which permits the audience to spontaneously derive the mechanisms by which 
a conclusion can be delayed.  As Cléante quickly suggests,  defending against Argan’s accusation that 
Angélique and himself have performed their song without words and so that there love for one another 
is not exposed “they’ve recently invented a method of writing notes and words all in one.”40  Cleanete’s 
improvised answer frames the rules that operate within Argan’s sickroom, his ‘notes and words all in 
one’ exhibit, by means of delaying Argan, and allowing the narrative to continue, the symptoms of 
hypochondria that describe being ill and healthy all in one. 
Molière’s death, almost on stage, construes his own claim that he is the author of the play. The 
miasmic countenance of Molière as he writes, narrates and acts out his role as Argan, exposes Molière 
to the same epidemiology of illness that contaminates Argan’s persistent hypochondria. If it is an ill 
Molière who writes of a sick Argan, then it is Argan’s continuing claim on everything and anything that 
will confi rm his being ill that catches Molière the playwright off -guard. Molière adopts the position of 
a reluctant amanuensis, a scribe who copies the intonation of another, Argan;  who turns the page for 
the virtuoso performer, himself; and whose image is made available to every member of the audience 
who risks being put on stage.  Argan and Molière, each contaminates the other; each can lay claim to 
an illness that is real; each must also present themselves as an out, as a potential cure for their illness. 
Molière takes ill on stage, while Argan still remains healthy – and yet Argan’s claim to sickness falls true, 
on stage, in front of an audience who could not claim otherwise even if his proprioceptive gestures assent 
to him being well. Molière and Argan exceed themselves, the always-other-side that would confi rm the 
authorship of La Malade Imaginaire, from beginning to its end, to the claim of a life of incurable health. 
The sickroom is an unfathomable space, without edges, even though Molière and Argan fi nd themselves 
surrounded on stage. 
The audience must recognise that an illness, rather than as a narrative conclusion, supposes 
an alchemical transformation of every sensation that accumulates at the furthest reaches of a life; a 
the mechanisms of the play. As Moore further suggests, the non-linear principle of Le Malade imaginaire allows Molière to “build up a vision not of a person nor of 
a plot but of a choice of attitudes.” W.G. Moore, as quoted by Powell, “Music, Fantasy and Illusion in Molière’s ‘Le Malade Imaginaire,” 222.
40   Molière, Le Malade imaginaire,  Act 2, Scene 5.
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hypochondriac’s life is fl attened out because there is nothing but the illness. Their illness is sustained by 
their illness and for that reason their existence is always in jeopardy, which is to observe fi rstly; that a 
hypochondriac, by virtuality of their illness, (because that is all there is) is always at risk of succumbing 
to their hypochondria and secondly and most crucially, to observe that they are always very nearly 
exposed for what they are, a hypochondriac.  
A Declaration of Love
To understand any space  that negotiates between two absolutes – Argan and Molière, health 
and illness, audience and actors, theatre and street, doctor and patient – in which characters confess 
to doubling one another’s actions, we must return to a scene of revelation that marks the beginning 
account of Socrates’ death by Plato.
Socrates’ death, recounted by Plato must confront the inconsistency of his text, for he records his own 
confession; Plato is noted as maybe not being in attendance due to illness. Plato writes and has Phaedo say, 
“I believe that Plato was ill.”41 The Phaedrus places Plato both in sight of and in the sight of another, so that 
he may appear out of sight. Plato, albeit by another name, makes an account of Socrates’ last moments as 
he reclines in his cell. Plato appears, as a clinician would, beside the bed of Socrates, to administer to his 
patient.42  But Plato is only present because he writes himself into the text so that he may be written out 
and as a consequence take-up in bed ill. And yet, he is able to claim, from above the text, himself as the 
author of the Phaedrus. A crime is committed, but it is not Socrates who is poisoned, rather Plato, taken 
ill by his own hand.  But Plato’s attempt to murder is committed against the murderer, himself, who, in 
turn escapes the text, remains above the act, may confess to it without a conviction. Plato is the author, 
the murderer and the murdered. Above all else, Plato is he who conceals himself between the pages; the 
succession of acts, thus far etched across the page, revealed in the absurdity of a  Borgesian vademecum, 
a handbook  where “each apparent page would open into other similar pages; the inconceivable middle 
page would have no ‘back’.” 43 The Phaedrus conceives of a radical logic that takes care of the middle and 
hopes the rest will take care of itself.  As Derrida explains the pharmakos were members of a city who were 
sacrifi ced if anything bad, such as disease, befell the cities inhabitants. Their sacrifi ce was characterised as a 
cure for the beleaguered city.  They were in some cases no more than domesticated pets, housed and feed 
by the city for the purpose of sacrifi ce. Their sacrifi ce consisted of them being been taken to the limit of 
the city and ritualistically beaten to death. As Derrida concludes, “the ceremony of the pharmakos is thus 
played out on the boundary line between the inside and outside.”44
Socrates’ death is played out in a cell that isolates him from the rest of the city. But this city limit is 
not the limit found on the outskirts of a city, but a cell that is presented as a more insidious threshold, 
inside the city. Socrates’ cell is composed in the fold of the city around him. Phaedo’s cloak, the Phaedrus 
itself,  is the very device that had to be mobilised so that Plato and Socrates could clandestinely share 
more than the same bed.  Socrates and Plato share a cell that enables them to claim a poison as a cure, a 
consequence of which is the revelation of an unqualifi able and imagined illness that he is affl  icted by. 
41   Plato, Phaedo, 59a
42  “clinic” ad. L. cl nic-us, a. Gr. Of or pertaining to a bed. “clinic”, n. The Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed., 1989, OED Online, Oxford University Press, <http://
dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50041567>, (29 Nov. 2010)
43   Borges amends the contrary observation of a single book with an infi nite number of pages opposed  to a vast library, as described in his Library of Babel, to 
Letizia Alvarez de Toledo, who describes a handbook  where “each apparent page would open into other similar pages; the inconceivable middle page would have no 
‘back’”. Jorge Luis Borges, The Library of Babel, (Boston: David R. Godine, 2000), 39, note 4.
44   Derrida, “Plato’s Pharmacy,” 130-134.
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It is true that, at the very least, an audience who have been privy thus far to the movements of the text 
could accuse  the author of inciting the mantic arts, but as the  following comment from the Renaissance 
writer Michel de Montaigne suggests,  further improvisation on my part can be brought to light. As 
Montaigne writes: 
Plato was therefore right to say that to be a true doctor would require that anyone who 
would practise as such should have recovered from all the illnesses which he claimed to cure and 
have gone through all the symptoms and conditions which he would seek to give an opinion. If 
doctors want to know how to cure syphilis it is right that they should fi rst catch it themselves! I 
would truly trust the one who did; for the others pilot us like a man who remains seated at his 
table, painting seas, reefs and harbours and, in absolute safety, pushing a model boat over them.45
Phaedo recounts that the day before Socrates’ trial, the Ship of Theseus had been crowned by the priest 
of Apollo. This was the ship that had taken Theseus to Crete and back, a journey which had ever since been 
re-enacted, in part, by a visit to Delos to pay thanks for his return. From the time the ship was crowned to 
its return to home port, it was deemed that no condemned man should be put to death and that the city of 
Athens must remain pure.46  Socrates’ ship is composed in the turning out, over and eventually the turning-
in of Plato’s spatio-temporal excess.  The following paragraphs will testify that the authoring of this text 
perpetuates entirely, the structures of uncertainty and exchange of the pharmakon.
In The Thief ’s Journal, the French writer Jean Genet, as author of the semi autobiographical account 
and as its main protagonist, fi nds a family lineage in the plant ‘broom’ which is written genêt in French. 
Genet writes: “I am not sure that I am not the king – perhaps the sprite – of these fl owers. They render 
homage as I pass, bow without bowing, but recognize me. They know that I am their living, moving, 
agile representative.”47  Derrida off ers further thoughts as to the substance of Genet’s name: “Genêt 
names a bush – with yellow fl owers (sarothamnus scoparius, genista; broom, genette, genêt-à-balais, with 
poisonous and medicinal properties, and distinct from dyer’s broom, genistra tinctoria or genestrolle, used 
for making yellow dye.”48 Genet’s botanical twin exhibits the same attributes of the pharmakon – it is 
both a medicinal plant, and potentially poisonous – but was also associated with the introduction of 
colour, further coinciding with the meaning of the pharmakon to mean paint, “not a natural colour, 
but an artifi cial tint, a chemical dye that imitates the chromatic scale given to nature.”49 It may also be 
used in reference to the fl owers perfume, in the same way that make-up masks the sight of death so that 
the corpse may imitate the living, the pharmakon “perfumes it.” 50 Leslie Hill, summarising Derrida’s 
remarks in Glas, suggests Genet’s namesake exposes his autobiographical methodology: 
[….] one that involved the author [Genet] not in renouncing his signature, the better to 
redeploy it elsewhere, but conversely, in taking it upon himself to sign everything in sight and 
mark it, patently and ubiquitously, secretly and cryptically – the one because of the other, the other 
because of the one – with his own inimitable, fragrantly or fl agrantly malodorous monogram51
For Molière the actor, a perfect white face was very telling52 while Argan turns a white face yellow 
45   Michel de Montaigne, “On Experience”  in, The Complete Essays, trans. M. A. Screech, (London:Penguin Books, 2003), 1225. See Plato, Republic, III, 408 D-E.    
46   Plato, Phaedo, 59b-59c
47   Jean Genet, The Thief ’s Journal, trans. B. Frechtman, (London: Penguin Books Ltd, 1971) 35.  
48   Jacques Derrida, Glas, trans. J. P. Leavey, Jr. & R. Rand (Lincoln & London: University of Nebraska Press, 1986), 35b.  
49   Derrida, “Plato’s Pharmacy,” 129.
50   Derrida, “Plato’s Pharmacy,” 142.
51   Leslie Hill, Radical Indecision: Barthes, Blanchot, Derrida, and the Future of Criticism, (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010), 283.
52    Venetian Ceruse was a form of white pigment, used as a cosmetic to lighten the face. The mixture contained lead, and subsequently, slowly poisoned the user over 
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and back again.53 Genet, in turn, stains the page, tints it, shades it, simultaneously brings it to light and 
conceals it from the sun, and does so without giving himself away.  But, as Ra found out, the shadow of 
a lunar twin comes with a cost, the ever present threat of usurpation; Molière, Argan, Plato and Socrates 
appear increasingly alike. They all inhabit the measureless expanse of their illness like a gilt and glazed 
sepulchre.  The sickroom of  Le Malade imaginaire and the Phaedrus are immaculately conceived within 
the city from which both Molière and Plato are simultaneously kept out, held back and housed within, 
only to be expelled. In the middle of the Phaedrus lies Socrates’ cell; from the middle of Le Malade 
imaginaire Argan lays out his illness. Both conceive of a lazaretto:54 what is set outside, inside, aside.
From the Sickroom to the Street : an Ascent into Lunar Sea
As has been already stated above, the clinic, far from its modern understanding, was spatially 
determined by a clinician that visited patients in their beds.  The clinic, as such, operated within the 
intimacy of the patient’s sickroom, the parameters of which were consolidated till their illness was 
what rendered, in its entirety the extents of the patient’s life. For the author of this text to swell 
the space of the clinic beyond a veiled horizon as though its existence was to be understood as only 
the ‘sailor’s etiquette’, is to be charged with excess.55 To ignore the théâtre’s Plimsoll line, would be 
to turn out all those who would reside in their lazaretto on the sea and nowhere else. We know that 
every crime, however small the murder, has a price when at sea. To put the turns of Phaedo’s cloak 
another way: to make a jack tar a canvas shroud, is to make the audience into a life long prisoner of 
the sea. It would be reasonable if the audience of this project, with the ever present portrait of Peter 
Corrigan, made comparisons to the imperfect muttering façade, not least to “a bit of a wreck in the 
mid Atlantic.”56 But to drag a charnel house across our path, from one horizon to another, does no 
more than draw a Circean poison: do not mistake a rusted hull for a swimmer’s corpse. And, to all 
those who are pre-occupied with the shallows: a thirst that will account for some, but not all, pulls 
bones from Aesop’s breath.57  Argan’s lazaretto gathers around it a language, and a musicality composed 
from what is at hand, and carries the action from the stage into the street. Argan is entirely reliant 
on the donning of the props of others, and of his own, echoed in the various imitations that precede 
his own conferring ceremony, and in regards to his performance it must also include his own illness. 
That is, the pharmakon provokes and stimulates an audience such that even Molière is caught in the act
The audience of the play administer to the actor’s malady because the actor draws the force of 
their performance from an audience who legitimise an actor’s illness on stage, and certain to a claim 
to a malady the audience submit to the symptoms of the actor’s illness. Even if the audience, and not 
only the play,  was composed of doctors, they would not be immune to the possibility of mimicry 
as the American neurologist Silas Weir Mitchell points out. Mitchell took Paget’s mimicry further to 
include doctor-patient relationships,and as Adreas Vrettos notes, he emphasised his point through an 
a prolonged period of use.  In the tradition of the French farce, actors would have their faces whitened with fl our. Gundolf, “Molière and the commedia dell’arte,” 22.
53   A yellow fl ag raised over a ship warned others of disease on board, though generally it was to inform others that the ship has not yet been cleared from quarantine.
54  The OED defi nes a lazzareto as: A house for the reception of the diseased poor, especially lepers; a hospital or pest-house; A building, sometimes a ship, set 
apart for the performance of quarantine; and in a nautical context, a place parted off at the fore part of the ‘tween decks, in some merchantmen, for stowing 
provisions and stores in. “lazaretto.” The Oxford English Dictionary. 2nd ed. 1989. OED Online. Oxford University Press. 29 Nov. 2010 <http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/
entry/50130833/50130833>.
55   Sailors and ex-sailors were traditionally hired to work the back stage mechanisms including the curtain. Refer to, Martin Harrison, ed., The Language of 
Theatre, (New York: Routledge, 1998).
56   Herman Melville, “Bartleby” in, Billy Budd and other stories, ed. H. Beaver, (London: Penguin Books,1985), 83.
57   “The mind is not all that different from those dogs in Aesop which, decrying what appeared to be a corpse fl oating on the sea yet being unable to get at it, 
set about lapping up the water so as to dry out a path to it, and suffocated themselves.” Montaigne, “On Experience,” 1211.
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analogy with the invisible structures that bind audience and actor:
 Mitchell stresses the specular nature of the sickroom using rhetoric that persistently invokes 
theatre and audience as a model for doctor-patient interaction. His lengthy chronicle of case 
histories, which ranges from a physician who unconsciously mimics the facial contortions of 
a patient suff ering from “unilateral grimace” to men who experience sympathetic morning 
sickness at their wives’ pregnancies, to an entire infi rmary of school girls who involuntarily adopt 
each other’s symptoms until separated and sent to diff erent hospitals, is laced with theatrical 
terminology. Although Mitchell insists that their pain is real and their behavior, in most cases  is 
inherent and involuntary, he describes these patients as “actors” in a “pathological drama,” and 
claims “the actor receives… from a too sympathetic audience, hints which enable him the better 
to sustain his part”. Sympathy here is thus doubly dangerous – it initiates the patient’s symptoms 
through the act of watching and it perpetuates them through the act of being watched.58
By some unreliable measure, an audience risks being smitten with Argan’s affl  iction, only because they 
are the cause. From Argan, an illness perpetuates, coaxes Molière’s illness up on stage and into the gestures 
of the actors. Argan’s illness, what springs from his lips and is thrown out in by his gestures, alters the scale 
of his sickroom on stage, enlarges the proportions of his illness, gathering the audience in its wake, and 
putting the audience in doubt of their own health. Argan’s illness is what will draw Molière and his audience 
forever near, that will cultivate further Argan’s illness on stage and will expedite the collapse of audience 
and playwright into lunacy, into the érémonie des médecins: not to fi nish them off , but to sustain them till the 
very end. The cérémonie des médecins propels Argan into the city, and draws the city up onto the stage. Each 
member of the audience is thus given the opportunity to succumb to the sensations that prevail throughout 
Argan’s illness, admitting them, alongside Argan, into the carnival that maintains no authority at all. 
Betrayed to the sea, the audience is what is brought together from the multitude only to emerge 
indistinguishable from the origins of their genesis. The position of the audience coincides with that of a 
reader of a text, who Montaigne ascertains,  should be a good swimmer, so that they do not drown in the 
author’s thesis.59 The coming and going of voices on stage form a chorus that chronicles every audience 
member’s successful attempt of its passage. It is a declaration that marshals the claim that “they must be 
a good swimmer.”60 It assures every member of the audience that they risk fi nding themselves at sea, an 
ambassador,  sent across a directionless landscape through an act of betrayal.  That is, the audience is what is 
collected in the image of a singular fi gure of Leggatt,61 from Joseph Conrad’s short story, The Secret Sharer: 
he who through some avarice escapes one boat by swimming to another only to share, briefl y, in the captain’s 
cabin, off  bounds from the rest of the crew, an unspoken life: “With a gasp I saw revealed to my stare a pair 
of feet, the long legs, the broad livid back immersed right up to the neck in a greenish cadaverous glow.”62 
The audience who comes on board, becomes confused with and by the actors on stage and with the ship 
itself, invariably attempt, through the aperture of the théâtre, to stake out an unspoken desire, in a minutiae 
58   Athena Vrettos, Somantic Fictions: Imagining Illness in Victorian Culture, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1995), 88. 
59   Montaigne writes: “[….]and that coincides with what was said about the writings of Heraclitus by Crates: they required a reader to be a good swimmer, so 
that the weight of his doctrine should not pull him under nor its depth drown him.” Montaigne, “On Experience,” 1211.
60   Conrad, “The Secret Sharer,” 179.
61   The name was derived from the Old French LEGAT, and was brought into England in the wake of the Norman Invasion of 1066. The name may have been given 
to an offi cial elected to represent his village at the manor court, as the origin and meaning of the name Leggatt was also occupational, ‘the legate’ an ambassador, 
or deputy that speaks on behalf of some other authority. In Roman mythology Triton is the messenger of the god of the ocean Neptune and appears the night before 
the crossing of the line ceremony to warn all those aboard that they are entering Neptune’s domain.
62   Conrad, “The Secret Sharer,” 178.
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of intimate relations. Leggatt’s appearance in this text marks a short detour for the purpose of obliging its 
audience the reason that permits his name to be heard.  As Cesare Casarino makes clear:
 A cursory etymological excavation of that enclave named Leggatt reveals it fi lled and 
resonating with two intertwined Latin echoes: legatus (messenger, harbinger, envoy, ambassador) 
and ligatus (bound, fettered, captured, confi ned). In between legatus and ligatus63
Leggatt is who stands in place of  and carries within him another’s thoughts, but who may also be 
confi ned by those thoughts: “Leggatt stands as an imprisoned messenger.”64 In the course of this PhD an 
audience may rebuke its author for not citing every thing; for not raising the attention of the audience 
to every fl icker of white on the horizon.65 But, it should be noted that as every would be authority is 
taken by surprise that an amputee may no longer be able to distinguish what belongs to them and what 
doesn’t and every sudden appearance of that diseased appendage delivers the spectre of a cure to the 
patient, the symptom points in no one direction, for a symptom on the horizon touches all extremities.66 
An unobservant mast-watch does risk losing their footing and consequently falling. As Melville writes: 
“with one half-throttled shriek you drop through the transparent air into the summer sea, no more to 
rise for ever.”67 Beneath this ship, and perhaps in line with its tall mast, if one may take into account the 
long shadows that fall when determining the distance of a ship from shore, are the protruding legs of an 
unfortunate Melvillian-Icarus.  Icarus as has already been speculated fell from his perch on a ship and not 
from the sky.68  If Icarus’ fl ailing legs are the result of the lines that surreptitiously form between ocean 
surface and mast-head, could not a sailor in the fl y of this ocean going theatre, be pulling the strings?69 
On the other hand, Melville turns the job of manning the mast-head into the image of a man with stilts 
long enough to allow him to navigate the ocean as if he were the ruler of this domain. Melville writes:
 [...] you stand, a hundred feet above the silent decks, striding along the deep as if the masts 
were gigantic stilts, while beneath you and between your legs, as it were, swim the hugest 
monsters of the sea, even as ships once sailed between the boots of the famous Colossus at old 
Rhodes. There you stand, lost in the infi nite series of the sea, with nothing ruffl  ed but the waves.70 
63   Cesare Casarino, Modernity at Sea: Melville, Marx, Conrad in Crisis, (Minneapolis & London: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), 200.
64   Casarino, Modernity at Sea: Melville, Marx, Conrad in Crisis, 200.
65   The repercussions of having a day-dreaming look-out are their failure to take much notice of what they should be watching for.  Melville’s narrator mimics 
the crude rebuke given to such a person by fellow shipmates “Why, thou monkey,” said a harpooner to one of these lads, “we’ve been cruising now hard upon three 
years, and thou hast not raised a whale yet. Whales are scarce as hen’s teeth whenever thou art up here.” Herman Melville, Moby Dick, eds. H. Hayford & H. Parker, 
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1967), 140.
66   In Plato’s Pharmacy Derrida sets out to show the indeterminate nature of the pharmakon, by undermining Plato’s claim on writing as a pharmakon and his 
own philosophical privilege that positions it as a feature of the Sophists domain. To do so Derrida turns to the writings of the Sophists which describe speech as a 
pharmakon, because, like an invigorating drug,  it has a deeply felt effect on the person, while for  Plato writing is a pharmakon that does quite the opposite of 
the Sophists pharmakon: it dulls the memory. But as Derrida explains, Plato’s claim against the Sophists is not merely that they commit to memory their speech, but 
that “within such recourse the substitution of the mnemonic device for live memory, of the prosthesis for the organ; the perversion that consists of replacing a limb 
by a thing, here, substituting the passive, mechanical ‘by-heart’ for the active reanimation of knowledge, for its reproduction in the present.” [108] The problem lies 
with the fact that the speaker must recall something already committed to the past. The writing is not present in the here and now of the very act of speaking, but 
must be recollected from the written text that has already been written out of the present. Derrida concludes by showing that the binary distinctions Plato makes 
about the pharmakon can no longer be seen as reliable as the man who derides writing as a pharmakon unwittingly offers speech up as a pharmakon. See the 
section ‘The Pharmakon’ for Derrida’s extended dismantling of Plato’s argument, and  the section ‘The Pharmakeus’ for an elucidation on Plato’s confl icting claim to 
the pharmakon.  Montaigne offers a coarser summary of the confl icting use of a pharmakon: “And how many have still died of it with three doctors by their arses? 
Precedent is an uncertain looking-glass, all embracing, turning all ways.” Montaigne, “On Experience,” 1236.      
67   Melville, Moby Dick, 140.
68   An alternate myth of Icarus has Persephone pull him from the edge of a ship Dadelus builds to escape the island of Crete.
69   The term to fl y was a nautical term used with reference to the hoisting of a ships sail.  Theatrically it was used to refer to anything that was raised or 
lowered from the fl ies the area above the stage that held scenery and lighting. It was common for sailors and ex-sailors to ensure the successful maneuvering of 
these elements. Refer to, Harrison, The Language of Theatre..
70   Melville, Moby Dick, 36-137. Melville also offers, on seeing the sails of the ship dancing across the ocean: “The three shrouded masts looked like the apparitions 
of three gigantic Turkish Emirs striding over the ocean.” Herman Melville, White Jacket or The World in a Man-of-War, (Londond: John Lehmann, 1952), 294. In Master 
Alcofribas’ account of the genealogy of Pantagruel, the giant Hurtali survives the Biblical fl ood. He does so by sitting astride Noah’s Ark, “as small children do on 
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There is however, no one in the top mast of this ship. The narrative thus far has already suggested 
that he has fallen, then might this also be the case of the sailor  who once stood at the mast head? Could 
we contend that it is an unaware sailor who both pulls the strings and is displaced by them. And,  might 
he have rather felt his way down the vertical lines, as a spider would, with their many legs, mistaking 
the vibrations of his own movements as he displaces the ship for another. And might these lines also 
suggest those of Melville’s as he stalks across the ocean, oblivious to the fact that they are his own legs! 
Does this not suggest that each leg of the proliferating number of legs, are numb to the realisation that 
they all share a life…?
A day dreaming sailor’s stride is nothing more than a periplus, the  passage of an insurmountable number 
of legs that compose the sensations of the ocean surface. Melville’s mast-watch is able to measure in one 
single gesture the distance of an ocean in the shortest amount of time, and yet, everything that lies before 
him remains accounted for. This is not to suggest that had a leg been taken off , our journey would be 
shorter, for every leg is measured by an imperfect distance. The audience is not only a witness, but also 
an accomplice to the poisoning of the author of the play, and, in part to his death. But the audience is not 
abandoned they are merely thrown overboard, before taking up again in the sickroom that becomes at 
once an image of a boat, a moving fold, like the trough of an outgoing tide,  that takes everything briefl y 
out to sea. Argan’s lazaretto, a space folded from the heterogeneous surface of the ocean, is a topological 
space that delays indefi nitely, in assuming that one ship embroils them all, not least the Ship of Theseus, 
Molière’s death. 
The cérémonie des médecins takes up the stage and all of Molière’s mechanisms,71 and puts it into the 
street, carrying across the threshold of the théâtre the audience as doctors, and an audience who take a 
share of Argan’s illness, permitting them to indulge in the carnival. Molière’s theatre is taken up in the 
image of The Panatheniac Ship, the ship-fl oat that carried the peplos, or robe of Athena during the Great 
Panatheneaic Festival of Athens.72 The festival was centered on the celebration of the goddess Athena, 
who as the mythical origin of the birth of Athen’s, was enshrined in a large sculpture that was installed 
at the centre of the Parthenon complex. Every four years, a newly woven peplos  was dedicated to Athena 
and displayed in the Parthenon. It generally featured the exploits of Athena and Zeus against the Giants, 
woven in saff ron and hyacinth coloured thread. During the festival the peplos  was suspended from the 
masts of the Panathenaic Ship as a sail. The Athenian philanthropist  Herodes Atticus provided one such 
ship for the festival that was in part used to inaugurate the Panathenaic stadium he had rebuilt, and which 
after the festival, found a site for display in a building adjacent the stadium. The Sophist Philostratus, in his 
Vitae Sophistarum  provides a description of the path of the procession and of Herodes’ ship-fl oat:
Moreover, I have been told the following facts concerning this Panathenaic festival. The 
robe of Athena that was hung on the ship was more charming than any painting, with folds that 
swelled before the breeze, and the ship, as it took its course, was not hauled by animals, but slid 
hobby-horses”, while using his legs to balance and guide the Ark while it waited for the waters to reside. See, Rabelias, Gargantua & Patagruel, trans. J. M. Cohen 
(London: Penguin Book, 1965), 174.
71   With Le Malade imaginaire, Molière took full advantage of the new mechanisms installed in the Théâtre du Palais-Royal that allowed for the rapid scene changes 
without some form of theatrical bridge. Traditionally, stage sets were often composed of existing scenery and props that remained from previous plays, rather than 
having new stages designed and incurring further costs to the production. For a description of the original stage set and production schedule for Le Malade imaginaire 
refer to: Powell, “Practices in the Theater of Molière,” 34-36. For a detailed description of make up of Molière’s stage sets, refer to: Roger W. Herzel, “The Decor of 
Molière’s Stage: The Testimony of Brissart and Chauveau,” PMLA, Vol. 93, No. 5 (Oct., 1978), 925-954. For details pertaining to the renovation of the Palais-Royal, 
including the installation of theatrical stage machinery and its use in the production of Le Malade imaginaire refer pages, 949-951.
72   For a detailed analysis of both the Panathenaic ship and peplos refer to: J. Mansfi eld, The Robe of Athena and the Panathenaic Peplos, Unpublished Dissertation, 
(Berkley: University of California, 1985), particularly Chapter Two, “The Panathenaic Peplos and the Panathenaic Ship”.
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forward by means of underground machinery. Setting sail at the Kerameikos with a thousand 
oars, it arrived by the Pelasgikon, and thus escorted passed by the Pythion, to arrive at where it 
is now moored.73
Phaedo succumbs to the odious smell of saff ron, his cloak strung high, suspended as a sail for the 
performance of the pharmakon. Socrates’ death, re-enacted with no resolution; an imperfect imitation 
the perfect imitation because Molière still dies, admittedly always baptised under another name, but it 
is always the same. The pharmakon exasperates to the point of delirium, the swimmer’s fl imsy grasp on 
the ocean’s still surface. 
A Clinic for the Exhausted’s vast domain can only be distinguished momentarily, in the enigmatic shifts 
in attention that underscore the gestures of this thesis thus far. A Clinic for the Exhausted is seemingly 
fraught with the encrustation of found objects that might suggest the hand of a rocailleur and the grotto 
homes of ocean deities. Certainly a grotesque seascape may form in the mind, but the listless bow of this 
ship as it gropes the blurry shores does no more than describe the sudden and hallucinatory appearance 
of a Venetian landscape that has already been intimated in the preamble, and in the course of the 
lazzareto. This is not to say that land has been found, for the appearance of any destination must adhere 
to the provisional nature of a city in the desert.74 To assist the passage of this project further it must turn 
to the excess of Molière’s patron, Louis XIV, King of France, who during his reign held notorious and 
fabulous fêtes at the Palace of Versailles as demonstrations of his power. The fêtes of 1664, 1668 and 
1674 remain the most spectacular and memorable due to their scale and expense. During the fi nal event 
of the fête of 1674 held to celebrate the re-conquest of France-Conte from Spain, and following on 
from a week of extravagant food, fi reworks and amusements, guests were provided with much quieter 
entertainment, but that was no less magical that the previous days: 
Their majesties stepped aboard beautifully decorated gondolas, followed on to the 
water by the rest of the court, who boarded a fl otilla of other vessels all suitably decked 
out. The surface of the canal resembled a looking-glass. Spaced around the banks were 650 
illuminated statues and between them an assortment of fi shes, lit up by coloured lights, 
apparently watching open-mouthed as the greatest of kings fl oated by, the sovereign not just 
of France but also of their watery realm. When the boats reached the pool at the junction of 
the main and transverse canals their passengers were thrilled by the appearance, at the Trianon 
extremity, of Neptune in this chariot pulled by marine horses and accompanied by Tritons. 
Then, turning towards the Ménagerie, they saw Apollo, at the reins of his sun chariot, rising 
into the air accompanied by four female fi gures representing the hours of the day. Finally, 
at the farthest end of the Canal, there was a palace, which seemed to have been built on the 
water out of crystal, with mosaics evidently composed of rubies, emeralds and other precious 
stones. It was with some reluctance, says [André]Félibien, that the court left this nautical 
kingdom, paddling slowly back up the length of the Canal to the accompaniment of violins.75
73   Refer to;  Jennifer Tobin, “Some thoughts on Herodes Atticu’s Tomb, His Stadium of 143/4, and Philostratus VS 2.550,” American Journal of Archeology, Vol 97. 
No. 1 (Jan. 1993), 81-89. 
74  “ Now, if he only followed the wise example set by those ships of the desert, the camels; and while in port, drank for the thirst past, the thirst present, and the 
thirst to come - so that he might cross the ocean sober” Melville, White Jacket, 46.
75   Ian Thompson, The Sun King’s Garden, (New York: Bloomsbury, 2006), 169.
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A Turn: from periplus to periplum
A Clinic for the Exhausted has thus far asserted an imaginative exercise that could be perceived as a 
rational breakdown, an emphatic account of an author having gotten carried away by  the project’s 
enigmatic self-deception. Such suspicions would fail to recognise that the energies that depart this PhD 
may make available practices that may entirely elude the author of A Clinic for the Exhausted.  An author 
who traverses the lunar sea of his text will fi nd that their gestures cede to the soft shadows that envelop 
the gloomy edges of a lucid théâtre. Let us then ask after the author, in the knowledge that even the 
author, like Molière and Plato, are  marked by the circumstances of their undertaking.
 He could be described as a man removing his hat,76 which is to draw your attention to every man 
who may off er themselves as a gentleman, only to snatch your hat from the top of your head.77 We 
could, if time allowed, measure each ruse against another, so that the degree of consanguinity may be 
determined. But the degree of imitation is such that each imperfection confi rms the copious pseudonyms 
off ered in part to distract if not to entertain us on our path. However much propriety prescribes that 
an introduction be made, there is every determination that an eff ort will be made to write around 
him. For, as well as an early form of maritime navigation, the periplus was an ancient Greek maritime 
battle maneuver. The term meant ‘sailing around’, and quite literally referred to the out fl anking of the 
enemy’s line of ships.78  Like Leggatt, the swimmer is but no-one, a man who never wears a hat, and yet 
might it be said that this is what is inferred by who ever proclaims themselves Captain?79  The periplus is 
what strikes the very thing it sails around, that is, it always sails around the center of the ocean, but also 
strikes it, is always an impression recorded by the captain, yet always in such a way that it can be assigned 
to no one. As Mikhail Bakhtin explains:
 The most interesting example of this carnivalesque game of negation is the famous 
“History of Nemo,” Historia de Nemine, one of the most unusual pages of Latin recreative 
literature.  Radulfus Flaber, a French monk, composed the Historia de Nemine in the form of 
a sermon. Nemo is a hero whose nature, position, and exceptional powers are equal to those of 
the second person of the Trinity, that is, the Son of God. Radulfus discovered the great Nemo 
in a number of Biblical, Evangelical, and liturgical texts, as well as in Cicero, Horace, and other 
writers of antiquity; the word nemo (nobody), which in Latin is used as a negation, was interpreted 
by Radulfus as a proper noun. For instance, in the Scriptures nemo deum vidit (nobody has seen 
God) in his interpretation became “Nemo saw God.” Thus, everything impossible, inadmissible, 
inaccessible, is, on the contrary, permitted for Nemo. Thanks to this transposition, Nemo acquires 
the majestic aspect of being almost equal to God, endowed with unique, exceptional powers, 
knowledge (he knows that which no one else knows) and extraordinary freedom (he is allowed 
that which nobody is permitted)[ … ]Nemo is the free carnivalesque play with offi  cial negations 
and prohibitions. This image is spun from freedom; it is the liberation from all the restrictions 
that oppress man and are consecrated by offi  cial religion. Hence the exceptional attraction of 
76   Scott offers us, by way of  Molière’s protégé Michel Baron,  an account of an unaware subject of caricature by Molière: “Baron remembered for instance, Molière’s 
irritation with him when he returned empty handed from Jacques Rohault. He had been sent to borrow a hat to be used as a costume piece for the Philosophy 
Master in Le Bourgeois gentilhomme, a character modelled on Rohault, but he made the mistake of telling Molière’s old friend why the hat was wanted. Molière was 
not pleased.” Scott, Molière: A Theatrical Life, 244.
77   Molière’s doctor friend Armand de Mauvillain, was not without controversy: “Mauvillain was considered a heretic by his colleagues and was actually suspended 
from the Faculty of Medicine for four years for snatching off the Dean’s hat during a heated discussion.” Scott, Molière: A Theatrical Life, 241.
78   “Periplus, n.” OED Online. Sept. 2009. Oxford University Press. 29 Nov. 2010 < http://dictionary.oed.com /cgi/entry/50175680 >
79   The anti-hero of  Jules Verne’s, 20,000 Leagues under the sea, is Captain Nemo of the Nautilus. In Latin, Nemo means ‘no one’, and is a reference to  Hom-
er’s hero Odysseus answer to a request by the giant Polyphemus to state his name.  Verne’s work continues a longstanding medieval literary tradition. 
B K 1 | 4 2
this came for medieval man. All the endless gloomy sentences: “no one may,” “no one can,” 
“no one knows,” “no one dares” are transformed into gay words: “Nemo may,” “Nemo can,” 
“Nemo knows,” “Nemo must,” “Nemo dares.” The authors of the revised texts heaped up 
more and more freedoms, liberties, and exceptions on behalf of their hero […] No one can have 
two wives, but Nemo is allowed bigamy. According to the Benedictine rule, it was forbidden to 
talk after supper, but Nemo was an exception, he could talk [...] Thus from the highest divine 
commandments to minor restrictions and limitations of monastic life, Nemo’s independence, 
freedom, and power remained unrestrained.80 
The Captain is always made the exception; a spatial and temporal excess, but it is the paratactic that 
marks the continuity of the passage from periplus to periplum. The term periplum clearly derives some 
of its intentions from the periplus. As Hugh Kenner explains, the periplum is, “the image of successive 
discoveries breaking upon the consciousness of the voyager”, [that it is] “the voyage of discovery among 
facts, whose tool is the ideogram, is everywhere contrasted with the conventions and artifi cialities of the 
bird’s eye view aff orded by the map.”81 The ship is not the centre of two lines intersecting, measured in 
longitude and latitude. It is rather a youthful immeasurable entropy: day-dreaming is a matter of staying 
where one is.  As Melville’s protagonist warns of the eff ects of the ocean on ‘absent minded young 
philosophers’, they can become “lulled into such an opium-like listlessness of vacant, unconscious 
reverie is this absent minded youth by the blending cadence of waves with thoughts, that at last he loses 
his identity; takes the mystic ocean at his feet for the visible image of that deep, blue, bottomless soul.” 82 
A swimmer may demand several times over that, at the very least, they should be in the margins and not 
under foot! But, looking upon the imbroglio of glimmers that draws the horizon line from up high any 
author could be forgiven for hearing only faintly a swimmer within the echoes of the waves beneath.  
The dualistic nature of this proposition does not want to give the impression that the periplus and 
the periplum, the audience and the author, the swimmer and the captain, erase each other; rather it is 
to always suggest a blending of great expanses. For this PhD is what lingers in the liminal, what is 
suspended within a mettisage of still surfaces. A swimmer, on his back, views only the sky, feels only the 
sensations of an ocean expanse, and confuses one with the other.  It is to one of these swimmers we will 
now turn to, a swimmer who tried to realise the infi nite expanse of their fl oating world.
80   See, Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, trans Helene Iswolsky, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 413-415.
81   The term periplum was coined by Ezra Pound in the Cantos. See; Hugh Kenner, The Poetry of Ezra Pound, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1985), 102-103.
82   Melville, Moby Dick, 140.
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Fig 10
The cast of Impressions d’Afrique, with Raymond Roussel as sailor, arms crossed, second from right 
Image removed due to copyright
The cast of Impressions d’Afrique, with Raymond Roussel as sailor, arms crossed, second from right. Reproduced from François Caradec, 
Raymond Roussel, trans. Ian Monk (London: Atlas Press, 2001), 138.
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A View from Roussel’s Window
In 1896 eighteen year old Frenchman Raymond Roussel wrote and published, at his own expense, 
a six-thousand line poem in alexandrine verse entitled La Doublure.1  The poem describes a romance 
between an unaccomplished actor, Gaspard, and a women named Roberte whom he can only see 
when her rich boyfriend is away. The poem opens with Gaspard dressed in theatrical costume at the 
end of a performance; he has, once again, fumbled his scene and mumbled his lines which incurs the 
mocking laughter of the audience.  To console Gaspard, Roberte recommends that they both leave 
Paris for Nice to partake of the festivities of the carnival.2 Two-thirds of the alexandrine couplets tell 
of Gaspard and Roberte masked, carrying confetti and shovels, as they navigate the carnival in Nice. 
Roussel’s language focuses on the papier-mâché fl oats, carnival masks and gestures of the festival as 
it slips into night, and immerses the reader into the spectacle and false appearance that dominates the 
carnival. The last scenes of the poem are spent down by the sea, before ending with Gaspard lamenting 
the loss of Roberte who has up and left him. The poem fi nishes with Gaspard,  made up in the costume 
of Mephistopheles – the devil’s physical stand-in, who speaks for the devil, and who makes himself 
everyone’s lover by deception – and stranded in a booth, working for a travelling theatre that has set 
up at a fair in Neuilly.
Roussel’s early literary technique evident in La Doublure’s images of the carnival, but also exhibited 
in other early work, including La Seine, a seven-thousand line verse play with fi ve-hundred speaking 
parts and Les Noces, a twenty-thousand line unfi nished poem describing soap bubbles blown by a 
child, are composed of  “descriptions of a terrifi c accuracy,”3 such that what is conceived is a literature 
wholly described by a series of “exhaustive observations.”4 This technique presents to the audience 
nothing outside an inventory of observations, and thus nothing that could reveal some hidden moral 
or ethical agenda behind the work. As Alain Robbe-Grillet states: “Roussel describes, and beyond 
what he describes, there is nothing.”5  The observations can be conceived no other way as the audience 
is confronted with the only way by which Roussel could write.  Privy to Roussel’s descriptions the 
1   For a synopsis of the poem La Doublure, a poem which still remains to be translated in full into English, I have relied on: Roger Vitrac, “Raymond Roussel” in, 
Raymond Roussel: Life, Death and Works, Atlas Anthology 4, ed. Alastair Brotchie, (London: Atlas Press, 1987), 49-50; Rayner Heppenstall, Raymond Roussel: a criti-
cal study, (Berkley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), 22-23; Mark Ford, Raymond Roussel and the Republic of Dreams, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell 
University Press, 2000), 46-47; and John Ashberry’s introduction in, Raymond Roussel, How I Wrote Certain of My Books, ed. Trevor Winkfi eld, (Cambridge, Mass.:Exact 
Change, 1995), xv-xvi.
2   As Ford points out, Roussel had attended,with his mother the Carnival in Nice since aged thirteen however, Roussel’s descriptions do not match precisely with 
the actual fl oats presented in 1896.
3   Vitrac, “Raymond Roussel” 49.
4   Ford, Raymond Roussel and the Republic of Dreams, 49.
5   Ford quoting Robbe-Grillet in, Ford, Raymond Roussel and the Republic of Dreams, 49.
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audience is caught up in the unrelenting mobility of the text as it confronts, without fail, every colour, 
texture sound or gesture rendering with acuity the inimitability of every object and scene, in such a 
way that no hierarchy could place any description above or below the other. Robbe-Grillet describes 
Roussel’s approach in these terms:
 We are in a fl at and discontinuous universe where everything refers only to itself. A universe 
of fi xity, of repetition, of absolute clarity, which enchants and discourages the explorer […] 
The clarity, the transparency, exclude the existence of other worlds behind things, and yet 
we discover that we can no longer get out of this world.6 
Roussel conceived La Doublure as “a novel in verse,”7 his preface advising the reader that, “as this 
book is a novel it must be begun at the fi rst page and fi nished at the last one.”8 Roussel’s sage advice 
might have off ered at least some confi dence to any eventual readers of La Doublure, for while politely 
praised by Marcel Proust,9 the poem failed to fi nd an audience. This lack of immediate success would 
bring on in Roussel a severe depression which would lead him to become a patient of the psychologist 
Dr. Pierre Janet. Janet reported Roussel’s case, some years later, under the name of ‘Martial’, the given 
name of a character from Roussel’s later novel Locus Solus.10 Martial, according to Janet, was wholly 
convinced of his impending glory. Martial is quoted by Janet as aphorising: “I shall reach great heights, 
I have been born for a blazing glory.”11  Janet mentions the intensity by which Martial worked on his 
fi rst work, a poem, that can only have been Roussel’s La Doublure: 
[...] he worked assiduously almost without ceasing, day and night, with no feelings of 
fatigue […] he lost all interest in anything else and has great diffi  culty in interrupting his 
work in order to eat from time to time. He was not entirely motionless, he took a few steps, 
then wrote a little, but he remained immobile for hours on end, pen in hand, absorbed in his 
reverie and his sensations of glory.12 
Martial’s collapse begun when walking out from his residence after the poem’s publication, the 
people in the street failed to notice the radiance streaming from him, and after he had so fastidiously 
kept hidden this radiance in his cell above the street as he wrote the poem. Martial confessed: “I did 
indeed have to take precautions, rays of light were streaming from me and penetrating the walls, the 
sun was within me and I could do nothing to prevent the incredible glare.”13  
Roussel, after his initial treatment with Janet, (with whom he would remain in contact with 
throughout his life), would repeatedly try to re-capture this fi rst euphoric radiance that had appeared 
during the writing of La Doublure. His substantial wealth accrued on his father’s death, the means by 
which he self-funded the publication of his works and theatre productions, also allowed him to travel 
the world. His travels however appear not to have been for the purpose of infl uencing his work. Michel 
Leiris, one of the few people to have known Roussel and had continuing conversations with him in 
6   Ford, quoting Robbe-Grillet in, Ford, Raymond Roussel and the Republic of Dreams, 48.
7   Ashberry, introduction in, Roussel, How I Wrote Certain of My Books, ix.
8   Vitrac, “Raymond Roussel” 49.
9   Proust wrote to Roussel: “Like the Child Hero of the Fable, you unfalteringly bear the weight of a formidable poetic apparatus…” Roussel, How I Wrote Certain 
of My Books, note 29, 39.
10   For the full account of Martial’s malady, refer to Dr. Pierre Janet, “The Psychological Characteristics of Ecstasy” in, Raymond Roussel: Life, Death and Works, Atlas 
Anthology 4,  ed. Alastair Brotchie, (London: Atlas Press, 1987), 38-42. Roussel also draws the readers attention to this in, Winkfi eld, How I Wrote Certain of My Books, 19.
11   Janet, “The Psychological Characteristics of Ecstasy,” 38.
12   Janet, “The Psychological Characteristics of Ecstasy,” 39-40.
13   Janet, “The Psychological Characteristics of Ecstasy,” 39.
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part because Roussel was a client of his father,14 suggests that Roussel’s travels were for the intention 
of, “paying serious attention only to the panorama which unfolded within him.”15 The French 
surrealist André Breton, quoting Leiris, explains that: “in Pekin, [sic] Roussel shut himself away after 
the most cursory visit of the city. Just as he had stayed in the cabin of his ship writing, when he had 
the opportunity of going ashore in Tahiti.”16  It could be suggested that this was in large part because 
of Roussel’s inability to conceive of these new landscapes, and that, it was about reconfi rming existing 
narratives not once, but several times over so as to establish what Leiris termed a “cult of precedents.”17 
Roussel’s obsessive behaviour whilst traveling and writing extended to wearing his collars just once, 
his shirts a few times, ties three times, and everything else fi fteen.18 Leiris commenting on Roussel’s 
peculiarly relationship to these new environments explains that: 
“Everything that is new disturbs me,” he would say, and so profound was his horror of 
change that, according to Charlotte Dufrêne, it would happen that having once performed 
a certain act, he would perform it again because the precedent thus formed had the force of 
an obligation.19 
This is not to say that Roussel did not like travelling, in fact it appears that he sought to distance 
himself from any obligation to stay put. An article in La Revue de Touring-Club de France, in August 
1926, featured a “very luxurious and practical house on wheels devised by M. Raymond Roussel.”20 
The article explains that: “The car is really a small house. In fact it comprises, by means of an ingenious 
system: a sitting room, a bedroom, a study, a bathroom and even a small dormitory for the staff  of 
three man-servants (two chauff eurs and a valet).”21 Such was the caravan’s innovation that it would earn 
the praise of both Benito Mussolini and Pope Pius XI. The latter, unable to leave the Vatican, instead 
sent out a adviser which caused Roussel to comment, conjuring the most humorous of images, on 
why he could not have just driven his caravan into the Vatican. 22  Roussel’s pride in his invention was 
evident. he confi ded to Roger Vitrac that: “It is very agreeable;” enabling him to: “stop where I please 
and go on when I please, a regular land yacht.”23 
Towards the end of Roussel’s fi fty-six year life span, his continuing desire to recapture the glory 
he had felt while writing La Doublure would cause him, enabled by his wealth,  to procure an extensive 
range and sum of barbiturates that he would self-medicate with. The extent of his narcotics abuse 
would be revealed on his death (it has been argued from an unintentional overdose, as a suicide or even 
at the hands of his chauff eur, who had apparently tried to blackmail Roussel’s nephew and heir by 
revealing Roussel’s supposed homosexual relationship with the chauff eur)  in a hotel in  Palermo, Italy 
14   Michel Leiris’ father, Eugène Leiris, was Roussel’s stockbroker. The family knew him well enough to have nicknamed him ‘Ramuntcho’. He would also play piano 
and give readings of novels to entertain Leiris’s family, particularly his children. François Caradec, Raymond Roussel, trans. Ian Monk (London: Atlas Press, 2001), 74-76.
15   Madeleine Gobeil, Michel Leiris, Carl R. Lovitt,  “Interview with Michel Leiris,” SubStance, Vol. 4, No. 11/12 (1975), note 3, 59. Leiris as quoted from Fibrilles.
16   Andre Breton, “Raymond Roussel” in, Raymond Roussel: Life, Death and Works, Atlas Anthology 4, ed.  Alastair Brotchie, (London: Atlas Press, 1987), 59. 
17   Michel Leiris, “Conception and Reality in the Work of Raymond Roussel” in, Raymond Roussel: Life, Death and Works, Atlas Anthology 4, ed. Alastair Brotchie, 
(London: Atlas Press, 1987), 75.
18   Leiris quoted in Caradec, Raymond Roussel, 113. Following his involvement in WW1, Roussel took to wearing the same clothes continuously, having noticed how 
well his army uniform had worn. “After beating all the records for elegance,” he told Charlotte Dufrene, “I am now going to beat all the records for inelegance.” 
Caradec, Raymond Roussel, 171.
19   Leiris, “Conception and Reality in the Work of Raymond Roussel,” 75.
20   F.T., “M. Raymond Roussel’s House on Wheels – Full-scale Motorised Camping” in, Raymond Roussel: Life, Death and Works, Atlas Anthology 4, ed. Alastair Brotchie, 
(London: Atlas Press, 1987), 149.
21   F.T., “M. Raymond Roussel’s House on Wheels – Full-scale Motorised Camping,” 149.
22   Vitrac, “Raymond Roussel,” 52. 
23   Vitrac, “Raymond Roussel,” 52.
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in 1933. Found partially dressed, it appears Roussel had dragged the mattress from the bed onto the 
fl oor because of his fear of falling out of bed24 and, placed it opposite the bolted door that was shared 
between his own room and the room of his travel companion of some twenty-three years Charlotte 
Dufrêne. Dufrêne’s role throughout these years appears to have been to mask Roussel’s true sexuality 
from public scrutiny.25  Dufrêne had, in the days leading up to his death, taken it upon herself to keep 
a diary of his barbiturate consumption. The daily inventory is worth quoting in full, fi rstly, so that 
the extent of Roussel’s search to recapture the sensations of glory he had felt during the writing of La 
Doublure might be realised and secondly, to suggest that the relations of the fi rst proposition extend 
from La Doublure, across his literary oeuvre, and onto Dufrêne’s scrap of paper, his last work. The list 
begins Sunday 25th June, and the last entry is Thursday the 13th July, the day before the morning of the 
discovery of his body:
That evening at six o’clock, Roussel took 6 Phanodrome tablets, then again, the same 
number at half past one in the morning. On the 26th., he began at ten past fi ve in the afternoon 
with 8 Hipalene; he took two more of these and immediately after that 4 more at half past 
nine; 30 others “in all during the night”. The 27th: one and a half bottles of Veriane. The 28th: 
at sixteen-thirty hours, 3 Rutonal tablets, three more at eighteen hundred hours, twelve more 
during the night: “18 in all without sleep”; or rather, with three hours sleep. The 29th. Is the 
great Soneryl day: 4 at seventeen hundred hours, 4 at eighteen-thirty hours; sleep at twenty-
two hundred hours, “wonderful euphoria” for twenty-four hours. The 30th: “Somnothyril 
19 without euphoria”, but with six hours sleep. The 1st. July: one bottle of Neurinase. The 
5th: two bottles of Veronidin. The 6th: he returns to Soneryl: 16 tablets, nine and a half hours 
sleep, “very great euphoria”. The 7th: at half past nine in the evening, 6 Hypalene, then 18, 
then 3 Soneryl; “a good state of euphoria”. The 8th: 20 Somnothyril tablets and a bottle of 
Neurinase: without eating, but in a state of euphoria all day. The 9th: 11 Phanodorme tablets. 
The 10th: two bottles of Veronidin at twenty-one hundred hours; a good sleep. The 11th, at 
the same time: 34 Rutonal tablets; three hours sleep. The 11th, at the same time: 34 Rutonal 
tablets; three hours sleep and then “marvellous euphoria”. The 12th: one and a half bottles of 
Veriane; a little sleep and then “excessive euphoria”. Thursday, 13th, the last note: Soneryl.26
Roussel’s illuminated cell in which he writes above the street, compels us to revisit the vision of 
another: Raggatt’s malady, his own, is posited in the street looking up at Building Eight’s illuminated 
interior. Just like Roussel, Raggatt fi nds that his affl  iction fi ts onto a scrap of paper – his confession 
at least addressed to someone. On one side the image of an ocean liner, on the other the elevation of 
24   Leonardo Sciascia, “Acts Relative to the Death of Raymond Roussel” in, Raymond Roussel: Life, Death and Works, Atlas Anthology 4, ed. Alastair Brotchie, 
(London: Atlas Press, 1987), 135.
25   On Roussel’s homosexuality, Foucault states:“Between cryptography and sexuality as a secret there is certainly a direct relationship. Let’s take three examples: 
When Cocteau wrote his works, people said, “It’s not surprising that he fl aunts his sexuality and his sexual preferences with such ostentation since he is a homosexual.” 
Then Proust, and about Proust they said, “It’s not surprising that he hides and reveals his sexuality, that he lets it appear clearly while also hiding it in his work, 
since he is a homosexual.” And it could also be said about Roussel, “It’s not surprising that he hides it completely since he is a homosexual.” In other words, of the 
three possible modes of behaviour – hiding it entirely, hiding it while revealing it, or fl aunting it – all can appear as a result of sexuality, but I would say that it 
is related to a way of living. It’s a choice in relation to what one is as a sexual being and also as a writer. It’s the choice made in the relationship [Page break] 
between the style of sexual life and the work. On refl ection it should be said that because he is homosexual, he hid his sexuality in his work, or else it’s because he 
hid sexuality in his life that he also hid it in his work. Therefore, I believe that it is better to try to understand that someone who is a writer is not simply doing 
his work in his books, in what he publishes, but that his major work is, in the end, himself in the process of writing his books. The private life of an individual, 
sexual preference and his work are interrelated not because his work translates his sexual life, but because the work includes the whole life as well as the text. The 
work is more than the work: the subject who is writing is part of the work. Michel Foucault, Death and the Labyrinth: The World of Raymond Roussel, trans. C. Ruas, 
(Garden City, New York: Double Day & Company, 1986), 183-184.
26   Sciascia, “Acts Relative to the Death of Raymond Roussel,” 132. The actual page is replicated page 130.
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Building Eight. On one side, the image of those aboard waving goodbye, and on the other, Building 
Eight bound to the inertia of its built predicament. Roussel, dominated by his desire to reclaim this 
glory fi nally falls prey to himself, and it is no diff erent for Raggatt, who in his letter to Corrigan admits 
that he may have gotten the better of himself. Whereby Roussel’s moment of glory is followed by 
ingestion, Raggatt has it the other way, his liquid intake disclosing the constellation of Building Eight 
and ocean liner, bathed in a mysterious light. But how, may you ask, can Roussel and Raggatt, standing 
at either end of a curious spectrum be introduced to the other? Is this not just a protracted back-peddle 
permitting one image to unfold another for the benefi t of the author? 
Given the prominence of Building Eight and the ocean liner evident in the preliminary passage of 
A Clinic for the Exhausted in the AA Unbuilt entry, and evidenced further by the preamble, prologue 
and introduction of this PhD, an alliance with Michel Foucault’s account in the publication Death 
and the Labyrinth of Roussel’s literary work off ers the possibility of an explanation that attends to 
the simultaneous approach, intersection and dispersion immanent in the dual events – in the 
textual gathering here and now of A Clinic for the Exhausted  with Roussel’s project of writing, and 
the imperceptible forces that bring Building Eight into unforeseen adjacency with  an ocean liner. 
Seized by this opportune diversion, A Clinic for the Exhausted envisions a continuous circular voyage, 
dispatching both Roussel and Raggatt’s projects - an encounter with every point along the continuous 
mobility of their literary horizons - into the molecular fl ows of this exegesis. 
 Raggatt and Roussel treacherous encounter will be pursued across a shared landscape,27 a smooth 
space that can, ultimately, “only be explored by legwork.”28 It is the assertion of this chapter to 
proceed like Roussel’s writing whereby every instance is as persuasive as the last. Every enumeration 
henceforth gives the ‘green light’,  enables both Raggatt and Roussel to preempt the critics of their 
work, because this is not a history of a certain individual, but rather potential histories affi  rmed by 
the throng of the crowd.  According to the sense of this seascape, there is no determinate location by 
which we may have recourse to make our way. Hence Roussel’s Epigenetic Landscape will be cut short at 
the middle of this compendium. Conceived as a demonstration of the Borgesian vademecum, this one 
leaf textual disruption inserted between Book 1 and Book 2 will counterpoise the drawings and images 
that compose The Swimming Pool Library and The Landscape Room.
Mobilising a Methodical Treatment of Chance
Two almost identical sentences were used to compose the beginning and end of Roussel’s novel 
Impressions d’Afrique 29 (1910). Roussel began the creative process of writing the novel with the sentence 
27   The ‘Epigenetic Landscape’ was a model for the contingent morphology of form, fi rst put forth by Conrad H. Waddington in his publication, Strategy of the Genes 
(1957). The model is described by an undulating surface, the epigenetic surface, determined by an assemblage of bonds that have one end fi xed to its underside and 
the other to a plane located beneath it.  The epigenetic surface is itself highly malleable, its undulating surface an expression of the array of connections that secure 
themselves randomly to the underneath of its surface from a matrix of points on the fi xed plane beneath. The ties also link to one another, drawing a three-dimensional 
matrix which results in every change in any one parameter being measured by the whole. On top, the epigenetic surface appears as a surging ocean surface, the 
evolution of a given form – its initial representation by Waddington takes the form of a small marble at the mercy of this surface - is determined by how it makes 
its way across this surface, the depth of the troughs determining paths, while the peaks mark out possible thresholds which the rolling marble may overcome by its 
own force, and therefore realise alternative developmental pathways. Sanford Kwinter, in his seminal essay Landscapes of Change: Boccioni’s Stati d’animo as a General 
Theory of Models introduces time to our understanding of the epigenetic model, conferring a certain conditionality upon the marbles progress, on account of  the 
deviations in the contours of the surface as a result of the bonds beneath which have the ability to shift, and which occasion the appearance of the peaks and troughs 
that the marble consequently navigates. See: Sanford Kwinter, “Landscapes of Change: Boccioni’s Stati d’animo as a General Theory of Models”, Assemblage 19, 1993.
28   Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari,  A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans., Brian Massumi, (London & New York: Continuum, 2004), 409.
29   John Ashberry in his introduction to Foucault’s Death and the Labyrinth gives a summary of  Impressions d’Afrique as follows:  “A group of Europeans has 
been shipwrecked off the coast of Africa. Talou, a tribal king, is holding them for ransom. In order to distract themselves until the ransom money arrives, the trav-
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‘the white letters on the cushions of the old billard table’ (les letters dub lance sur les bandes du vieux 
billard)  juxtaposed against ‘the white man’s letters on the hordes of the old plunderer’ (les letters du blanc 
sur les bandes du vieux pillard). The simple displacement of one letter results in a radically shifted sense, 
what is found in the fi rst sentence of Impressions d’Afrique by the word billard, fi nds an identical form in 
the approximation of the word pillard meaning plunderer in the fi nal sentence.  From these two words, 
Roussel would grow each sentence, selecting words for their resemblance but diff ering meanings. The 
resulting sentences would then set out a potential narrative that could fi ll the almost imperceptible 
dislocation of meaning imposed by Roussel’s grammatical disjunction. Having read the fi rst sentence 
of Roussel’s text, a reader would unwittingly realise the fi nal sentence, and would proceed knowing 
the narrative that they had yet to know. Nevertheless the void over which billard now refers to pillard 
exposes an area of doubt that marks the “neutral space of language.”30 As Foucault states “the uneasiness 
is not dispelled [by the narrative inbetween] since the indecision is infi nite.”31 On reaching the objective 
in the expression of the fi nal sentence, the narrative returns us to its starting point, to the confusion of 
language that manifested the movement of the narrative in the fi rst place. 
The narrative between the two points of reference marks the rhythm of Roussel’s procedure, and 
maintains the contrapuntal movement from the sentence inhabited by billard to another inhabited by 
pillard. This is not however a  simple linear progression charting the minor etymological diff erences, 
a homogeneous meter that exposes a hidden account of a narrative genealogy. Neither is it the case 
that the fi rst sentence picks up the second sentence or vice versa. No order of association that could 
diametrically oppose one sentence against another could organise the principle by which Roussel’s 
narrative progresses. It is the rhythm of Roussel’s language that systematically immobilizes the manner 
by which diff erence can incriminate an account; the narrative is the incommensurable diff erentiation 
located between  billard and pillard. Foucault acknowledges this process within Roussel’s latter novel 
Nouvelles Impressions d’Afrique (1932) in which “the sequence of comparisons, similes, distinctions, 
metaphors, and analogies fi lters one, monotonous, persistent meaning through countless words and 
objects, through endless repetitions which affi  rm, in 415 verses and over 200 examples, that what is big 
must not be confused with what is small.”32 In Impressions d’Afrique (1910) ‘what is big is not small’  is 
inverted to produce a narrative from which pillard and billard can do nothing to escape from each other; 
the narrative “articulates the impossible by amassing evidence with the most meticulous attention to 
detail.”33 In Nouvelles Impressions d’Afrique the detail is managed by the stuttering use of parentheses 
inside of parentheses, blocks of parenthesis that apprehend “lists of gratuitous gifts; idle suppositions; 
objects that have the form of a cross; or others that are similar in appearance but not in size, and which 
one must be careful not to confuse.”34  The narrative inexplicably changes direction; “sometimes as 
many as fi ve pairs of parentheses ((((())))) isolate one idea buried in the surrounding verbiage.”35  
ellers plan a “gala” for the day of their liberation. Each contributes a number utilizing his or her particular talents, and the fi rst half of the book is an account 
of the gala, punctuated by a series of his subjects who have incurred his wrath. The second half is a logical explanation of the preposterous and fantastic scenes 
which have gone before.” Foucault, Death and the Labyrinth, xxii.
30   Foucault, Death and the Labyrinth, 16.
31   Foucault, Death and the Labyrinth, 21-22.
32   Foucault, Death and the Labyrinth, 22.
33   Foucault, Death and the Labyrinth, 26.
34   Foucault, Death and the Labyrinth, xxv.
35   Foucault, Death and the Labyrinth, xxv.
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Roussel’s novel Chiquenaude (1900) extends the tumultuous play between the fi rst sentence and 
the last beyond the productive repetition of the sentence, allowing the potential transmutation of one 
sentence by another to resonant throughout the plot.  Foucault provides a synopsis:
one evening a music-hall comedy is being performed, but it’s not opening night (it’s the 
repetition of the reproduction). The spectator who is going to narrate the play has composed a 
poem which will be recited several times on stage by one of the characters. But the famous actor 
who has the part has fallen ill: an understudy will replace him. Thus the play begins with “les vers 
de la doublure dans la pièce fe Forban talon rouge” (the verse of the understudy in the play of Red Claw 
the pirate). This Mephisto twice removed appears on stage and recites the poem referred to above: 
a vainglorious ballad in which he boasts of being protected from harm by a piece of magical scarlet 
clothing that no sword can pierce. In love with a beautiful girl, one night he disguises himself – a 
new imitation – as her lover, a highwayman and an inveterate duelist. The bandit’s protective 
genie, his clever alter ego, discovers the devil’s plan in the refl ections of a magic mirror which 
unmasks the impersonator by repeating his image; he then takes the magical garment and sews 
inside it a lining made from a piece of moth eaten material of the same colour, a fl awed lining. 
When the bandit returns to challenge the devil to a duel, confronting his double played by an 
understudy, he has no trouble piercing the formerly invulnerable material with his blade, now 
separated and severed from its power by an imitation, to be exact, “les vers de la doublure dans la pièc 
du fort pantaloon rouge” (the moth holes in the lining of the material of the strong red pants)36
Roussel’s initial game of counterpoint that composed Impressions d’Afrique according to the play 
between sentence, is reproduced in Chiquenaude. What is initially avoided in Impressions d’Afrique 
is however celebrated in Chiquenaude,  not only in the return of the fi rst series of words in the last 
series, but within the premise of the plot that envelops the characters in a play of resemblances and 
mistaken identity. The path of the narrative is marked by the temporal duration of each sentence. As 
such, the movement of the narrative between billard and pillard, becomes, in Chiquenaude dimensional, 
the aforementioned objects become at  once a quality and a property of the narratives rhythmic texture.
Both sentences do not explicitly mark the end or beginning of Impressions d’Afrique. Roussel uses the 
two sentences to construct a framework for his novel, but they are not explicitly written on the fi rst and 
last page,  but fi nd themselves, implied by the narrative: pillard fi nds itself present in its associations with 
the actions of the characters that inhabit the plot, and billard becomes the force that sets in motion the 
narrative. Roussel elaborates the plot from the chaos between these two sentences, exposing the “whole 
brilliant and vibrant surface of words;”37 simultaneously opening the genus of the word billard and pillard 
and, fathoming future territories in which the plot can take place. Foucault provides a description of 
Roussel’s undertaking:
Each word of the eponymous sentence is associated with a kindred realm: from billard to 
billard cue, which often bears an inlay – a monogram of silver or mother-of-pearl – the initials 
of the purchaser, who during the game reserves for himself the exclusive use of it; which leads 
us to the word chiff re (initial/number). Each of these words will be treated as seminal words, used 
in an identical form but with a radically diff erent meaning.38 
36   Foucault, Death and the Labyrinth, 25-26.
37   Foucault, Death and the Labyrinth, 34.
38   Foucault, Death and the Labyrinth, 34.
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Roussel’s literary procedure descends further and further into the specifi city of each word and its 
accoutrements, the plot of the novel realised in the projection from one specifi city with its genus in 
the fi rst sentence, to another specifi city with its genus in the other sentence, the milieus sliding across 
the void that separates the two sentences “independent of any coherent meaning”39 and exploring the 
molecular “wake of the motion of words”40 that ensues both sentences rarefi ed being, not exterior to 
the chaos between, but within the chaos.  Hence, the movement that launched the sentences with the 
intention of a pure and homogenous outline of each other is marked by a periodic repetition of  the 
procedure which launched the narrative. Retracing his steps, Roussel would construct further passages 
to inhabit the plot from the matrixes of singular words derived from the composition of a found 
sentence: “The folk song “J’ai du bon tabac dans ma tabatière” (I’ve got good tobacco in my tobacco pouch) 
gives “Jade, tube, onde, aubade en mat à basse tierce” ( Jade, tube, water, mat object, to third base)”41 which 
goes on in part, to describe in Impressions d’Afrique a jet of water emanating from a jade tube watched 
over by a young poet who recites his poetry through a megaphone of mat silver metal. The movement 
from one sentence to another, from a sentence to a series of autonomous words enfolds the point of 
origin, that is,  the source of the movement is not replaced by a contrivance, it is not irretrievably lost, 
rather, an origin can be found in the excess of a claim to potentially be found anywhere. Foucault 
fi nds no reason why “knowledge of the actual text from which it [Roussel’s transformative process] 
starts is at all necessary,”42 believing that the existence of an origin that remains unknown “throws the 
reader into a state of being uncertain.”43 Despite the found sentence having a limited capacity to be 
arranged into a concurrent block of words, “the reader thinks he recognises the wayward wanderings 
of the imagination where in fact there is only random language, methodically treated.”44 That is, the found 
sentences are “homonymous to the initial words, but heterogeneous among themselves.”45    
Death in Venice
Georges Perec and Harry Mathews’ in their article “Roussel and Venice: Outline of a Melancholy 
Geography”46 illustrate a possible response when confronted by a seemingly haphazard array of evidence. 
Their article investigates fi ve sheets of paper bearing an outline for a verse play found stitched into a 
Renaissance-era book printed in Venice that had once been owned by Roussel. They deduce that the 
book had originally been bought in Venice in 1895 by his mother, Marguerite Roussel, with whom 
he was travelling at the time. Marguerite Roussel was there to visit a childhood friend whose son, 
Ascanio, then aged sixteen, Roussel, then aged eighteen, subsequently befriended during their three 
week stay. Analysing the fi ve pages of coded text left behind the authors conclude that Roussel and 
Ascanio had fallen in love. They suggest that the remainder of Roussel’s literary output was decisively 
infl uenced by this brief relationship and Ascanio’s death the following year. The premise is founded 
on authors’ suggestion that Roussel would spend the remainder of his life avoiding Venice during his 
extensive travels and, in his failure to name the city in his writing.  Perec and Matthews’ claim that this 
is a procedure by which Roussel avoids coming to terms with the location of his desire, Venice, and the 
death of his lover, Ascanio. Their essay proposes a map derived from a comparison between the literary 
39   Foucault, Death and the Labyrinth, 35.
40   Foucault, Death and the Labyrinth, 36.
41   Foucault, Death and the Labyrinth, 41.
42   Foucault, Death and the Labyrinth, 181.
43   Foucault, Death and the Labyrinth, 181.
44   Foucault, Death and the Labyrinth, 38. Emphasis mine.
45   Foucault, Death and the Labyrinth, 35.
46  George Perec & Harry Mathews, “Roussel and Venice: Outline of a Melancholy Geography” in, Can’tatrix Sopranica L.: Scientifi c Papers (London: Atlas Press, 2008), 
65-100.
B K 1 | 5 5
topography of his books on one hand, and the topographic reality of Venice on the other, a “Venetian 
mirror,”47 that produces a fi gure much like Roussel’s own monograph, the letter ‘R’ and its mirrored 
double.  In the fi rst instance the centre is Paris, while in the second, the centre is the hotel where he and 
his mother stayed during their visit to Venice. The allusion, within what amounts to an ongoing literary 
confession to a network of physical locations permit Roussel to explore the site of his desire till his death 
without, as it were, revealing its true signifi cance to himself or any other; masking his great love with a 
coded language, and burying it further within the complexity of his writing technique. The plot of the 
found play is revealed by the authors to be the story of a young man who is wrongly accused of killing 
his fi ancé but is afterwards saved when her fi nal words, having become trapped in the water within the 
pipes of the house are released from the showerhead, incriminating the family boatman. The young man 
is freed and his fi ancé revived.  Perec and Mathews’ conclude that the narrative of the play takes place in 
Venice, with a set quite literarily composed of the Renaissance-era book,  and roles which for all Roussel 
had set to cast himself in. They also suggest that while Roussel only ever writes the letter ‘V’ in the 
scant plot outline, it stands for ‘voyage’ and in turn ‘Venice’, and that the play, unable to bear his grief, 
must include  Venice by its absence. Roussel’s desire to erase Venice is continued through into the text, 
whereby, Perec and Mathews’ suggest,  Roussel merely  replaces the word ‘gondolier’ with the word 
‘boatman’. Furthermore, they argue that the young girl’s sudden resuscitation constitutes Roussel’s life 
long failure to grieve for his young lover.
Perec and Matthews’ scholarly article is convincing in its breadth, in the collection of the specifi c 
details, and demonstrates well known Rousselian procedures in a newly found work. However, the 
entire premise of the article remains a parody.48 They argue that anyone intending to write on Roussel’s 
literature  does so knowing full well the complexities of his writing method, the existence of original 
images and sentences not found, not to mention the peculiar life of the author, and are subsequently 
unable to fail to see something as they navigate their research. To progress through Roussel’s writing 
is a task fi lled with anxiety; it remains impossible to acknowledge the full thickness of his literature or 
fathom the bottom of his writing procedure. Both authors suggest, by way of their scholarly article, 
that  any critic with just such intention sets out to fail, and that accordingly the task of any critical 
text on Roussel becomes one of accommodating the potential of an origin yet to emerge rather than 
reducing his writing to a series of key sentences. That is, any audience of Roussel will not fi nd the key 
statement or the key image by which his entire literary oeuvre could be unlocked and revealed, because 
every sentence or image off ered by Roussel’s work is left open to another, and so on. While Roussel’s 
posthumous confessional text, How I wrote certain of my books, outlines the origins of some key sentences, 
47   Perec & Mathews, “Roussel and Venice: Outline of a Melancholy Geography,” 87.
48   Bernard Magné offers an insightful glimpse into Perec’s literary games. On having an article included in the exhibition catalogue for Maps and Figures of the 
Earth, held at the Pompidou Center in 1980,  Perec responds to his interviewer :  “The last fake that I made, no one identifi ed it [laughter]. It’s in a catalogue 
on cartography. ... I wrote a text on cartography that I did not sign and where I appear in tiny letters at the end, as translator. I appear in the index [of the 
catalogue, as a contributor]. People leafi ng through the index said to themselves: “Well, what’s he doing in this catalogue?,” they search but they don’t fi nd ... Right 
there, that is the height of fakery. No one even knows that it’s a fake.” Bernard Magné, “Georges Perec on the Index,” trans. Peter Consenstein, Yale French Studies, 
No. 105, (2004), 72-88; 87-88. 
 Douglas Fogle, in turn offers another delightful moment of a counterfeit activty, and I include it here as it seems pertinent to the passage of this 
chapter : “[Mel] Bochner, who like [Bruce] Nauman, began experimenting with photography in 1966, had originally compiled a list of quotations about photography 
as part of an article that he submitted to Artforum in 1969 under the title ‘Dead Ends and Vicious Circles’.  When the article was rejected for publication, Bochner 
brought together a number of these quotations to form his “theory of photography.”  Presented on note cards in a manila envelope, the nine photographs of handwrit-
ten quotes that constitute this work, the Misunderstandings: A Theory of Photography (1967-1970), were derived from purported sources as wide-ranging as Marcel 
Duchamp, Mao Tsetung, and the Encyclopaedia Britannica.  The problem was, however, that three of these citations were fabrications by the artist (it is still unclear 
which ones), slipped like a virus into the discussion of the truth function of photographic representation.” Douglas Fogle, “The Last Picture Show” in,  The Last Picture 
Show: Artists Using Photography 1960-1982, ed. Douglas Fogle, (Minneapolis: Walker Art Center, 2004), 9-20:13.
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and the manner by which Roussel’s procedures progressed, it is Foucault who reminds us that even this 
book is still written by him, that it is also part of his literary out put, and that we have no way of knowing 
that it has not undergone the same or a diff erent literary transformation at the hands of Roussel.49  At 
best, an audience of Roussel’s work can conceive of nothing but the excess of what is before them. As 
both Perec and Matthews attest: 
Any attempt to explain Roussel stumbles over the obstinate fact of his unfathomable method. 
Our claim that the hypothetical play whose possible origins we have attempted to describe is 
the last, posthumous metonym of a trip to Venice around which the delusion of writing was 
organised derives not from any illusion that our arguments defi ne Roussel but, in the last resort, 
from the incomparably Rousellian emotion the traveller feels when standing on the steps of the 
Evangelisti, he discovers for the fi rst time the city of which Roussel was the mental architect.50
Roussel’s ‘I’, an apparatus like no other, continuously tracing an imperfect line across a perfect 
surface. But for the fact that his work went unnoticed, the “dispassionate lucidity”51 of Roussel’s 
language that discloses potentially emotional scenes in unaff ected descriptions, manifested itself in 
the form of his self-beautifi cation removing any need to convince an audience of his greatness.52  It 
should come as no surprise then that Roussel’s fi rst published work, a poem, written the same year as 
La Doublure, and entitled Mon Âme should share with La Doublure Roussel’s self-confessed title of his 
fi nest achievement. Mon Âme concludes with the lines: “At this explosion deriving/From my universal 
genius/I see the world bow/ Before this name: Raymond Roussel.”53 His name: a confession made in 
the hope that he may once again confi rm his residence in a city of glory.  Leslie Hill observes:
Roussel’s work becomes a kind of celebration of his own name […] the author’s name […] 
is the only verbal unit to retain, paradoxically, its identity with itself, although it too in the 
later version of the poem [Mon Âme] was to suff er a transposition into that of Victor Hugo. 
Roussel becomes here, like Hugo, an orgiastic devourer of the dictionary, metamorphosed 
into a reincarnation of literature itself in the shape of its most splendidly prolifi c and self-
confi dent demiurge. Chance and destiny meet here in the ‘échéance’ of birth.54
Foucault regards Roussel’s assemblage as a machine that becomes ever more complex with every 
new inter-relation of word and image.55 It should be noted that  Roussel was an able pianist, having 
been admitted into the Conservatoire National de Musique in 1893.  Inseparable from the machines 
growing complexity is the mechanical noise of Roussel’s uncouth assemblage as it becomes louder 
and louder, so that even a faint resonance of the rhyming register that set the machine in motion 
cannot be heard. Furthermore, no intervening text could separate Roussel’s sensation of  glory and the 
description of the barbiturates he dies from. This gap is the brevity of Roussel’s own literary aff air, a 
compositional ambivalence that attempts to divide his literary out put and the fi nal list of barbiturates. 
Between the labyrinthine text that trawls but never again brings to the surface his initial claim to glory, 
pen held over paper, and his death marked out by Dufrêne’s list of barbiturate and their various eff ects, 
49   Foucault, Death and the Labyrinth, 6.
50   Perec & Mathews, “Roussel and Venice: Outline of a Melancholy Geography,” 94.
51   Ford, Raymond Roussel and the Republic of Dreams, 49.
52   As Ford states: “Roussel had no need to confront or harangue or convert his audience, for his supreme power ‘was a fact, an established fact’.” Ford, Raymond 
Roussel and the Republic of Dreams, 50.
53   See Ford, Raymond Roussel and the Republic of Dreams,
54   Leslie Hill, “Roussel and the Place of Literature”, The Modern Language Review, Vol. 74, No. 4 (Oct., 1979), 823-835. 835, Note 1.
55   Foucault, Death and the Labyrinth, 179..
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there is nothing. As the literary critic Pierre Macherey writes it is; “Roussel who is sick in language, 
who is suff ering from the sickness of language itself, from a sickness of which literature exhibits the 
exemplary marks.”56
Foucault argues against Janet’s diagnosis that Roussel’s complex language can be explained by his 
apparent illness because his anxiety concerns the failure of the public to see the same luminance he had 
expelled while writing and not the sensations he felt while writing.57 Roussel’s language is therefore 
not a symptom of his subsequent illness rather, his illness is the concern of his sensation of glory that 
emerged as a thickened and entangled literature that remained unrecognised. The foundation of his 
initial literary greatness was to elude Roussel for the rest of his life, as though on walking out the door 
of his apartment he misplaced the master key for which he would forever remain looking for.  His 
language is certainly fore-grounded by his illness but it is also silhouetted by the original sensation 
of his literary achievement. Neither his illness nor his literary output off ers a suitable or complete 
explanation for his language which Roussel made apparent through his incomplete confession in How 
I wrote…  as both allow the revelation of his language as though it cannot reveal itself, but must, as it 
were, take a form under a certain number of veils. It is between his illness and his work that Roussel’s 
language speaks. It is in the void between that Foucault suggests any conversation with Roussel must 
begin; not as though Roussel’s literary work masked his illness, as Janet would have it, or as though 
Roussel’s language spoke only of an eccentric and therefore easily dismissible interior monologue. 
It should be recognised that Roussel, from where he stood, spoke the truth.58 Roussel exposes the 
inability of language to concern itself with one thing, revealing the “proliferating emptiness of 
language,”59  what Foucault would defi ne, in relation to Roussel’s poem La Doublure, as a “tropological 
space.”60  As Foucault contends, language is necessarily open ended because it has the ability to claim 
one fi gure while also claiming another, and it is this that Roussel takes advantage of, illustrated at the 
start of this chapter by the title of Roussel’s poem ‘doublure’ which can refer to a double, an understudy 
or the lining of a piece of cloth,61  while bringing to light the remarkable moment when language 
could not  know what it was talking about. Foucault elaborates in The Order of Things:
[…] at the base of spoken language, as with writing, what we discover is the rhetorical dimension 
of words: that freedom of the sign to alight, according to the analysis of representation, upon 
some internal element, upon some adjacent point, upon some analogous fi gure. And if languages 
possess the diversity we observe in them; if from the starting-point of their primitive designations, 
which were doubtless common to them all owing to the universality of human nature, they have 
not ceased to develop according to the dictates of diff ering forms; if they have all had their own 
history, fashions, customs, and periods of oblivion; this is because words have their locus, not in 
time, but in space in which they are able to fi nd their original site, change their positions, turn back 
upon themselves, and slowly unfold a whole developing curve: a tropological space.62
56   Pierre Macherey, The Object of Literature, trans. David Macey, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 214.
57   Refer to the chapter “The Enclosed Sun” in, Foucault, Death and the Labyrinth.
58   As Macherey states, Foucault rejects Janet’s hypothesis, believing instead that “Roussel’s works are to regarded as the site for the emergence of truth.” Macherey, 
The Object of Literature, 213.
59   Foucault, Death and the Labyrinth,165.
60   Foucault, Death and the Labyrinth, 18.
61    Gilles Deleuze, “Michel Foucault’s Main Concepts” in, Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and interviews 1975-1995, ed. David Lapoujade, trans. A. Hodges & M. Taormina, 
(London & Cambridge Mass.: The MIT Press, 2007), note 8, 402.
62   Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Science, (London & New York: Routledge, 2002), 121-127; 126.
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Tropological space is where every language means nothing because, according to Foucault, language 
has as its foundation only the nothing from which it emerges. Equally the nothing gives space to a 
language of nothing that is the origin of all language.  Thus, Foucault concludes his account of Roussel’s 
literary contribution by suggesting that Roussel’s procedures for writing exposes the reader to the void 
from which all language emerges, and therefore from where all his commentators and critics speak from. 
As a consequence, the commentators and critics come to share in the circumstances of Roussel’s literary 
output; as Foucault concludes: “it makes his illness our problem. It enables us to speak to him in the 
context of his own language.”63   
On his world tour, in 1921, Roussel spent time in Sydney, Melbourne and Tasmania. A postcard 
from Roussel to Dufrêne, copied from the original by Leiris, shows Collins Street in central Melbourne, 
and reads: 
You would not like Melbourne, for it is full of handsomes [sic] cabs. I adore it, for I love this 
form of locomotion. I have already used the candle-powered heating, for it is winter here; during 
the fi rst part of the crossing, I think they would have melted without my lighting them. As my 
room faces due north, I have the sun all day. There are delicious oysters and as there is nor in the 
month, it is the perfect season for them. One evening, I intend to eat kangaroo soup, which is 
a great Australian specialty. Horse races are a passion. There are seven tracks in Melbourne and 
every other city likewise; as for towns, they all have at least one. This is the home of Melba; her 
real name is Armstrong and Melba a stage-name taken from Melbourne. Here, there are two 
sea resorts called Brighton and Menton. What was the point coming so far if it was just to go 
to Brighton and Menton, which I have already done! A thousand tender thoughts. Raymond.64
David Wills has pointed out that where Roussel means Mentone he leaves the ‘e’ off , instead 
referring to Menton. This could be the result of Roussel’s hand, or it may be Leiris who provides us 
with a transcription of the postcard, not least the possibility that the ‘e’ has been lost in translation from 
the original French, and paradoxically fi nds itself translated back into French. (menton translates from the 
French into the English for ‘chin’). Wills, like Foucault, concludes similarly that with any of Roussel’s 
texts, “it can never be a matter of anything other than minor divergences that are potentially enormous 
digressions”65 and that this makes Roussel’s postcard, “as much a model for his books as anything else,”66 
and that, as Perec and Matthews also suggest, permits him to construct a narrative that explores the 
fringes of Roussel’s literary oeuvre for:
 if life contaminates his [Roussel’s] art as soon as he signs it, and does so even more explicitly 
once he begins to explain the excursionary procedure for it, and if the procedure contaminates 
the impressions of Australia written on a voyage in 1921, then we would equally expect that 
procedure to contaminate all his work.67  
Wills proceeds to almost ‘fi nd’ Roussel in a painting by the Australian painter Charles Conder, A 
Holiday in Metone, off ering by way of Roussel’s own geographical displacement an excuse for the lapse 
between the year of the paintings conception in 1888 and Roussel’s own worldly travels in 1921. The 
63   Foucault, Death and the Labyrinth, 167.
64   Caradec, Raymond Roussel, 175.
65   David Wills, Prosthesis, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1995), 267.
66   Wills, Prosthesis, 266.
67   Wills, Prosthesis, 275.
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picture displays a beach, divided into foreground and background by an elevated pier. In the foreground 
sits a women in a chair reading, her back towards a dapper fi gure in a hat, while between them lying 
prone across the sand is a man, his lower leg partially obscured by his reading material. Wills suggests 
that we might convince ourselves of fi nding Gaspard and Roberte from La Doublure or that the painting 
presents the same over-determined description in Roussel’s poem La Vue.  We could speculate further on 
the characters – Roussel’s mother in the seat, her son upright and watching a part of the ocean beyond 
the canvas, or, Dufrêne reading over her diary, the prone fi gure of  Roussel stretched out in the sand 
crippled by the list of barbiturates - but Wills refrains.68 But, unlike Perec and Matthews, Wills takes care 
to pace out his excursion to Menton/Mentone in full sight of his readers and only after he has told then 
what he is about to do, informing his readers that: “I wish to give to the latter’s fi ctional extravagances 
a certain autobiographical sense, although by no means a traditional or psychobiographic one, and so 
reinforce the idea that he dies choking on an excess of words.”69 
Roussel’s life as much as his text, remains unconfi ned by parenthesis; unclosable, always unlocked or 
slightly ajar; parenthesis that frame not only the tightly packed and closely bound words, but also his room, 
enclosed on all sides, or on his death at the foot of a door between two rooms.  Hence, what allows Wills’ 
own text to drift becomes a game of ‘hangman.’ (A game that requires the right letters to be selected to 
spell out a word designated by a certain number of place holders. Every wrong letter derives a new line that 
composes fi rst the scaff olding and the noose, and then the body, arms, legs and heads of a fi gure. The word 
must be spelled out before this sketched fi gure is completed and thus hung, thereby losing the game).   The 
ambiguously present ‘e’ in Roussel’s postcard provides no end to his game, because an indeterminate line 
amends itself to Wills’ hung man. In the moments of his own death Roussel was said to have ejaculated, 
his erection the result being the same as if he had been hung. Roussel’s ‘e’ a line that amends itself to the 
convicted man as his erection, or taking it away, realising Roussel’s erection but only one of his legs.
Before his father’s bedside dresser that displays the barbiturates that allowed him to sleep, and  in the 
bedroom where his father would take off  his false leg, Wills’ stumbles on, his text encountering the boîte 
à surprises, a timber box contained within the bedside dresser that held amongst other things the licorice 
throat lozenges his father would give him as a child. Wills’ text uses the same propositional procedure 
that Roussel used in the novel Chiquenaude that allowed one word to be connected to another by the 
preposition à to realise the constructions dual meanings in the narrative. Wills’ box is but another Rousselian 
contamination, for the boîte à surprises conveys, in the slip of intonation and accent, the French word for 
limping - boîtier - and thus, Wills conjures both the movement and sound of his father’s gestural gait.70
Let us return to the motif of the ‘doublure’ that gathers the introduction into a manifest form. The 
poems carnivalesque theme, realised not least by Gaspard the actor and understudy, (admittedly not a 
good one in either case),  is a trope for the impulses behind the production of this exegesis. In his death 
Roussel is revealed as just the same, if not an understudy to them all: at a presentation of Impressions 
d’Afrique at the Théâtre Fémina in 1911, the title page informed the audience that they were about to 
see a play by M. Raymond Raissel; Robert Montesquiou included him in his book La Trépidation, under 
the name Edmond Russel; in the fi rst draft of Locus Solus he names the journalist as Raymond Noussel, 
and has Cantarel, the fi gure of the inventor, in the publicity handouts for the play, request the audience 
68   Refer Wills, Prosthesis for the following occurrences: menton translated as chin, 267; the painting by Conder, 269; Gaspard & Roberte, 272; La Vue, 272.
69   Wills, Prosthesis, 260.
70   Wills, Prosthesis, 278-285.
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read the book that he has just written under the pseudonym Raymond Roussel; while the Italian police, 
completing an inventory of the hotel room where he died, ascribe bound copies of Locus Solus to one 
Armand Roussel; he collected letters from namesakes, including Blanche Roussel and Henri Rousselle, 
and sent copies of his books to a namesake, Raymond Roussel; he was to once sit as a jury foreman for the 
trial of Louis Rousselet who had been charged with the attempted murder of his lover, and murder for 
killing the policeman who had come to arrest him. And, in every rhyming couplet of Roussel’s titles, in 
the double ‘ss’ and ‘ou’, do we not see the double ‘R’ of his monogram, or, in the rais, raies, rayons and roués 
of his half-submerged name?71 Roussel’s affl  iction impinging on Charlotte Dufrêne, whose real name was 
in fact Marie Frèdez, Charlotte was her middle name whilst Dufrêne was supposedly elected by Roussel 
for her.72 Ultimately, each in someway partakes of the other, an understudy and, no less a usurper.
Since that one moment, when Roussel’s very being illuminated the page he was writing on, he has 
been forever an impersonator, his own understudy to his illness and to this initial luminance. Conceived 
behind closed curtains, and born into the world, without anyone’s knowledge, a language introduced 
only after his death. But, the understudy was always the role he was born to play, for it was always where 
his glory was secure, his fi nal act, not the fi nale, but the realisation, that his death off ered an eternal 
return. “I only knew the feeling of success,” Roussel confesses, “when I use to sing to my own piano 
 accompaniment and, more especially, through numerous impersonations which I did of actors or of 
anyone else. But there, at least, my success was enormous and unanimous.”73
Every impersonation, every lyric subject, like each of Roussel’s imitations, are stitched in to the 
other, a lining turned out only to simultaneously be brought inwards which, in their coming together, 
marks the hinge around which Roussel’s roulette turns, permitting a game of chance. Does not Roussel’s 
‘land yacht’ so perfectly gather his self-confessed hero Jules Verne’s ocean going home  with the euphoric 
‘I’ of Rimbaud’s drunken boat? 74 A narcotic autobiography where from every window a diff erent 
landscape with a diff erent city can be seen, and that, as an eff ect of the author’s speed, makes every city 
pass tirelessly into his own.75   Does not the fact that there is more than one assembled, propose, through 
sheer numbers that is, of all possible impersonations, the atmosphere of a festival? From outside his 
window, as Roussel played out his last great mystery, he would have heard the roar of the crowd rushing 
from the fascist demonstration celebrating the arrival of the Italian air-force to the fête in honour of 
71   Hill suggests that Roussels ‘procedure’, by way of its rhyming “rooted perhaps in the double R of Roussel’s monogram – make it unlikely that the recurring ‘ou’ 
and ‘ss’ of many of Roussel’s titles (La Doublure, Impressions d’Afrique, La Poussière de Soliels) are entirely due to chance.” See: Leslie Hill, “Roussel and the Place 
of Literature,” The Modern Language Review, Vol. 74, No. 4 (Oct., 1979), 823-835. Note 1, 835. Goodman fi nds that “it is hardly surprising that the four syllables of 
the writer’s names seem to surface everywhere in the text. One can only speculate as to whether the repeated use of “rais” and “rayons” (rays), disguised in various 
permutated forms, is calculated onomastic play or an over-determined semic constellation that has been incorporated into “Martial’s” delusional system.” Lanie Goodman, 
“Le Corps-accord rousselien: Machines à composer” Espirit créateur, 26, no. 4 (1986), 52, as quoted in,  Wills, Prosthesis, 270.
72   For further explanation of these instances, refer to the excellent,  Caradec, Raymond Roussel: M.Raymond Raissel, 119; Edmond Russel, 151, 163; Raymond Nous-
sel, 194; Armand Roussel, 345; Blanche Roussel, Henri Rousselle, Raymond Roussel, 217-218; Louis Rousselet, 289; Marie Frèdez, 111, 346. Futhermore, a large canvas 
painted in 1902 by Francois Flameng decorates the ceremonial stair case of the Masséna Villa, owned by Victor Masséna. The painting portrays his wife, Princess 
d’Essling and her young son, Prince André Masséna alongside other family members. On the right, between two classical pillars is the Duchese d’Elchingen, (Roussel’s 
sister, Germaine Roussel); opposite, is the Duc d’Elchingen (Roussel’s brother-in-law, Charles Ney, father of Michel Ney, Roussel’s only heir on his death). Cardac points 
out that “in the background, a person, two small to be identifi able, can be seen at the fi rst-fl oor window of a white house with a terrace, behind a blind, looking at 
the scene from a distance. This onlooker probably depicts the artist, Francois Flameng (1856-1923); but, as certain Rousselians suggest, why not Raymond Roussel?” 
Caradec, Raymond Roussel, asterix, 73.
73   Roussel, How I Wrote Certain of My Books, 28; also, note 52, 44.
74   For the admiration Roussel felt for Jules Verne’s work, and his infl uence on Roussel’s own writing refer to : Roussel, How I Wrote Certain of My Books, note 17, 
35-36. Roussel’s reverence for other writers also included the work of Victor Hugo, and Pierre Loti,  see: Roussel, How I Wrote Certain of My Books, note 20, 36-37.
75   As Winkfi eld points out, Roussel was “an avid reader, he was fond of taking long car drives buried in his book (or rather the relevant pages which he’d torn 
out), never once glancing at the landscape whizzing past”. See: Roussel, How I Wrote Certain of My Books, note 20, 36-37
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Santa Rosalia, which included a “competition of fantastic allegorical lights on boats and barges on the 
stretch of water in front of the Foro Umbert.”76  Is not Dufrêne’s diary not merely the doublure of such 
a list off ered to us by Argan as an opening into Roussel’s own imaginaire? And, does not this list merely 
preface the publication of Roussel’s own key confession prepared in advance of his trip to Palermo and 
published on his death as How I wrote certain of my books? And if not Roussel then certainly the fact that his 
hypochondriac mother lived in constant fear of death and sickness and routinely travelled with a doctor, 
is evidence enough?77 What does it suggest if we are to know that Argan’s chair, no less a throne than 
any other, from Molière’s original performance is still used, at least a double of it, at every performance of 
Le Malade imaginaire at La Comédie-Française? Were not Molière’s upgrades to the theatre to allow quick 
scene changes, exactly what Roussel’s procedure presented on stage and off ?78 Should not Roussel, like 
Socrates, die soon after a bath, assured of his immortality?79 Is not Roussel’s confession a vademecum, 
when he advises the readers of his novel Impressions d’Afrique, on a slip of green paper, that those “not 
initiated in the art of Raymond Roussel are advised to begin this book at p. 212 and go on to p. 455, 
and then turn back to p. 1 and read to p. 211.”?80 Is not this green slip the same green that Molière was 
forever wearing on stage and off , whilst Roussel’s green veins distinguish him in comparison, no less 
than an emerald man, a  l’homme aux rubans verts?81 And would not such a title be followed by a Rousselian 
76   Sciascia, “Acts Relative to the Death of Raymond Roussel,” 135.
77   Mme. Marguerite Roussel was very protective of her beloved son Raymond. Following the collision between a two trains, one of which Roussel was on at the time, 
Roussel had to confi rm several times over that he had not been hurt. Once, she reprimanded him, for daring to compare himself with a monkey. Mme. Roussel lived 
in constant fear of death and sickness, routinely traveling with a doctor. Caradec recounts that around 1909 “ Roussel’s mother contracted a sore throat and, despite 
already employing a general practitioner, she made the acquaintance of Dr Gerorges Clement, an ear, nose and throat specialist, and brother of the Opéra-Comique 
tenor Edmund Clement, whom she greatly admired. She insisted that Dr Clement come to examine her throat every day and made no bones about telephoning him if 
he did not make himself suffi ciently available. Sometimes, she simply announced her arrival at the doctor’s home, at 37 Rue de Rome, and then promptly invited herself 
to dinner. Marguerite Roussel needed to be constantly reassured concerning her health. Her diaries are full of the names of the fashionalble resorts where she stayed 
according to the season (Monte Carlo in winter ; in summer, Aix-les-Bains, Châtelguyon, Évian, Mont-Dore, Luchon, Plombières, Royat, Saint Moritz; the end of the season in 
Dieppe and Biarritz), many of which are spa towns, though we do not know exactly what course of treatment she took in these resorts.” Caradec, Raymond Roussel, 93.
78   Critics were particularly confused and frustrated by Roussel’s play, La Poussière de Soleils (The Dust of Suns, 1926), however, they were complementary of the 
quickness of the set changes. It was speculated by the press that Roussel have offered the set changes extra money for every second they saved with each set change. 
Caradec quotes Michael Leiris, who remembers “giving him [Roussel] delight when, quite by chance, I praised the extraordinary brevity (so much so that when performed 
on stage the text was diffi cult to follow) of each of the anecdotes that make up Etoile au Front”. “ I endeavoured to tell each story using the fewest possible words,” 
Raymond Roussel replied.” Caradec, Raymond Roussel, for reviews of La Poussière de Soleils, see, 266-267; Leiris quote, 250.
79   On July 2, Roussel rang for the room servant, who found him covered in blood in the bathtub. He had opened his left wrist. A doctor was called, and his wrist 
patched up. Sciascia, “Acts Relative to the Death of Raymond Roussel,” 131. His subsequent regret at the attempt to cut his wrist, is perhaps, a consequence this 
form of suicide not befi tting his standing, that it was, as said of the cutting, ‘too easy’. In a letter to Dr. Janet, Roussel recounts his impressions: “Having arrived in 
a New  York hotel, I wanted to have a bath and that idea rather pleased me; I learnt that there were three thousand bathrooms in the hotel, that three thousand 
travellors could have a bath at the same time as me; my pleasure vanished […]. To enjoy something to the full, one must know that it is forbidden to toers, that 
is it is a privilege.” Caradec, Raymond Roussel, 184.
80   Michel Butor, “The Methods of Raymond Roussel” in, Raymond Roussel: Life, Death and Works, Atlas Anthology 4, ed.  Alastair Brotchie, (London: Atlas Press, 1987), 62.
81   The colour green was connected with eccentrics, and with the foolish and deranged. Critics have also suggested that it was Molière’s favourite colour, made ap-
parent by the interior of his apartment that contained a bed with bronze green feet, a dome of green taffeta, curtains and fringes of the same colour, tapestry with 
green bottoms, armchairs with green satin bottoms and the fronts of doors and chimneys all green, and that the brocatelle de venise, a form of satin wallpaper from 
Venice was also green. Furthermore, of the twenty fi ve costumes of Molière, ten are expressly green. The character of Alceste in Molière’s play, Le misanthrope wore 
green ribbons on his grey coat, while one critic suggested he wore a green hat. It is suggested that Molière chose green for Alceste because it was an unfashionable 
colour and would have affronted the audience, who would identify such an affront with the characters personality. However, Lawrenson notes that there is evidence that 
King Loius XIV wore plain jackets decorated with ribbons including green, and as such Molière would not have risked ridiculing his sovereign. He argues that Alceste 
is wearing green not as a misanthrope, a hater of mankind, but for his deep respect of it; not in excess of fashion, but that he follows the mainstream of fashion 
with restraint. For the complete argument refer to: Tom Lawrenson, “The wearing o’ the Green: yet another look at ‘l’homme aux rubans verts’” in, Molière:Stage and 
Study, Essays in Honour of W.G. Moore, eds. W.D.Howarth & M. Thomas, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), 163-170.
 In Roussel’s novel Locus Solus, the scientist and inventor Martial Catarel has invited guests to tour his garden. The novel is recounted through a series 
of tableaux vivants that are witnessed by his guests. One of those is the tale of Juel the Great, King of Kerlangueze, and the origin of a green veined slab of marble 
embedded with a gold ingot, and signed Ego. Juel appears to the present king, Kurmelen, and informs him to melt down his crown and hide it in Morne-Vert, a great 
cavern of sea-green marble studded with gold nuggets. Kermelen does so, signing beneath the now melted crown, Ego, so that it may be found again. The cave is 
protected by bewitched gates, which are opened by a secret password. Another tableau presents a series of musical tarot cards, infi nitely thin,  that derive their power 
and chance compositions from insects that lie within. The insects are named the emerald, in reference to the green-halo that they produce. Their luminosity is drawn 
from a plant from Scotland called the Caledonian wintergreen, which leaves the normally white insects a rich shade of emerald green. Raymond Roussel, Locus Solus, 
trans. Upert Copeland Cuningham, (London: Calder & Boyars, 1970). For the story of King Kurmelen, see 11-23; on the emerald, refer, 220-225.
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list of every nuance possible: vert naissant, vert gai, vert brun, vert de mer, vert de pré, vert de gris, merde d’oie, 
celadon…?82  And, does Roussel, like Molière, not play the part that he wrote for himself: “to Raymond 
Roussel, given by his namesake”?83 Should not the festival so perfectly be sending off  Roussel’s own 
great ship, described by Robert Desno’s inscription: “To Raymond Roussel | Defi nite calculation of the tides 
| Mathematics of constellations | Triangulation of destiny’s continents | Trigonometry of dreams | Meausre of time | 
Figure of silence,” below this, inscribed in ink, a small pen drawing depicting a boat at sea.84 Could this 
boat serve to illustrate that he dressed for his only part?85 Is not the noise, what every would be reader 
can hear from their desk or chair on reading this text, an open window and reading light substitute 
enough for a sky illuminated with lanterns or fi reworks each, in some small way replicating Roussel’s 
own green luminance;  the sound of Roussel working early in the morning echoing into the night, his 
literary loom driven by paddles describing a certain festival ship-fl oat already disclosed?86  And before 
the audience should rebuke me for so many propositions, so dismissively put, let me once again refer to 
Leiris, who knew Roussel much better:
It was extremely diffi  cult to get him to speak of his own work. From time to time, 
an isolated remark... But, in a sustained manner, it wasn’t possible. Charlotte Dufrêne, his 
confi dante, had spoken to me of this trait, and I had occasion to fi nd it out for myself. He 
had a gimmick for avoiding potentially bothersome questions, meaning those concerning his 
work. He would speak fi rst! He would ask news of all sorts of things! The last time I saw 
him, he asked me questions about all the members of my family and friends of the family 
whom he had known, in a way that was perfectly mind-boggling. It was because I had tried 
to question him...87
A Return to Venice…
A Clinic for the Exhausted is comparable with Roussel’s literary procedure by way of the heterogeneous 
narrative that is suspended in the antinomy between two points of reference. Furthermore, the 
narrative fragments that fall outside of the attributes of Building Eight and ocean liner are developed 
through an association with the ‘random language’ that is ‘methodically treated’ that Foucault argues 
Roussel’s work aptly demonstrates. The prevalence of dispossessed artifacts in A Clinic for the Exhausted 
that involve an opportune departure away from the localised context within their respective fi elds of 
literature, architecture, philosophy or the like, is because of the need to imagine and accomplish the 
world diff erently, sharing in some of the resonance or movement evident in the expatiated fl ight of 
Raggatt’s monstrous progeny.  Roussel’s procedures proliferate his literary larceny, what was gathered 
from “anything at hand.”88 Stolen away by Roussel, the reader is none the wiser. Raggatt exposes himself 
82   Lawrenson, “The wearing o’ the Green: yet another look at ‘l’homme aux rubans verts’”, 165-166; 166, note 15.
83   Inscription in a copy of Locus Solus addressed to a namesake. The full inscription reads “to Raymond Roussel, given by his namesake, who will preciously keep 
his witty letter.” Caradec, Raymond Roussel, 218.
84   Caradec points out that below this inscription is a small pen drawing depicting a boat at sea. Caradec, Raymond Roussel, asterix, 279.
85   Roussel took the part of one of the sailor’s in the 1912 production of Impressions d’Afrique. This is the only part he is known to have played in any of 
his theatre productions.  Leiris, copying Dufrêne’s comments, notes that: “He loved blue tunics and sailors’ uniforms with red pompoms,” while Michel Ney spoke of 
fi ghts in sailors’ bars. Caradec, Raymond Roussel, 18; 109.
86    Roussel uses métier (profession) aubes (dawns) to realise métier (loom) à aubes (blades of hydraulic wheel), conceiving in the process the loom the engineer Bedu 
has constructed on the shores of the Tez in Locus Solus. See: Roussel, How I Wrote Certain of My Books, 7, for Roussel’s explanation; and,  Foucault, Death and the Labyrinth, 
64, for an explanation of the mechanisms of the loom and its relationship to the procedure by which it comes into being. Foucault further identifi es in métier à aubes, 
Roussel’s own penchant for hard work. According to Dufrêne, Roussel “worked an average of three hours every morning, often with the curtains drawn, by electric light, 
starting and fi nishing at the same time, just like a clerk at his offi ce” See: Foucault, Death and the Labyrinth, 64;  Roussel, How I Wrote Certain of My Books, note 30, 39. 
87   Gobeil, Leiris, & Lovitt,  “Interview with Michel Leiris”,  46. See, 46-49, for Leiris’ comments regarding Roussel’s infl uence on his own writing, and Roussel’s suicide.
88   In listing the sentences on which he would perform his literary procedure, Roussel confesses that: “I used anything at hand”. Roussel, How I Wrote Certain of 
My Books, 13.
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to the same charge, when he procures the ocean liner to spirit Building Eight away. But, A Clinic for the 
Exhausted  does not operate with the intention of tracing Building Eight, imitating its form through out 
the project, nor does the ocean liner prescribe how we could know of A Clinic for the Exhausted. On their 
own both are unable to resolve the impasse that saw each become an instrument of the other. The image 
of a building casting a shadow across the ocean would not have been enough to realise the absence of an 
ocean liner stealing away into the night. When and if the ocean liner does exhibit itself to an audience’s 
undertaking of A Clinic for the Exhausted, it does not appear as how they might contend to know what an 
ocean liner is. The ocean liner is not purely an addition to Building Eight, nor is its appearance simply an 
expression of Raggatt’s surplus constitution.  A Clinic for the Exhausted  expresses the ocean liner through 
the competing articulation of Building Eight.  Like pillard in Impressions d’Afrique, the ocean liner is caught 
up in the cumulative eff ort of the innumerable observations that cultivate and further the architecture of 
Building Eight. The artefacts and ideas that compose the fi eld of knowledge regarding Building Eight 
invoke Roussel’s “haze of associations,”89 and function, much like the monogrammed billiard cue from 
whence was derived the word chiff re, according to their own rules of self-formation. Each architectural 
tableau that is accorded the title of a ‘Clinic’ within the undertaking of A Clinic for the Exhausted marks the 
conscientious accumulation of artefacts and ideas that constitute the many edges of building and ocean 
liner. Every tableau then comes to the aid of the movement between Building Eight and ocean liner and is 
also struck by Raggatt’s lone delirium. How a collective impression can be conveyed, drawn under the title 
A Clinic for the Exhausted, is realised by penetrating the specularity of Raggatt’s glance as it passes through 
the conjunction of ocean liner and building. It is the severe brevity with which Raggatt’s revelation draws 
together Building Eight and ocean liner that abandons the need to condition every artefact and idea.
Foucault identifi es in Roussel’s work “a certain way of making language go through the most 
complicated course and simultaneously take the most direct path in such a way that the following 
paradox leaps out as evident: the most direct line is also the most perfect circle, which in coming to a 
close, suddenly becomes straight, linear, and as economical as light.”90 The Ourboric passage of Roussel’s 
work anticipates this project’s engagement with Raggatt’s letter as it traverses every circumstantial 
accent of ocean liner and Building Eight. As Roussel’s text came to its beginning-end, as pillard reaches 
out to touch billard through the multicursal structure of the found sentences that traces the narrative of 
Impressions d’Afrique, and as our ocean liner reaches its destination from whence it departed, weighed 
down by the wealth of artefacts and ideas that it has plundered, their paths become straight and linear. 
Each curve is not unfolded and laid out so that the path taken may be revealed. Instead the circle is 
revolved around its other axis, reducing the angle of perception, and reducing the curve to a line. While 
the original curve is unseen, it is however felt.  Surrendering to the space of Roussel’s work and life, A 
Clinic for the Exhausted is distinguished by the founding of new endings, and the starting of old beginnings, 
perpetually narrating the history of its own obsolescence. 
Raggatt’s initial perception that confused building and boat is amplifi ed within the molecular 
circumstances of A Clinic for the Exhausted. Like the diff usion of billard and pillard into the self- propagating 
movement of their own continual association in the course of their numerous appropriations, Building 
Eight and ocean liner become the hinge from which the curvature of A Clinic for the Exhausted’s 
innumerable paths can revolve around.   Building Eight  does not substitute the ocean liner’s capacity to 
89   Foucault, Death and the Labyrinth, 32.
90   Foucault, Death and the Labyrinth, 31.
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draw a passage from its own potential movements, nor is Building Eight subservient to the movements of 
the ocean liner. The line that appears to strike each respective edifi ce is not the basis for a diff erentiation 
of Building Eight and ocean liner, but marks the inadvertent proximity of each artefact in the labour 
to emulate the other. One line constitutes the undermining of the sources of another that returns with 
full force the gesture of Raggatt’s initial line. This is not a case of one line following after another and 
so on; it belies the imperceptible distance of proximity that realises their actions simultaneously across 
the undertaking of A Clinic for the Exhausted. The many lines that compose Building Eight and ocean 
liner do not exhibit the same impression, the same felt force as one another. Instead, every line further 
dissolves the symbolic boundary that would seek to compare building and boat, stretching open the void 
between the eponymous fi gures of Building Eight and ocean liner such that the measure of their passing 
into one another is extended.
In as much as the convoluted theatricality of Roussel’s procedures could be acknowledged as an 
appropriate method of comprehending A Clinic for the Exhausted, (particularly as it discloses elsewhere 
other than in his text his literary conventions,) the expressive potential of a method that strays from 
passive agency to a lucid self-deception must recognises the performative potential of Roussel’s 
manuscripts to go further than a cast of artefacts and a set of procedures. Framing, by way of Roussel’s 
own procedures, the contrivance of Raggatt’s text permits A Clinic for the Exhausted the experiential 
opportunity to lay Building Eight and ocean liner on the same page.  This becoming-ocean liner is 
defi ned as an infl ection that registers the sudden change in Raggatt’s perception as it opens up across 
the surface of Building Eight. As Bernard Cache explains an ‘infl ection’ is what “designates a pure 
event of curvature where the tangent crosses the curve,”91  it is an intrinsic singularity between the 
extrinsic singularities, what we know as Building Eight and ocean liner. Because Raggatt’s drunken state 
permits only pure sensations he erases the coordinates of the axis by which we could claim his vision 
in Cartesian space and makes evident the encirclement of references and possibility which otherwise 
would be lost to sobriety; As Cache informs us, “infl ection is the sign of images that are strictly defi ned 
while being ungraspable.”92 Raggatt’s immersion suggested by a state of awareness that “concentrates 
only on infl ections,”93 coincides by chance and necessity with the opportunity that Building Eight take 
fl ight. The allusion in A Clinic for the Exhausted to a spilling out and spilling over is called into being by 
Raggatt’s conceptual Oedema which is then demonstrated by the ornate procedures of Roussel’s literary 
output. The conjunction of Raggatt and Roussel’s text propagates the relations of Roussel’s ornately 
conceived monogram of his mirrored initials:    R. The primary image of Building Eight as ocean liner, 
the infl ection characterised by the slippage from one image to another marked out by Raggatt’s glancing 
blow, is not a fi nal or closed image; as Cache explains furthers: “This perception is necessarily fl eeting and 
variable, since we can’t be come “used to it”. We can’t settle into it through the determination of a best 
reaction, it is a mobile image in which an unlocatable position eludes our comfort.”94 Hence Raggatt’s 
gaze, as it confl ates the dimensions of Building Eight and ocean liner, is forestalled by the specularity of 
the infl ection on the horizon and traced by the undertaking of his letter to Corrigan.
The line that marks the in between by which the image of Building Eight as ocean liner is constructed 
also intercedes in the intercalary space that marks Roussel’s turn from his own luminous ‘infl ection’ 
91   Bernard Cache, Earth Moves: The Furnishing of Territories, trans. Anne Boyman, ed. Michael Speaks, (Cambridge, Mass. & London: The MIT Press, 1995),16.
92   Cache, Earth Moves, 102.
93   Cache, Earth Moves, 36.
94   Cache, Earth Moves, 36-37.
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to the ‘infection’ of Rousselian procedures which contaminate his own literature, the writing of others, 
and thus what  must also make this exegesis suspect: the inf-|-ection,  a single ‘I’, that tempts the reader 
to posit the primacy of the biographical occasion in the task of interpretation, and that underwrites the 
operation of  their authorship. A Clinic for the Exhausted  is embodied in Perec and Matthews, and Wills’ 
virtuoso performance, but its expression is inseparable from the nature of its own emergence, an intimate 
knowledge of the phenomenon of Roussel’s desire to have sought through his writings a consideration 
of his very subject; as Roussel explains: “one writes to become someone other than who one is.”95 By 
mobilising the compositional equivalence of Roussel’s literary space, A Clinic for the Exhausted lies within 
the event of its speaking out but with the recourse to an unlimited space which can readily be written on, 
appropriated, used by any and everybody.
Raggatt’s letter blurs this vision, his ‘eye’, by representing the realm of uncontrollable resemblances 
as a register of his narrating voice, an uncertain lyrical subjectivity, which he selects as a cure for the 
diff erentiated relation between the subject and the object of vision. This is not to say that his cure would 
in fact absolve him of this vision. Like Argan’s tawdry inclusion into the profession, Raggatt’s cure is one 
that allows him to sustain his manifestation just that bit longer.  Furthermore, Raggatt as the narrator 
of this story is duplicitous, because he is not only the one who orchestrates the becoming-ocean liner of 
Building Eight, but he is also the one that transcribes it to the page. He is his own amanuensis. It is the 
scribe that allows the slip from infection and infl ection, Mentone and Menton, to pass into one another, 
introducing, by a lapse in concentration or an overzealous stroke of the pen, sporadically infecting the 
story  with an ‘I’.
To what extent that Roussel’s language can be scrutinized, separated or associated with the 
mechanisms that underlie the progress of A Clinic for the Exhausted is an endeavour that would evidently, 
(if we are to take into account the alignment and subsequent examination here) be caught up in a 
Rousselian refrain of its own. Nevertheless the experiment does not leave either Roussel’s work or that 
of A Clinic for the Exhausted indiff erent to the heedlessness of such an undertaking. Both projects are 
staked on the surfeit of excess which they induce unto themselves, a certain insistence and resistance 
to the conditions, junctures, fractures that are poised,  always doubly ready to address everyone and to 
draw a close.
The following text will address the unmeetable dimensions of this PhD, to the extent that the 
deforming potential of an ‘I’ that unmoors Building Eight from its concrete foundations initiates a 
practice that wields the power to think otherwise.
95   Foucault, answering a question from the translator Ruas that regards Roussel’s turn to theatre from writing to gain popular success, believes that Roussel 
had also sought popular success with his writing. Foucault states: “There’s a beautiful passage in which he said that after his fi rst book he expected that the next 
morning there would be rays of light streaming from his person and that everyone on the street would be able to see that he had written a book.” Foucault, Death 
and the Labyrinth, 182 .
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Fig 11
Marguerite Roussel admiring her recently purchased Charles Frederick Worth dress and pearls, circa 1900
Image removed due to copyright
Marguerite Roussel admiring her recently purchased Charles Frederick Worth dress and 
pearls, circa 1900. Reproduced from, François Caradec, Raymond Roussel, trans. Ian 
Monk (London: Atlas Press, 2001), 26.
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And is it a privilege of my present age or the misfortune of my whole life that I always 
see myself from behind, when in fact I’ve always had my back to the wall?
Jean Genet, Prisoner of Love1
His whisper was getting fainter and fainter, and all the time he stared straight out through 
the port-hole, in which there was not even a star to be seen. I had not interrupted him. There 
was something that made comment impossible in his narrative, or perhaps in himself; a sort 
of feeling, a quality, which I can’t fi nd a name for. And when he ceased, all I found was a 
futile whisper. 
Joseph Conrad, The Secret Sharer 2
A Question of the un/known
The philosopher Gilles Deleuze has stated that the outcome of his eff orts to study a history of 
philosophy through the aggregate interpretation of other philosophical practices amounts to a “sort 
of buggery or (it comes to the same thing) immaculate conception.”3 Deleuze conceives an image of 
himself “taking an author from behind and giving him a child that would be his own off spring, yet 
monstrous.”4  By taking a position out of sight and according an immaculate conception as the result of 
his transgressive collaboration Deleuze opens up the categorisation of his off spring to the monstrous. The 
designation of the monstrous is taken up by the unpredictable dimensions and variability of Deleuze’s 
procedures, as well as the radical condensation of unknown categories that would denote the off spring’s 
species-formation as monstrous. The monstrous in turn frames any discourse – including this one – that 
emerges as a consequence of the evidential impasse incurred by Deleuze’s model of transgression with 
his accomplice.  It will, therefore, be necessary for this text to address further the terms by which the 
monstrous at once binds and liberates any additional account, and, furthermore, how it may come to 
underpin the future circumstances of this thesis.
Teratology, or the science of monsters was founded by Etienne Saint-Hilaire and his son Isodore 
Geoff roy Saint-Hilaire in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. Teratogenists, as Marie-
Hélène Huet explains, believed a monster was something that could not carry out certain roles, such 
as the means to procreate.  To them monstrosity was another classifi cation of science, normalised by 
its inclusion into the ordering system of the scientifi c gaze, and within the economy of moral and 
physical heredity resemblances. A particular example of categorizing was Ernest Martin’s  Historie des 
monsters depuis l’antiquité jusqu’à nos jours (1880), which uses the terms ‘simple monsters’ and ‘complex 
monsters’. Camille Dareste  in his Production artifi cielle des monstruosites (1891) provided a more detailed 
model of Martin’s simple and complex classifi cations. Dareste determined four categories, hemiterata, 
being slight anomalies, and heterotaxia, hermaphrodisms, and monstrosities of a greater complexity. These in 
1  Jean Genet, Prisoner of Love, (London: Picador, 1990), 28, as quoted in, Cesare Casarino, Modernity at Sea: Melville, Marx, Conrad in Crisis, (Minneapolis & London: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2002), 208.
2   Joseph Conrad, “The Secret Sharer” in, The Nigger of the ‘Narcissus’ and other stories (London: Penguin, 2007), 187. This is a moment of pause as Leggatt explains 
his escape from the Sephora to the narrator. The narrator is ultimately left unable to express himself.
3   Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations: 1972-1990, trans. M. Joughin, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 6. Slavoj Žižek imprecates the Jewish legend of the birth of 
the Messiah to illuminate Deleuze’s sense of buggery and immaculate conception. Žižek goes on to explain that “God wants to give birth to the Messiah, but knows 
that all of the forces of evil are waiting in front of the vagina of Shekina to kill the Messiah the minute he is born. So God goes at night to his mistress, Lilith, the 
symbol of evil, and penetrates her anally (the expression used can also mean that he pees into her vagina). The Messiah will come from Lilith after anal sex: this is 
the way God tricks the forces of evil, by bringing the Messiah through evil.” See, Slavoj Žižek, Deleuze and the Lacanian Real, http://www.lacan.com/zizrealac.htm, 09 
September 2009. Also refer to: Moshe Idel, Kabbalah: New Perspectives, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988.)
4   Deleuze, Negotiations: 1972-1990, 6.
B K 1 | 7 2
turn were again divided, in such a way that hemiterata found itself composed of autosites, omphalosites and 
parasites. Experimentation thus became essential to the mapping of heredities and extended to producing 
‘monsters’ in the laboratory.5 
These interpretations compiled and outlined the development of the theoretical concerns of the 
monstrous that, at least by the end of the nineteenth century, frame it as what no longer could be 
defi ned alone as the uncategorisable. The monstrous refl ected a measure of what could not be explained 
through experimentation, expressed according to categories of monstrosities further classifi ed by their 
level of complexity. Of these classifi cations, monstrosity was subsequently included as a sub-category. 
The monstrous was itself appropriated into the language of classifi cation that marked the vocabulary 
of science, and simultaneously found itself the collective marker for the unknown. For the philosopher 
Giorgio Agamben, a language that marks the oscillating passage between an impression and its use as a 
universal referent straddles a temporal and spatial divide where “creatures are irreparably astray.”6 This 
gap, between the universal and the particular, establishes the same fraught passage negotiated by the 
monstrous; the lack of visible monstrosities does not diminish the discursive rupture that it occupies in 
a language that would mark out its claim to a vocabulary and that would epitomise the circumstances 
of its life in the limbo of the un/known. Deleuze’s off spring is therefore not a life in jeopardy requiring 
a gesture that would deliver it to the known or unknown, but is an ambiguous sense that can never be 
ascertained, that can never be wholly known or unknown. 
The monstrous is a language that exhausts language, because each context in which it would be 
uttered with full certainty is undermined by its presence seemingly elsewhere and, which disencumbers 
it of the necessity to betray itself to meaning. The monstrous takes place in the potential of its own 
domain. It is a language according to Agamben that has “completely achieved its “declension” in cases 
and moods and is now “stretched out on its back” exposed and neutral.” 7  It appears that the supine is 
a metaphor for the type of language that would determine the origins of Deleuze’s off spring. But, the 
metaphor remains without an origin for every name would attribute the off spring to someone else: the 
monstrous is what marks the emergence of the philosopher’s off spring and denial of its emergence. The 
monstrous laments being called by name , convinced otherwise that it goes by any other and can thus 
only be pursued entirely through pseudonyms.  It is this labyrinthine ambiguity, Agamben contends, 
that makes every wanton liaison with language appear “always on the verge of ending up in bed.”8 
The monstrous is a language that divulges itself in the unmasking of a threshold that cuts across the 
symptomatic spatial and temporal excess of its own monstrosity. 
An expression that cannot be nominated by its form or its content alone is the result of what takes 
place between Deleuze and the other philosopher, a monstrosity or something entirely un/known and 
therefore monstrous. However, Deleuze’s pose and his surprise at the resulting off spring demonstrates 
a paradoxical outcome between two parties whereby the other party has no sense of their role as co-
conspirator. Lost to the onanistic pleasure of their proximity the resulting emissions from each parties 
complicity in the act are exploited by the other party. Any subsequent off spring begets knowledge 
5   See, Marie-Hélène Huet, Monstrous Imagination, (Cambridge and London.: Harvard University Press, 1993), Chapter 5, Monstrous Father : The Birth of Teratogeny.
6   Giorgio Agamben, The Coming Community, trans. M. Hardt, (Minneapolis & London: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 6. This, along with the following quotes 
are written by Agamben in relation to the writing of Robert Walser.
7   Agamben, The Coming Community, 59.
8   Agamben, The Coming Community, 6.
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of only one of the philosophers who takes part. The other is a necessary but unaware participant in 
the production of an off spring that remains anonymous to their initial close confi nement within an 
unthinkable act of deception. But, as Deleuze further explains, “the child was bound to be monstrous 
too, because, it resulted from all sorts of shifting, slipping, dislocations, and hidden emissions.”9   As a 
consequence of Deleuze’s intimate distance with another, a procedure which charges Deleuze with 
making a baby behind the accomplices back, the philosopher comes face to face with the incongruities 
of his own supine position. Hence, both parties remain open to the possibility of not knowing; that 
every emission evades detection including all that is brought forth from their liaison.  Thus, in eff ect the 
monstrous is analogous to what is seized in advance of the emergence of Deleuze’s prodigal off spring 
and, that which is perpetuated in a life born on its back.   
 By co-opting the science of monsters that is found to have a correlation in the expressive potential 
of Deleuze’s oanistic procedure this text will postulate that the mutable coordinates of production that 
operate in “making a baby behind one’s back”10  cannot be ignored because such movements remain 
unevidenced. By transposing all of the resources of the monstrous, this text argues for what is elided in 
a language that arches its back.
The Peculiarly Diffi  cult Task of Remaining Hidden 
In Metamorphoses, Ovid tells of two lovers Pyramus and Thisbe, who live next door to each other but 
remain separated by parental opposition and a wall that is shared by their respective family homes. The 
wall however exhibits a crack that permits them to communicate to each other, to arrange a meeting 
and which leads ultimately, through a series of misread signs, to their deaths.11 During the passage of 
whispers through the wall no face stares back that could identify from whom they originate. Pyramus 
and Thisbe’s  desire hence remains unacknowledged by any physical recognition, nevertheless, the desire 
that springs forth is not unknowable because they escapes the embrace or glance of the other. Their 
whispers secure a space to conjugate their exchange in the crack in the wall. This encounter enables 
Pyramus and Thisbe to hesitantly describe a meeting in an intimate divulgence of whispers that oversteps 
any perceptible fatigue engendered by their segregation on either side of a solid wall.  A gap in a solid wall 
describes the imperceptible caesura of Deleuze’s coital embrace; the resulting contrary fi gure of desire 
that is squeezed out from Pyramus and Thisbe’s intimate separation gives way to an image of monstrosity. 
The alignment of the story of Pyramus and Thisbe with an image of monstrosity corresponds with 
Cesare Casarino’s account of the ‘voice’ of those who whisper:  
“To whisper, in fact, is not only to speak in a lower volume but also to speak with a diff erent 
kind of voice altogether – namely, with a voice that has lost its recognizable uniqueness, that no longer 
belongs to a specifi cally nameable body, that can be spoken and shared by anybody.”12 
9   Deleuze, Negotiations: 1972-1990, 6. Italics my emphasis.
10   I am indebted to a now lost reference for this terminology. I can only offer a scholarly consolation by deferring to Paul Carter’s The Lie of the Land in 
which Carter, having lost the origin of a reference, quotes the Renaissance writer Montaigne: “I am so outstanding a forgetter that … I forget even my own words 
and writings … If anyone wanted to know the sources of the verse and exemplar that I have accumulated here, I would be at a loss to tell him.” Paul Carter, 
The Lie of the Land, (London and Boston.:Faber and Faber, 1996), 370, note 24.
11   For an extended synopsis see:  Louis Marin, Sublime Poussin, trans. C. Porter, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1999), 85-92. A more contemporary, 
and perhaps, more appropriate fi gure of the consummate homosexual desire exhibited by Deleuze is found in the scene from the fi lm by Jean Genet, Un Chant 
d’Amour, that portrays two convict lovers whose cells are brought together by a stone wall through which they pass smoke from each others mouth through a straw 
inserted into a small hole in the mortar. The airy, formlessness of the convicts smoke offers a visual description for what passes between both parties, and what can 
remain hidden from others.  The wall does not permit the two convicts to come face to face literally, in which case, there is no face to face meeting. However, it 
is the wall that brings them face to face, that through its placement and its lamentable continuation as it moves between, gathers the two convicts on either side.
12   Casarino, Modernity at Sea: Melville, Marx, Conrad in Crisis, 216.
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That which ‘no longer belongs to a specifi cally nameable body’ reiterates the conceptual parameters 
of the monstrous whilst ‘a voice that has lost its recognizable uniqueness’ anticipates the production 
and staging of various monstrosities which included the realisation of the monstrous as a specifi cally 
nameable body within the evaluation of the unnameable. The monstrous formation of Pyramus 
and Thisbe’s love and its inception in the whispers that are buried in an impermeable interlocutory 
space, suspends their desire momentarily in a lexical uncertainty, a double bind that conceives of each 
whisper as an origin and ultimately what is deprived of an origin. In order for Pyramus and Thisbe to 
be convinced of the others desire, the medium of communication must function in such a way that any 
whisper that is allowed to establish a legitimate self-identity must also be overcome. An overcoming 
does not necessarily mean to throw out, to ignore or to compete with the wall that separates. It suggests 
that any moment of ‘conception’ must celebrate the mechanisms that allow either fi gure, Deleuze|other 
philosopher, Pyramus|Thisbe,  to liberate the other, to mobilise the other, to think themselves otherwise. 
Every other, in some way, is redolent of the other: the unassailable paradox of the monstrous is that it 
is always a pseudonym for itself and another self. Thus the task of this text is to make an audience an 
accomplice.
Pyramus and Thisbe must risk everything, including themselves, if they are to realise the numerous 
utterances of desire introduced by an elaborate correspondence of pseudonyms. The whispers do not 
annotate an original desire that is elaborated from Pyramus and Thisbe having known of one another, 
nor do they then reproduce the greater collective fi ction of desire simply because of the lack of any 
philosophical predicates that could ensure the extravagance of Pyramus and Thisbe correspondence in 
the wall. If Pyramus and Thisbe have any chance of asserting the parameters by which the successive 
utterances embody their desire, they must take up the same radical discourse undertaken by the 
Teratogenist: as Huet explains, “the teratogenist creates his won fi eld of experimentation, imagines 
a new experimental domain.” 13  Pyramus and Thisbe must capitalise on the spatial and temporal site 
of immanence that is marked out in the elaborate embodiment of identity that emerges from the 
pseudonym.  The experiential and the experimental must acknowledge a pseudonym that is more 
than an inscription from a lover to a beloved scribbled across the face of an accomplice.  A pseudonym 
evokes the lover by name, an incantation that bears an image of the not-named on it’s back, on the side 
not seen and not heard.  The beloved returns this gesture in turn, but the beloved’s failure to be seen to 
call out by their lover is mirrored in the pseudonym that presents itself as an epitaph for the one who 
is not-named. The pseudonym prevents the lover from being seen, but simultaneously, is also what 
the lover stands against. The pseudonym is the background and the other side of this background, what 
stands with their back to the wall, the lover’s side, which by all measure remains imperceptible; it is 
the pseudonym that is never seen in the round. The pseudonym is a pretense for what stands for and in 
lieu of, and simultaneously occupies the place of the lover. Louis Marin, elaborating on the function 
of the epitaph, ultimately traces the course of the pseudonym evidenced in the enfolding of Pyramus 
and Thisbe’s whispers:  
this motif, which the expression “in the place of…” designates, is the key motif of the 
autoptic; in the double sense of “what is in the place of…, in the place in space occupied 
by…” and “what is being substituted for…, what replaces as its delegate, stands in the stead 
of…,” the “in place of…” defi nes, in its ambiguity, the deep structure of representation and, 
more generally, of the sign as refl exive-transitive. But it is also the mainspring of strategic 
13   See, Huet, Monstrous Imagination, Chapter 5, Monstrous Father : The Birth of Teratogeny. 
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mechanism, since in the same place and owing to this substitution, the “same” dies and is born 
at the same moment , a form of the divine dream of being the author of one’s self.14
The pseudonym  arnesses what is unsaid in the gap of the wall,  without ordering or reducing how 
Pyramus or Thisbe could avail themselves with a legitimate naming of their desire. A gap in a solid wall 
is not something that the two worlds of Pyramus or Thisbe on either side of the wall can make sense 
of. A solid wall cannot have a gap if it is to be understood as solid. A gap in a solid wall is conditional 
on the shades of whisper that mingle within the barriers that keep Pyramus and Thisbe apart. The 
play of light and shadow that materialise across the spatial and temporal corporeality of Pyramus and 
Thisbe’s whispers, hint only of the lubricated movements that accompany Deleuze’s willingness to 
propagate -  the shifting, slipping, dislocations faithful to the minuet of desire in the smallest of gaps in 
an otherwise solid impasse.15  The pseudonym entails the very traits of the off spring composed entirely 
of the divergent gestures performed by Deleuze. The pseudonym seizes the off spring provisionally 
beyond the gesture of a wall by revealing the closeness of the oscillating movements of desire between 
accomplices. It is here between the whispers, in the countless instances of a language that cuts across the 
face of an ill-fated collaborator that Deleuze, in his nocturnal solitude, comes face to face with the gap 
of his oanistic emissions.  Deleuze, like the protagonists of Ovid’s tale contemplates a threshold at the 
limit of two outsides, as himself and in place of another, at once the conjugate space of that threshold 
and the dehiscence that initiates the multiple testimonies to an outside. In claiming the emergence of 
a monster Deleuze speaks of a  marred surface that gives almost everything away; in his decree of an 
immaculate conception he scrutinises the spectrum of desire envisaged by the imperceptible whispers. 
Wedged between the two genealogies of the monstrous, what is held forth, a pseudonym as much as a 
collaborator.
Not-knowing: how we might know what we don’t yet know how to know…
The rhetorical what is it worth is the privileged ground of knowing’s modus operandi, as the instrument 
with which to combat a experimental path of expression. It is an interjection that endeavours to make 
tangible and plausible a task that cannot be comprehended outright. The question of who or what ‘worth’ 
is (in that the appellation in this text fails to discern outright worth as a preposition or as a proper noun) 
does not suddenly reveal something hidden about worth, nor is the question of worth an oppressive 
intrusion that counters the consequence of not knowing. Instead what worth is fails to manifest itself in a 
category that could be assailed by critical or subjective judgment, fi nding itself indeterminately an answer 
and a question. Any testimony to either would compose nothing but outright conjecture, because the 
intimate question of what worth is established in a query of knowing, suspends itself in the belief that it 
can ultimately establish, at the least an allegorical signifi cance, and subsequently persuade another that 
such a position distinguishes it as legitimate. What worth is fails to emerge because, a comprehensive and 
exemplary answer is at odds with the question of worth maintaining, as a matter of defi nition, that it does 
not know, and furthermore, fails to identify, as an imperative to knowing, the extent to which what worth 
is may invest in not-knowing as a strategy to affi  rm its own struggle to account for itself.
Irit Rogoff  in her essay “Academy as Potentiality” confesses that she attests to sometimes having 
14   Marin, Sublime Poussin, 199.
15   The minuet was a popular eighteenth-century French style of dancing that prefi gures contemporary ballet. It became popular because “it was the only one [dance] 
that could be performed to any music in the appropriate meter, rather than a specifi c tune.” See: Sarah R. Cohen, “Watteau’s Fête Galante and the Artful Body” in, 
Antoine Watteau: Perspectives on the Artist and the Culture of his Time, ed. Mary D. Sheriff, (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2006), 94-105; 98.
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no idea what to say, when existing structured knowledge does not off er her the means to negotiate 
a newly discovered path of expression.  Because subjective expression cannot be foreseen or attested 
to by existing bodies of knowledge to have clear and comparable outcomes that are the result of an 
investigative process, the expression is deemed foreign or at the least subjected to an interrogation via 
existing accepted models of knowing and expression. Rogoff ’s expression of  ill-comprehension as a 
legitimate recourse to knowing is subsequently excluded.16   Brian Massumi has noted that contemporary 
institutions have often derided a result that is a subjective expression, reducing it to a model of “uncritical 
subjectivism,”17 personal treachery that is evaluated as irresponsible, narcissistic or egotistical within the 
framework of existing models of assessment that can attest to the rationality and therefore the comprehension 
of what is being communicated. The validity of an expression is hence determined by saying and meaning 
mirroring, representing and describing each other, the expression anchored to a context, the content of the 
expression fundamentally predetermined by an object, systematically perceived an arm’s length away so that 
a reliable exchange of information could take place between subjects. Nevertheless, Massumi acknowledges 
that putting expression into context is fundamentally limited by the fact that meaning is not produced in 
isolation, but is rather a consequence of an array of subjectivities and objective structures brought together 
on an irredeemably incoherent plane of meaning, across which meaning emerges as the temporal event of 
a fi eld of complex factors not clearly defi ned exterior to this event and which, paradoxically, include the 
domain of meaning in which the expression takes place. Meaning is not inherent to the object of that form, 
or to any defi nition that would fi x to a fi nal or agreed upon form a meaning; rather, it occupies the vast 
domain of a potential meaning that is inherently subjective. Massumi argues that the casual faith held for a 
system of a mirrored exchange constituted the way in for post-structuralist and post-modern discourse 
to engage in the discursive correspondence of meaning; in an excess of signifi cation. He argues that 
post-modern discourse, while operating by parody and irony to expose the absurdity of the limits of 
the existing expression-content system, conversely held the existing system as a back drop to their own 
activities so that their political imperative would remain comprehensible. Without a correspondence 
between expression and form, post-modernism would become unanchored. Further to this, he identifi es 
in post-modernism’s re-centering of speaking and writing subjects nostalgia for the return of the author, 
whose death had been their initial call to action. The preliminary questioning of the expression-content 
model by post-modernism had merely seen it re-appear without question; the post-modern subject is 
reproduced as an expression of the initial system that aff orded it a foundation. Consequently there was 
little room to cultivate a truly expressive subjective agency outside the existing system, and the opaque 
power relations of post-modern discourse.  Equally though, Charles Altieri understands both the post-
modern and post-structuralist discourse to be as politically disabling as each other. He believes that the 
post-structuralist treatment of the subject as an “irreducibly indeterminate principle of free play”18 failed 
to understand the complex historical and social paradigms that would allow disenfranchised subjects to 
forge an identity. Subsequently, the post-modern account of the subject imagined by identity politics 
failed to understand how identities could be pursued from the political affi  liations that ran concurrent 
to the exemplary distinctions of race, class and gender, particular when it came to understanding the 
multiple associations that a subject may engender when describing their identity. It did not take account 
of the making with the process of identifying with or resisting these categorical reductions. 
 
16  Irit Rogoff, “Academy as Potentiality” in, A.C.A.D.E.M.Y, eds. A. Nollert, I. Rogoff, B. De Baere, & et al., (Frankfurt am Main: Revolver, 2006), 13-20.
17  Brian Massumi, “Like a Thought” in, A Shock to Thought, ed. B. Massumi, (London & New York: Routledge, 2002). xiii–xxxix: xiii.
18  Charles Altieri, Subjective Agency: A Theory of First-person Expressivity and its Social Implications, (Oxford & Cambridge, Mass: Blackwell, 1994), 1.
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Rogoff  argues that the fact that we locate ourselves in a particular condition through these diff erent 
affi  liations, identifi es a paradigm shift from criticism as a “form of fi nding fault and of exercising 
judgment according to a consensus of values,” through critique as an operation of “examining the 
underlying assumptions that might allow something to appear as a convincing logic” to a model Rogoff  
terms “criticality.”19 Criticality is located away from the assured model of expression-content, instead 
“operating from an uncertain ground of actual embededness.”20 Criticality is not an account held 
outside the role of critique rather, it makes apparent how the post-modern subject believed itself to be a 
consequence of its own choice similarly failing to see itself as an expression of the very system it had set 
out to lampoon. Criticality sits in parallel to the structuralist claim on critique but, “wants nevertheless 
to inhabit culture in a relation other than one of critical analysis; other than one of illuminating fl aws, 
locating elisions, allocating blames.”21   The notion of creativity, as Rogoff  writes, has centered on 
“old fashioned notions of inspiration without articulation, slightly less old fashioned notions of the 
importance of analytical and critical profi ciency all vie with contemporary pedagogies of actualisation, 
embodiment, and criticality as the lived out consequences of knowing,”22 that all co-exist around a 
complacency or exasperation that imagines the domain of not knowing.  The model of critique in which 
“the manifest of cultures must yield up some latent values and intentions through endless processes of 
investigation and uncovering”23 and the model of critical analysis which “attempts to turn the latent of 
hidden conditions and unacknowledged desires and power relations into a cultural manifest”24 assumes 
that all true expression must contain meaning, and that only through the modal variances of critique 
and critical analysis can this be uncovered. Critical judgment manoeuvres expression through the no-
man’s land of not knowing and not meaning. In doing so it fails to understand the complex associations 
of desire that manifest themselves in being creative. Deleuze suggests that, as a consequence of the 
criticism faced by the opposition of universal or individual knowledge, we have lost interest in the 
prospect of the subject and that a renewed eff ort to re-conceptualise the discourse surrounding the term 
is necessary so that the subject can “confront the fi eld of questions to which they are in answer.”25 In an 
attempt to engage the subject, this text will pursue an alternative to knowledge sourced creativity that 
corresponds to Rogoff ’s pursuit of “how we might know what we don’t yet know how to know,”26 in 
the expressive potential of not-knowing
Kairos: an Excursion between Theory and Practice
The potential of not-knowing is observed in the practice of the early nineteenth-century French 
educator Jospeh Jacotot.27 Jacotot observed the teaching of Latin, mathematics, and law, before being 
off ered a position teaching French Literature at the University of  Louvain, Brussels,  following his exile 
from France after the Restoration. Jacotot’s university lecturers would come to be held in high regard 
by his French speaking students, to the extent that he began to gather further admirers who wished 
19   Rogoff, “Academy as Potentiality,”17.
20   Rogoff, “Academy as Potentiality,”17.
21   Rogoff, “Academy as Potentiality,”17.
22   Rogoff, “Academy as Potentiality,”14.
23   Rogoff, “Academy as Potentiality,”16.
24   Rogoff, “Academy as Potentiality,” 16.
25   Gilles Deleuze, “A Philosophical Concept…” in, Who Comes After the Subject? eds. E. Cadava, P. Connor &  J. Nancy,  (New York & London: Routledge, 1991)  
94-95, 95.
26   Rogoff, “Academy as Potentiality,” 14.
27   Jacques Ranciere, The Ignorant Schoolmaster : Five Lessons in Intellectual Emancipation, trans. Kirsten Ross, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1991). 
As Kristin Ross notes in her introduction, throughout the text it remains diffi cult to distinguish the voice of Rancière and that of Jacotot, or in fact the potential of 
a third protagonist. Consequently, I have rendered all concepts as that of Jacotot, at once so as not to suddenly introduce Rancière, or to have to explain how and 
where one voice separates from the other, if at all this could be done without diminishing the value of this text to the exegesis presented here.
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partake of his lectures but who did not speak French. Equally problematic was that fact that Jacotot had 
yet to grasp Flemish and thus had no way to communicate consistently with the newly acquired member’s 
of his audience. There was no vernacular means to communicate between the parties without the use of a 
translator to mediate the passage from one language to the other. It was therefore necessary for Jacotot to 
determine a commonality which could resolve the quandary brought about by the success of his lectures. 
Communicating via the translator Jacotot requested the students purchase the bi-lingual edition of the 
twenty-four volume novel Télémaque by the French author Fénelon which presented, without conferring 
the regulatory of a line by line comparison, on one page the French text and on the opposite a Flemish 
translation. Jacotot asked his students to learn the French text without off ering any aid beyond the irregular 
adjacency of the translation presented in the book, and then asked the students to write about what they had 
read, verifying their arguments through references to the Télémaque. The result exceeded his expectations. 
Far from childish representations they had achieved grammatically correct sentences containing complex 
ideas, all in French, a language they previously did not know but had learnt without the aid of Jacotot, 
whose position of authority had partially lain in the fact that he was a native French speaker.
Jacotot’s claim to authority was also determined by his command of French Literature, a skill 
which required him demonstrating a measured teaching, taking his students from the basic to the most 
complex literary idea without however, the student ever surpassing the knowledge that bestowed 
on Jacotot his privileged position as an explicator of the texts he taught from. Jacotot’s student was 
forever to remain a student in relation to his authority because his position could never be anything 
but contrary to the students position if the activity of the institution was to make sense.  The diffi  cult 
circumstance in this instance,  was that Jacotot’s newly found audience had not been provided with a 
class in French grammar beyond the provision of Télémaque. Jacotot could not teach them because he, 
like his student remained ignorant of a language, unable to speak in Flemish. To ‘know French’ would 
have required the students to be given an explanation of the rules that frame the construction and 
dissemination of the French language. But the students were given no more than a request from Jacotot 
that if they wanted to ‘know French’ then they needed to ‘know the Télémaque’. Jacotot’s mastery was 
not played out in his ability to recount to his students his own knowledge of the French language. His 
presence had only been necessary so as to prompt the student who did not know French, to realise their 
capacity to do so within the pages of the Télémaque. In doing so, Jacotot had enabled the students to 
break the existing hierarchy of explication that had served to subordinate their intelligence to his own. 
The student’s intellectual capacity, traditionally linked to an unfolding of knowledge perpetuated in a 
coherent system that subordinated the will of the student to the intelligence of a master, was drawn-out, 
exposed and subsequently affi  rmed via the knowledge acquired from the translation of the Télémaque. 
Jacotot’s experiment had exposed the institution to an epistemological crisis. The ability to not only 
learn French, but to do so without an explanation from the institutions appointed authority, had raised 
a question over just who really enabled knowledge. Additionally, Jacotot had inadvertently unbound 
the mechanism which saw his knowledge as the apex that authored the student’s intellectual capacity 
and their will to learn.
To test the hypothesis that the master’s role was not that of explication but rather enabling the 
student to realise their own intellectual capacity, Jacotot set out to teach two subjects he was completely 
incompetent in - painting and piano - to his French Literature students. Jacotot believed that to enable a 
student to conceive of their intellectual capacity, their master must be able to think themselves capable 
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of teaching even though they remain ignorant of the knowledge to do so. This required the master to 
realise that “any human work of art is the practice of the same intellectual potential”28 and, that each 
member of the community could equally partake of their intellectual potential which remained the 
origin and not the fi nal aim of their intellectual emancipation.  Jacotot’s method suggested that “in the case of 
shoe-makers making shoes etc, they must also be, in their manner, grammarians, moralists, or physicists.”29 
He argued that to emancipate and to be emancipated, it was necessary to “extend each ‘persons aff airs’ to the 
point where it is part and parcel of the common reason enjoyed by all.”30 The generosity of emancipation 
was labeled by Jacotot as panecastic, drawn from the Greek Pan meaning “everything” and hekastos 
meaning “everything in each,” their unhyphenated conjunction determining the suggestion that 
“everything is in everything.”31 Jacotot’s hypothesis proposed that the student’s intellectual awareness was 
conceived through their confrontation with a community as a whole: “understanding must be understood 
in its true sense: not the derisive power to unveil things, but the power of translation that makes one speaker 
confront another.”32 To teach painting and piano, Jacotot was robbed of his ability to speak with authority to 
his students, for his authority had only ever been confronted from within the language of French Literature, 
while his students, having been confronted with French Literature in French, were now to undertake leave 
of this subject for others they had no knowledge of. While the students had achieved the learning of French 
this had been enabled by the strength of their desire to learn French Literature from a French speaker. 
Jacotot’s proposal robbed the students of their language and their will to learn, faced with the prospect of 
a skill they had not previously manifested any interest in learning.  But, Jacotot’s everyday experience of 
“translating and counter translating thoughts into words and words into thought”33  showed that language 
was in itself to be always robbed of a language and to be in turn capable of “perpetual improvisation.”34 
Furthermore, Jacotot had already shown that his role was not to imbue knowledge, but was to enable the 
student’s will to conceive of their intellectual capacity. 
Jacotot’s epistemological improvisation devises a way for an expression to be comprehended without 
being universalised. His desire to cultivate in his students the aspiration to invent was enabled by it’s 
establishment in the provisional excess of his own will-to-invent, in kairos. Kairos, as Eric Charles White 
argues, must be understood as a “principle of invention”35  because “it implies that there can never be 
more than a contingent and provisional management of the present opportunity.”36 Kairos can only ever 
be bound by the irreconcilable tension between tradition and innovation, between the knowledge of 
past experience and the knowledge that is always yet to come.  Because it does not rest within a closed 
system that would see its objective as already founded and bound to the progress of historical experience 
kairos is subsequently not a statement of truth.  Equally, kairos is not an arbitrary statement that could 
be dismissed. Its ‘truth’ is an instant of itself, which in turn is bound to the proliferation of method that 
determines the very course of its improvisations. Its ‘truth’ is always provisional because every appeal to 
a statement of coherence implies a particular improvisation which in turn befalls the very method that 
gave rise to it in an infi nite series of improvisations. This is not to say that it remains incoherent, and that 
28   Rancière, The Ignorant Schoolmaster, 36.
29   Rancière, The Ignorant Schoolmaster, 34.
30   Rancière, The Ignorant Schoolmaster, 39.  
31   Rancière, The Ignorant Schoolmaster, 27.  
32   Rancière, The Ignorant Schoolmaster, 64.
33   Rancière, The Ignorant Schoolmaster, 63. 
34   Rancière, The Ignorant Schoolmaster, 64.
35   Eric Charles White, Kaironomia: On the Will-to-Invent, (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1987), 13.
36   Charles White, Kaironomia: On the Will-to-Invent, 13.
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it abandons tradition for the irrationality of anything goes. As White explains, kairos will:
 slide undecidedly between the promise of a transtemporal knowledge and an admission of 
its inability to transcend the historical determinations of its own occasion. At once a theory and 
a practice, it remains caught in an inevitable double bind between an intention to “speak the 
truth” about the endlessness of interpretation and an awareness that every “truth” (including 
the one that would posit “no-truth”) is historically determined.37 
It is not necessary for this text to recount the methods with which Jacotot taught painting or piano. 
Jacotot’s method cannot be translated by this investigation into an  authorial representation made anew, 
but neither does his method seek to devalue the importance of knowledge whose imperative is derived 
from a scholarly examination. There is much that could be speculated in the discrepancy between being 
able to draw or play the piano, and to be a virtuoso of either. Jacotot does however put to work a method, 
but rather, like his students, learns of it not from the beginning but in the midst of it. In this case, the 
case of the Télémaque should not be seen as a universal method, it is merely a fragment of a method 
observed and recognises that “to speak about Télémaque they [the students] had at their disposition 
only the words of Télémaque.”38 In every case of emancipation, the master asks the student to fi rstly 
mediate any of their claims in the appropriation of what is in front of them and secondly to attune their 
improvised compositions to the same temporal conditions that enable such revolutionary autonomy 
that demands an altogether diff erent kind of relation between that person’s will and their intellectual 
capacity.  For Jacotot, emancipation is a method of deciphering, but it is one that functions through 
an indirect discourse: appearing here and there only to be taken up, again and again in another mode, 
resisting any self-representation.39  It is Jacotot who is subsequently caught up in his improvisation as he 
proceeds to teach what he does not know without any knowledge of how to do so.
What is a Measure of Not-knowing
In the essay “Composition and Interpretation” Hans-Georg Gadamer discusses ambiguity in the face 
of poetic language, believing that “the ambiguity of poetic language answers to the ambiguity of human 
life as a whole [and that] interpretation seems to be a genuine determination of existence rather than an 
activity or an intention.”40 Gadamer locates this ambiguity and the resulting unease in the improvisation 
of an interpretive gesture. He argues that this gesture embraces the paradoxical, off ering itself as nothing 
more than our surprise at coming face to face with ourselves as the condition of such a gesture. As Gadamer 
explains, “what a gesture expresses is ‘there’ in the gesture itself [and] reveals no inner meaning behind 
itself, [however] what the gesture reveals is the being of meaning rather than the knowledge of meaning.”41 
Consequently the language of interpretive gesture is not the interpretation of a subjective interiority but 
rather “ the interiority of rapt attention wholly absorbed in the enigma of our existence.”42  
The ridiculous and essential vocation of Jacotot is not only felt but reiterated as a condition of 
Gadamer’s own improvised composition. The will-to-invent by which Gadamer’s essay not only sets 
37   Charles White, Kaironomia: On the Will-to-Invent, 42-43.
38   Rancière, The Ignorant Schoolmaster : Five Lessons in Intellectual Emancipation, 10.
39   See Deleuze’s response to the question “Does the narrator have a method” in regards to Proust’s  In Search of Lost Time, in Gilles Deleuze, “Proust Round Table” in, 
Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and interviews 1975-1995, ed. David Lapoujade, trans. A. Hodges & M. Taormina, (London & Cambridge Mass.: The MIT Press, 2007), 45-49.. 
40   Hans-Georg Gadamer,  “Composition and Interpretation” in, The Relevance of the Beautiful and Other Essays, ed. R. Bernasconi, trans. N. Walker (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986), 66-74, 71.
41   Gadamer,  “Image and Gesture,” 79.
42   Gadamer,  “Image and Gesture,” 81.
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out but also partakes in, and which is assured by the potential of subsequent interpretations, eff aces 
all possibility of a truth returning to an original concrete translation. Thus every text is a translation, 
including this one, that begets the existence of a truth in an action that turns a back to any truth. 
This further implies that every improvisation is adhered to a monstrous emergence, because every 
interpretation presents to an audience the ineradicable stain that stigmatises what is born on its back. Hence, 
any qualifi cation that demands to know the content of the translated composition, also negotiates an 
encounter with the monstrous conception of each and every improvisation, including their very own 
gesture to faithfully translate the spectacle presented to them. Improvisation is unable to be evaluated 
by any other attribute than the monstrous, because attributes that could render one translation as this 
or that remains unable to establish where this or that takes place in the satiety that is accorded to the 
ceaseless supposition of what that demonstrates the aff ective force of a gesture of not-knowing.  
Personally identifying with the confounding experience of what worth is outlines the proleptic 
functioning of what as an appeal that orientates the will-to-invent  alongside the emergence of 
incomprehension in a chain of monstrous improvisations. As Jacotot’s initial use of the Télémaque 
suggests, the will-to-invent is provisional on fi nding how contested paths may be shared and how 
points of intersection may be located. This is not to say that homogeneity is sought, and that this 
homogeneity takes place in the domain of the addressee or from the source of the address. There is no 
‘monstrous voice’ that can contain the innumerable variances of tonal infl ection that take place in the 
emergence of incomprehension. What is not an empty space of full and total agreement.  Accounting 
for the value of these improvisations requires the employment of everything at hand so that every 
gesture may be conceived of as decisive, recognising that any improvisation be given credence within 
the gestures it tries to maintain and taking into account that the generosity of each gesture credits an 
audience with knowing it as well as it knows itself.43 Conversely, as has already been presented in the 
case of Roussel’s posthumous confession, an audience cannot be reassured of what worth is by it alone, 
without doubting the degree to which what worth is exaggerates the limits by which it makes its self in 
its attempted improvisation. Furthermore, what worth is is irredeemable in a catalogue of comparisons 
that would awaken, as evidence enough, a historical contingency, because what worth is has always yet 
to fi nd a gesture by which any of its improvisations could be confi ned. Nevertheless, it does remain 
possible to accomplish, but only hesitantly, a mis-en-scene that does not diminish the improvisations that 
encompasses what worth is and the territory it occupies for itself. 
For Jean-Luc Nancy, a model of attesting to an account which cannot be reduced to a unanimous 
decision of who or what is and is not speaking, and what is meant by this account in clear and comparable 
outcomes that attest to a shared proposition, is an urgent contemporary need. Nancy locates his argument 
in the word ‘art’ and what it may or may not encompass within the contemporeanity of its continual 
sense making. While art can be identifi ed in the tangibility of its attributes, in what art composes, 
no category could defi ne what art is, yet, art fi nds itself in a sense obligated to a unity defi ned by its 
practices. The composition of art itself remains exterior to categorisation but nevertheless it can be 
expressed as such as art.44  Art marks a context that is yet to come, nevertheless it remains contingent on 
the tangibility of its contemporary limits. While Gadamar believes that the artist “discovers on behalf 
43  As Rancière / Jacotot point out “this is the true modesty of the ‘genius’, that is to say, of the emancipated artist: he employs all his art, all his power, to show 
us his poem as the absence of another that he credits with knowing as well as he.” Rancière, The Ignorant Schoolmaster, 70.
44   Refer to,  Jean-Luc Nancy,  Philosophical Chronicles, trans. F. Manjali, (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), 59-64.
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of all an image that acquires uncontested validity”45  the attributes which exist as a consequence of art’s 
contemporary situation cannot defi ne what this image  is. ‘Art’ cannot be invoked and then applied to the 
problem of knowing what ‘art’ is, neither can ‘art’ affi  x an identity or meaning to ‘art’ according to what 
the resulting expression resembles or is separate from. Rather, art  is constituted as such,  in the contrapuntal 
specifi city of its own dimension in a cloud of not-knowing.  
For Rogoff , art is a question of performing, it is a question of ‘what an artist is’, which enables the 
broadening of the pronoun ‘what’ to include other forms of creativity bound by shared cultural issues 
and knowledge production with that of art, including architecture.46 The durability of kairos, with its 
contradictory array of impermeable and vulnerable defi ning structures prevents any expression from 
manifesting or designating a signifi cation that is known and which therefore, paradoxically, prevents it from 
attesting to the unknown.  It operates from within a vague context, an uncertain duel, diagrammatically 
played out between the known and unknown of expression and content. Kairos risks much on  this uncertain 
ground, yet remains unable to attest to this risk. Certainly the un/known is a risk, but the risk lies in the 
inability to express this risk.  Kairos locates the tools to answer the demand of the question of what art is, 
away from historically predetermined models of assessment and pre-existent categories, and instead locates 
it in the performativity of what an artist is, in the hallowed ground of no-man’s land. However, no model 
answer to what an artist is that had traditionally been agreed on as the outline of an artist can be relied on, 
including the methodologies that supplied us with the certainty of our models of coherence. What  is ‘this’ 
and ‘that’ which gestures to the ‘artist’ and inextricably can no longer contain the designation of ‘artist’. 
What worth is challenges a distinction of its value via the forms and attributes of its expression; kairos 
invents itself by interrogating itself. Thus, a response to the question of what worth is conditions a return 
to the aforementioned statement of ill comprehension by Rogoff . What, as felt by the perplexity of what 
worth is is distinguished by Sianne Ngai from its use relative to that which could encompass it. Ngai locates 
it in the interrogative demand intensifi ed via its exclamation (What!) and in a demand for repetition 
(What?).  Ngai conveys the fact that, ““what” paradoxically expresses a state of inexpressiveness. Here the 
term’s sense-making agency resides in its impotentiality, or inability to refer and represent, since what it 
expresses is precisely a situation in which whatever “what!” is being uttered in response appears to defy 
expression.”47 Thus, what worth is is asserted as ubiquitous within the understanding that what is the self-
determining agent of expression. What assumes in the phrase what it is  a logic of its own, that is “at once 
relative, interrogative and potentially stupefying in its aff ective force.”48
What as an interrogative pronoun raises a question when it actively seeks to escape the formal 
distinctions by which we qualify and categorise something. What, as an exclamation at the sudden loss 
of knowing, and as a consequence of the proliferating improvisation, does not demand an answer: what 
improvises, in turn off ering an invention equal to that of the invention presented to it: what, “deceptively 
simulates an inability to respond or speak at all.”49  What is not an oppressive entity that counters and 
opposes the consequence of the un/known,  but raises “the signifi cant question of how we might respond 
45   Gadamer, “Composition and Interpretation,” 70
46   As the title of her essay states, Rogoff examines the question of what a theorist is, but this does not prevent us here in this text from evaluating how other 
practices might also be asked after.
47   Sianne Ngai,  “Stuplimity: Shock and Boredom in Twentieth-Century Aesthetics,” Postmodern Culture, Vol 10, No. 2 (January 2000) Accessed 02.06.08, http://
www.iath.virginia.edu/pmc/. para. 3
48   Ngai, “Stuplimity: Shock and Boredom in Twentieth-Century Aesthetics,” para. 3
49   Ngai, “Stuplimity: Shock and Boredom in Twentieth-Century Aesthetics,” para. 1
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to what we recognize as ‘the diff erent’ prior to its qualifi cation or categorisation (as “sexual” or “racial” 
for instance), precisely by pointing to the limits of our ability to do so.”50 When faced with the deep uncertainties 
of existence, not-knowing is off ered as a way of commandeering the sensations the generality of a life as 
such, transmuting it, by way of a legato improvisation that underscores the will-to-invent, into a lyrical 
onomastics, an unattributable suchness.
I daresay Freya is pretty rotten. On the other hand The Secret Sharer, between you and 
me, is it. Eh? No dammed tricks with girls there. Eh? Every word fi ts and there’s no single 
uncertain note.
Joseph Conrad to his literary agent 51 
“As long as I know that you understand” he whispered. “But of course you do. It’s a great 
satisfaction to have got somebody to understand. You seem to have been there on purpose” 
And in the same whisper, as if we two whenever we talked had to say things to each other 
which were not fi t for the world to hear, he added, “It’s very wonderful.”
Joseph Conrad, The Secret Sharer 52
Not-knowing, Knowing as such.
Grammatically as such is successful in fi nding a level of coherence only if, in carrying forward the 
argument, it references a prior gesture. On account of the aff ective inconsistencies exercised by what’s 
proleptic function in an exclamation of incomprehension, a coherence that enables the passage of past, 
present and future to be laid on the same page amounts to a rhetorical game of persuading someone 
outside the game to play,  that the idealisation it presents, in all its looseness, is coherent. Coherence 
is pursuant to Deleuze’s engagement with another, to the fi rmness of the hold, to the stickiness of 
the participant’s parts. What determines a valid means of coherence is that all the pieces of the claim 
join up and fi t together without any gaps in between and implies no room for interpretation or play. 
Coherence that is orientated by this assumption is pointed out by Sylviane Agacinski as being incorrect as 
“those who share are also divided among themselves.”53 There is no singular determinate ‘we’ that could 
account for its label of coherence after the fact of the coming together of separate parts. Sense must be 
made, not of form, but by an action of forming organised around the opening-up of self-questioning to 
the receptiveness of others. The question of what worth is is paramount to the will-to-invent that includes 
others.  Consequently whoever or whatever interrogates what worth is through the questioning of its 
freedom, does so by also putting the question of what worth is to itself. Ngai explains that the language 
encountered by what  “is language that, in undermining conventional patterns of grammar, syntax, and 
sense, threatens the limits of self by challenging its capacity for response, temporarily immobilising the 
addressee as in situations of extreme shock or boredom.”54  Confounded by what worth is, the addressee 
50   Ngai, “Stuplimity: Shock and Boredom in Twentieth-Century Aesthetics,” para. 4. My emphasis.
51   Casarino quotes a letter from Joseph Conrad to his literary agent that compares Freya of the Seven Isles and The Secret Sharer.  Freya is determined a failure 
purely on it both being named after and its narrative being centered on a women. However, The Secret Sharer, as Casarino explains “ plays the kind of “tricks: at 
which he [Conrad] is so good, namely, tricks with boys – and hence the narrative “is it”. Such an italisised “it” marks here that unspoken, goes-without-saying, 
no-need-to-mention event that happens “between you and me: that takes place between two men. For “it” is the sublime of the closet itself.” Casarino, Modernity at 
Sea: Melville, Marx, Conrad in Crisis, 218-219.
52   Conrad, “The Secret Sharer,” 206.
53   Sylviane Agacinski,  “Another Experience of the Question, or Experiencing the Question Other-Wise” in,  Who Comes After the Subject? eds. E. Cadava, P. Connor 
&  J. Nancy,  (New York & London: Routledge, 1991), 9-23; 15.
54   Ngai, “Stuplimity: Shock and Boredom in Twentieth-Century Aesthetics,” para. 6.
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is forced to exclaim there inability to respond, in doing so, the incommensurable assumption of worth  is 
broken down in what; in the momentary sharing of language. This provisional identifi cation with what 
shifts the principle of assessment from a descriptive to a productive identifi cation.
What worth is  is situated in the formal gesture of an address of apparent  incomprehension that 
confounds the ability of what worth is to respond. It is not what worth is that instigates the incomprehension; 
rather the incomprehension emerges through the lived experience of its foundations in the very freedom 
of what worth is.  A measure of coherence that would account for what worth is, is engendered in the 
material process of the making of what as a statement of bewilderment.  The argument for the function 
of as such emerges when the capacity to communicate though a solid wall of seeming incomprehensibility 
and impenetrability becomes the only means by which to emancipate a life.
For Agacinski, what as an expression of incoherence is “a shared weakness,” defi ned as “the existent’s 
experience that the subjectum hides itself and that the existent is not therefore its own subject.”55 What is 
a gesture of non-disclosure, a refusal to affi  rm an allegiance to one or other of the inexhaustible number 
of categories -  what  being the actual of the irreducible suchness of as such -  that requires what worth is to 
use all possible means as a support. Agacinski writes: 
to relate to the body of the other as an object that can be used, that one can instrumentalise 
or think of as a means, is a way for subjective consciousness to reappropriate this outside, to 
prevent the other’s fl esh from infringing on its own, to prevent its ‘own’ body from spilling over 
onto another’s.56 
At stake is the fi gure’s stickiness and fi rmness, borne out of a shared surprise in fi nding itself responsible 
to another, “by chance someone else’s support.”57 What’s proleptic function is contemporaneous with a 
person who fi nds themselves a support for another. By exceeding all the possible objections and answers 
in anticipation of either becoming applicable, as such fashions a way to simultaneously prevent itself 
from losing control and enable what worth is to attest to a level of coherence.  Agacinski argues that, 
“responsibility is conceived of from the perspective of a new experience of the question, which is also 
a new determination of freedom, insofar as the question is the decision that most properly belongs to 
spirit and its freedom.“58 The phrase what is it worth is neither the means to understand the observer’s own 
awareness, or a plea from an observer that desires to identify what the observer directs its exclamation 
of incomprehension to: what is not a rhetorical invitation to negotiate. What worth is  forces us to ask 
after it, to locate our expression of incomprehension within and not exterior to its own questioning of 
what worth is. The criteria for knowing the origin of the expression does not exist within our affi  liation 
to what something is or is not determined by the social conditions in which what worth is presents itself, 
neither can we affi  rm the question via a response that is the result of either what is observed or heard, 
has said or done as a means of that saying or doing.  To distinguish what worth is,  the full force of what 
that is emerging  in the expression of incomprehension must be felt. 
55   Agacinski, “Another Experience of the Question, or Experiencing the Question Other-Wise,”16.  The subjectile is “the word or the thing [which] can take place of 
the subject or of the object – being neither one or the other.” The neologism can be broken into its consubstantial derivations. Subjectile is expressed by etymological 
movements of the origins of the word subject: in Latin subjectus meaning ‘to lie beneath’ and subjectum, which is the subject of a proposition. Derrida locates this shift 
in the shared suggestion of the ‘-jec-’ whose origins lie in jacere, latin for ‘to throw’.  Further to this, the suffi x -ile, expresses an innate potential that is sustained in 
the act of being thrown between subjectus and subjectum.  See,  Jacques Derrida, “Maddening the Subjectile,”  Yale French Studies, o. 84, Yale University,  1994, 154-171.
56   Agacinski, “Another Experience of the Question, or Experiencing the Question Other-Wise,”17.
57   Agacinski, “Another Experience of the Question, or Experiencing the Question Other-Wise,”16.
58   Agacinski, “Another Experience of the Question, or Experiencing the Question Other-Wise,”19.
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What worth is employs what it happens upon, dislodging the ability of its context alone – its ‘location’, 
its ‘voice’, the extent of its ‘body’ - to govern what it expresses, and therefore what it could be.  In 
doing so it identifi es itself with Nancy’s “desire for feeling and for feeling oneself feel”59 rather than a 
cultural longing that would confuse what worth is with the known or unknown. What worth is necessarily 
undertakes an improvisation so that what can be felt in the making with another through the plurality 
of what could be. Rather than asking what worth is by way of its performance, the other who puts the 
question to what worth is is included in the expression of what worth is that is not yet known by either 
party. The other comes to share with the initial gesture some resonance or movement evident in the 
expatiated fl ight between the material substances that composed the initial gesture of incomprehension 
and what worth is. The other is no longer exterior to what worth is may be, but is intimately folded into 
its very improvisations. 
What worth is must defi ne its own context for expressivity, a desire to feel, using not just pre-determined 
languages but whatever means are available, extra-linguistic forces comprised of gestures, props and the 
voice of others.  In doing so what worth is does not renounce or transcend the existing communicational 
models of expression, but confronts a situation by validating existing patterns of production, and 
placing what worth is at the centre of its own confi guration, feeling itself feel. 
Paramount to this intimacy as an event of what worth is formation, is the rejection of any assumption 
that the mode of expression is the reproduction of a concluding form from which can be derived a 
logical homogenous process that, consequently, may account for the fi nal product. Instead what worth is is 
composed of the plurality of the diff erent forms of knowing, which sees one form, known or unknown, 
pass into others.60 A discursive drift frames the non-resemblance of the known or unknown.61  For the 
known and the unknown to rearticulate themselves, they must be prepared to allow further expressions 
to mark the substance of the existing system and conversely shed other expressions that have concluded 
participating. In doing so, what worth is remains an event of this passing between the known and the 
unknown that opens in to the simultaneity of being both one and other. 
What worth is  is a priori to the improvisation  of  language, subjects and institutions that may wish to 
constrict its excesses, yet, these are the bodies that permit the movement of its expression into the world. 
Nevertheless, what worth is remains fundamentally without a narrator, as it is only provisionally arrested 
from its movement by any gesture. Furthermore, what is always looking further ahead to another 
destination, to another materialisation without ever arriving or materialising. What worth is disregards 
the moral principle of its virtue -worth -  that would have it take a past, present or future tense. What 
worth is is a collaborator, its evasiveness construed by imperceptible changes in direction that constitute 
59   The inclusive disjunction that all ‘art’ is met with is the source of Nancy’s expression. Art, as he states, “brings forth a desire that is neither the desire for an 
object nor the desire for a meaning but a desire for feeling and for feeling oneself feel – a desire to experience oneself as irreducible to a signifi cation, to a being 
or an identity.  A desire to enjoy, in sensibility, the very fact that there is no unique and fi nal form in which this desire would reach its end.” Nancy, Philosophical 
Chronicles, 61-62.
60   Massumi recounts Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s encounter with Michel Foucault’s example of the prison, as an illustration of the specifi city of content and 
expression. The pronouncement of guilt by a judge is an expression that fundamentally shakes the substance of the prisoner’s body, both of whom contribute to 
the form of the prison. Yet, “there is no resemblance between a pronouncement of guilt and an emprisonment.: Instead both contribute to the content of the prison 
regime. Deleuze and Guattari restate Foucault’s analysis that the prison system emerged from a discourse on ‘delinquency’, rather than a discourse on what a prison is: 
“There was no essential connection between delinquency as form of expression and the prison as form of content. There is no logical or teleological reason why that 
particular articulation had to be. Its power was the cumulative result of a thousand tiny performative struggles peppered throughout the social fi eld. The connection 
was made, and it was made collectively, under the control of no individual subject.”
61   As Massumi points out: “’Delinquency’ would subsequently migrate, extending to a new form of content: the school.” 
B K 1 | 8 6
a play of resemblances and mistaken identity. Despite this amoral position, one must actively pursue 
how one contributes to a share of the world. The ability to participate in the movement and speed 
of the improvisation is established by the necessary failure of signifi cation to mean. Any action that 
performs does so momentarily within an abstract territory, whose eff ect is only felt outside the act that 
immediately takes place. The gesture’s volubility performs through the preceding gesture, a territory 
marked out by a chain of reverberation. What is always an expression uncharacteristic of the context in 
which it fi nds itself. Language, whether non-verbal or verbal,  is pushed to its cutting edge, to a state 
that remains always yet to become, because the expression has always moved on, has already shifted its 
context at the very moment in which its preceding context gains the ability to attest to a meaning.  That 
is, while what worth is cannot be owned outright, one can play within it.62  It therefore remains possible 
to express the momentum of what worth is by deforming the temporality of the play – stretching and 
twisting Deleuze’s lascivious contortions further.
What worth is is Worth Not-knowing.
An account of what worth is cannot be mediated by a text that would frame ‘worth’ according to 
existing or future classifi cations; hence this account occurs, takes place through the concrete modalities 
of that expression. The singularity of this account via an emerging fi eld of resemblances moves what 
worth is towards the particular which becomes taken up by the interjection the that had initially denied 
it any signifi cation in the shared expression of what.  Not only does the potentiality of what worth is lie 
in its singularity, as an event of its emergence, it also materialises in the potential to share a particularity 
informing a collective yet to be known.
What worth is will emerge at the limits of this project, where the orthodoxy of a PhD undertaking 
is forced to address the collective expression of the what  in a dialogue where no common ground can 
be assumed, and where what worth is has manifested the terms by which any  occupation is possible 
within a context in motion. There is no nostalgia for what worth is to resemble what we already know, 
because what worth is is an event of a contemporenaeity that is always working inbetween the limits of 
our knowledge, slipping between the known and the unknown.  The contingent poesie63  of the phrase 
as such off ers a way of suspending the familiar landscape of evaluation that accord the open space of 
contemporary modes of assemblage with the shifting mix of inter-multi-trans-referential prefi xes into 
coherent confi gurations of collaboration; or the closed space of subjective experience that renders the 
role of any accessory or accomplice merely a task or a tool in the production of an outcome. Rather 
than proceeding to ‘know’ what worth is via what is being expressed through a reifi ed assessment that 
would seek to reconcile the model of collaboration with the principles of coherence and incoherence, 
what galvanises that which gave rise to it, the potential of a failure to know, in a returning gesture 
that at once preempts any question of its claim to coherence and reiterates the underlying strategy of 
collaboration that renders apparent the intentional contradictions when faced with an outcome that 
exceeds the existing capacity of comprehension: not-knowing provides a stage for the arraignment of 
what worth is, incriminated in an improvisation, as such. 
62   Play, as John Huzinga explains, “only becomes possible, thinkable, and understandable when an infl ux of mind breaks down the absolute determinism of the 
cosmos” that play is rather a “stepping out of ‘real’ life into a temporary sphere of activity” and that “with the end of play its effect is not lost; rather it continues to 
shed its radiance on the ordinary world outside.” Johan Huizinga, Homo Ludens: A study of the Play Element in Culture (London: Maurice Templar Smith, 1950), 22, 53.
63   Elkins provides a summary defi nition of poesie as “poetic utterances with a surplus of nuance and a paucity of overt symbolism.”  James Elkins, Why are our 
Pictures Puzzles? On the Modern Origins of Pictorial Complexity (New York & London: Routledge, 1999), 137. 
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Fig 12
Roussel with his mother and an elephant on the shores of Lake Kandy, Sri Lanka. 
Image removed due to copyright
Raymond Roussel with his mother and an elephant on the shores of Lake Kandy, Sri Lanka. 
Reproduced from Mark Ford, Raymond Roussel and the Republic of Dreams, (Ithaca, New York: 
Cornell University Press, 2000), Figure 10.
Interlude
An elephant, seemingly inconspicuous, is the pretense for a creative correspondence 
between two cursed performers. The dimensions of the elephant infer a bias that would 
designate each performer their fair share, that the elephant could be divided in two, 
right through the middle. Faced with an allegation that aligns its generosity to either 
performer, the elephant conceives itself as nothing more than a scrim that traverses the 
narrow divide of proximity, an infi nitely thin body that, in its passing between, draws 
the seen and unseen together. The elephant’s wrinkled vestiges secure space enough 
to conjugate an exchange. Inscribed across its surface is the trauma of each performer 
who, with their every gesture contemplating the space of the elephant’s threshold, 
pursues an opening through a solid impasse, repeatedly testing the elasticity and 
strength of the grey galliot. As a result of the confusion of the elephant’s scale the 
extent of the hide does not anticipate which performer is installed in the back or the 
front, for it cannot be determined as to whether the elephant has not been reduced to 
two backs or two fronts. Occasionally, to fl aunt their progress or to steal a glance, one 
performer manages to pull back the drape in the hope of  hearing the prophetic peal of 
trumpets - let the walls of Jericho fall! But, at most only a whisper is heard, each into-
nation claiming victory over the din of the other; what is at stake reduced to nothing 
more than a no-man’s land drawn in by, or released to, the breath of the other. In the 
texture of a hide we fi nd a suggestion of a certain diagram, a complex plane that appre-
hends, on the back of an elephant, an encounter with a character of potential worth.
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... in this puzzle called The Approaching Ship, one piece 
is shaped as a boy playing with a dog; another is a servant, 
bowing to a women; and there are a dozen fancy symmetrical 
ornaments that resemble mountings for drawer pulls or 
brass doorknockers. The fi gure pieces are randomly aligned 
in respect to the picture itself, but there are also pieces that 
strictly follow the picture’s contours. A woman’s silhouette 
cuts across the fi r tree, spanning half its width and also taking 
in some of the sky to its right. Just behind her is a form-fi tting 
piece that follows the tree but also her head. The puzzle is an 
intermittently random imposition of pictures and fragments 
on a single larger picture. Some pieces repeat the shapes of 
the The Approaching Ship, and others are scattered about by 
the puzzle makers so that they spread evenly thoughout the 
picture, without attention to how they overlap depicted forms 
 
James Elkins,  Why are our Pictures Puzzles? 1 
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OUR APPROACH: CAST IN 
THE IMAGE OF A BOAT1
The description that introduces this section of text is drawn from 
James Elkins’ book Why are our Pictures Puzzles? and focuses on a children’s 
jig-saw puzzle that is titled The Approaching Ship. This jig-saw puzzle is 
composed of interlocking tiles that have the shape of  known forms and the 
tiles with an ill-formed silhouette whose shape can be found in many other 
jig-saw puzzles. Elkins’ synopsis of The Approaching Ship calls attention to 
the exemplary fi gures of the former tile, such as a boy, a dog or a female 
silhouette. These pieces are not on their own able to complete the fi nal 
composition that describes the image of a ship approaching a seaside town 
if not accompanied by the later tiles that remain more diffi  cult to discern 
from one another, though their ill formed shape is able to describe both 
the silhouette that allows the individual fi gures to be discerned  and the 
space that lies between each of the fi gures that composes the remainder of 
the jig-saw. The tiles that present identifi able shapes are able to designate 
a known fi gure distinct from their inclusion in the jig-saw puzzle’s overall 
composition, and yet the jig-saw puzzle in its completed form fails to 
ascertain a hierarchy between the multitude of forms grounded by the other 
tiles and the image of a ship approaching and its ground in the collected tiles 
under the title The Approaching Ship. Every occurrence of the fi gures that 
breach the context of the jig-saw puzzle and every more-or-less indistinct 
jig-saw tile reiterates to the audience who engages the jig-saw assemblage 
that their comprehension must oscillate between the identifi able and the 
formless, if any approach is to be posed by The Approaching Ship.
1   James Elkins,  Why are our Pictures Puzzles? On the Modern Origins of Pictorial Complexity (New York & London: 
Routledge, 1999), 80-82.
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An approach embroils every creative endeavour and thus in turn tasks this 
exegesis with an approach. But an approach is what is always to be approached, 
that is, no sooner has an approach been elucidated, then one is again tasked 
with the eff ort of an approach. Thus an approach across that extends across the 
extent of this undertaking is elucidated under the aegis of the jig-saw puzzle’s 
title, The Approaching Ship. An approach  implied in the distant proximity 
of Elkins’ jig-saw tiles and in the image of a ship as it construes a fl eetingly 
prophetic approach brought forth from the apprehensive certainty that there 
is indeed an approach to be had, that all the tiles will fi t. The persistence of the 
wake of the jig-saw’s stationary ship is what will move the argument made 
here in this text some way towards disclosing how an approach is caught up 
in the jig-saw puzzle’s expression of an approaching ship.
This text continues knowing of the ship’s contradictory ground in a  jig-
saw puzzle where each tiles derives a place in which to fi t. That is, each tile 
is apprehended by the pace of the approaching ship’s immobility, a condition 
which penetrates the duration of the jig-saw puzzle enough for the title The 
Approaching Ship to bear them all. Indefi nitely the edges of the tiles approach 
each other according to how jig-saw puzzles are composed, via the habitual 
momentum of two dimensional folds of the orthodox puzzle edges, each 
formed or unformed extremity  fi tting alongside or reaching out to, or 
pushing in the soft edges of another. The jig-saw tiles bring together and are 
brought together by virtue of the approaching ship: it is therefore the ship 
that off ers an approach in turn. The tiles are voyagers held in their stationary 
advance by the ship’s latent passage of the jig-saw puzzle’s watery expanse.
What then is the signifi cance of Elkins’ jig-saw puzzle to the particularity 
of an approach in this PhD undertaking?  Cast astray across the diff erent 
permutations of formed and ill-formed puzzle tiles, an approach is moved in 
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response to the whim of the pictured ship’s swell, and is soaked by it, forced 
to lie where it has been cast in the totality of our own puzzle, A Clinic 
for the Exhausted. But, this text that attends to Raggatt’s letter has thus far 
resisted becoming fi xed to this one or that of its multiple modalities and has 
continuously eluded the particularities and various instances that construct 
its approach.  Raggatt’s ship is threatened by the violence that would have 
cause to distinguish each fragment of this text, (a practice that would break 
this approach and cut its passage short) and yet, as aggregate formations, 
objects and scenes that could potentially compose an approach, are voyagers 
borne by it. Every tile of this project in turn, comes to fi nd itself both as 
surface and support for the another. To throw something out, to cast out, 
is to ask for a response, to ask for someone else to build upon a proposed 
approach. The same approach imagined by Elkins’ jig-saw puzzle is applied 
to the image of Raggatt’s ship; they are  both what engender the respective 
movement of the other in this text, and equally, they are the support for this 
texts own approach off ering itself to itself as an approach, all the whilst a 
ship draws forever near.
Elkins’ ship  is what exposes our approach here in this thesis  to a 
continual repotentilisation that, like the extent of Roussel’s literary output, 
submits this approach to a constant and necessary advance. Confronted 
with the horizon, a ship emerges as the liberating potential of a stationary 
approach, not cautionary, but what rushes ahead via an unregulated velocity, 
a potential encounter sustained ad nauseum; a movement distinct from the 
sedimented and the absolute. It is this movement that the next section seeks 
to address, a movement that forces both ocean and sky to turn around the 
image of an open boat  as it approaches.
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ON THE WAYWARD MOVEMENT 
OF AN OPEN BOAT
In the opening passage of the Essais, the Renaissance writer Michel de 
Montaigne depicts the nausea that affl  icts him during a journey by boat.2 It is 
not upon a rough stormy sea that he feels nauseous, but rather, in “that slight 
jolt given by the oars stealing the vessel from under us, I feel my head and 
stomach troubled, I know not how, as I cannot bear a shaky seat under me.”3 
Montaigne fails to ascertain the form of his seasickness, however, his nausea 
can be described in the movement of the ship and the mapping of its eff ects. 
Richard Scholar suggests that it is in his prose that Montaigne undertakes 
a lexical elucidation of the boat’s disconcerting movements in the hope of 
apprehending a fragment of what seasickness is. As Scholar argues, 
[Montaigne’s] writing starts in experience before moving 
towards explanation and back again, with the movement to and 
fro of a boat upon water [refl ecting] the restless attempt to capture, 
evaluate, and test human experience of the world.4 
2  During the course of this section on Montainge I will quote from three different sources, not to appear indifferent to 
the scholarly task, but to gather together the various translations in such a manner that the various infl ections of the 
translators may confi rm the presence of a voice, an inconclusive authority. 
3   “I cannot now long endure (and when I was young could much less) either coach, litter, or boat, and hate all other 
riding but on horseback, both in town and country. But I can bear a litter worse than a coach; and, by the same reason, 
a rough agitation upon the water, whence fear is produced, better than the motions of a calm. At the little jerks of oars, 
stealing the vessel from under us, I fi nd, I know not how, both my head and my stomach disordered; neither-can I endure to 
sit upon a tottering chair. When the sail or the current carries us equally, or that we are towed, the equal agitation does 
not disturb me at all; ‘tis an interrupted motion that offends me, and most of all when most slow: I cannot otherwise express 
it. The physicians have ordered me to squeeze and gird myself about the bottom of the belly with a napkin to remedy this 
evil; which however I have not tried, being accustomed to wrestle with my own defects, and overcome them myself.” “On 
Coaches” in, Essays of Michel De Montaigne, ed. Cilliam C. Hazlitt, trans. C. Cotton, 1877. Made available, Project Gutenberg, 
2006, < http://www.gutenberg.org/fi les/3600/3600-h/3600-h.htm> accessed 02  August, 2009.
4   Richard Scholar,  The Je-Ne-Sais-Quoi in Early Modern Europe, (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). 234.
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Montaigne’s pursuit of an illness in symptoms borne by the grammatically 
contingent mobility of his text and that exceeds its initial itinerant passage 
of a boat in the ebbs and fl ows of an ocean, suspends any credulous or 
dismissive claims of seasickness in the calm waters between the open ocean 
and the shoreline, in the middle region between two ever receding thresholds. 
Montaigne’s ‘middle region’ is best described in a parlour game recounted 
in Of Vain Subtleties, one of the essays included in the Essais. The intention 
of the game was to link two opposite limits together without rendering an 
existing middle term.5  This game traces Montaigne’s own concern regarding 
the judgment of the two extremes of readers that may commit themselves to 
studying the Essais. According to Scholar:
the middle region between those two extremes appears here as 
the natural place for the readership of the Essai. But the rules of 
the game mean that this region must remain defi ned only by the 
groups of readers that it does not contain. So the middle region is 
left undescribed.6
 
For Montaigne, the middle region implies a “quasi-conversational 
situation”7 in which the author addresses and hopes to be read by individuals 
in an exclusive and intimate manner. Montaigne likens this point of contact 
to a good friendship or sex, both of which, “delight in the sharpness and 
vigour of its intercourse”8 The purpose of Montaigne’s writing becomes one 
of recording this vigour as it takes place, as though he were talking to this 
friend or lover, and subsequently to the reader whom he seeks. The writing 
conjures an other and conjoins Montaigne and an other as they are wrought, 
5   Ian Maclean, “Montaigne, Cardano: the reading of Subtley / the subtlety of reading”, French Studies, No. 37 (1983), 143-57.
6   Scholar,  The Je-Ne-Sais-Quoi in Early Modern Europe, 250.
7   Scholar,  The Je-Ne-Sais-Quoi in Early Modern Europe, 252.
8   “I like a strong, manly fellowship and familiarity, a friendship that delights in the sharpness and vigour of its inter-
course, as does love in bites and scratches that draw blood.” Montaigne as quoted by Scholar, The Je-Ne-Sais-Quoi in Early 
Modern Europe,  252. 
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stretched and bent into a single fi gure by the near and far refl ections exploited 
in the gymnastic prowess evidenced by Deleuze’s actions, and in the jig-saw 
tiles of the The Approaching Ship.9 All parties however remain unable to anchor 
this middle ground. As Montaigne’s eff ort  to defi ne his close friendship with 
the French writer and poet La Boétie in the essay On aff ectionate relationships 
exhibits, the middle region is not so easily straddled or surmounted: “If you 
press me to tell you why I loved him, I feel that it cannot be expressed, except 
by answering: Because it was he, because it was I.”10  What ever takes the 
place of their commitment to each other, it encompasses both Montaigne 
and La Boétie. As Scholar points out, having exhausted an explanation 
without providing one, Montaigne is forced to provide an account of his 
experiences of the friendship in his writing. Montaigne can only point out 
that the initial founding of the friendship was beyond anyone’s control, and 
that, if any explanation be found, it is in the positive eff ect the friendship has 
had on each party refl ected by Montaigne’s writing which serves to capture 
some of the friendships force. In On educating children, another of the essays 
that are included in the Essais, Montaigne responds to the observation of 
someone who lives out the very inability to express themselves, believing 
that their struggle is not a failure to deliver an explanation as though held 
before its expression. Montaigne understands it as an alchemical conception, 
the person’s stammering and stuttering the very passage of the expressions 
conception, as though they are “licking an imperfect lump into shape.”11 
Montaigne’s search for an all embracing explanation of his friendship with La 
Boétie concludes in its attribution to an unknowable and inexplicable force, 
9   “Handling and use by able monads give value to a language, not so much by innovating as by fi lling out with more 
vigorous and varied services, by stretching and bending it. They do not bring to it new words, but they enrich their own, 
give more weight and depth to their meaning and use; they teach the language unaccustomed movements, but prudently 
and shrewdly. And how little this gift is given to all is seen in so many French writers of our time.” Montaigne as quoted 
by Scholar, The Je-Ne-Sais-Quoi in Early Modern Europe, . 259.
10   Montaigne as quoted by Scholar, The Je-Ne-Sais-Quoi in Early Modern Europe, 267.
11   Michel de Montaigne, “On educating children” in, The Complete Essays,  ed. & trans. M. A. Screech, (London: Penguin 
Books, 2003), 190.
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via his turn to the phrase je ne sais quel, the adjective form of je ne sais quoi (I 
know not what).12 The indefi nite sense of the phrase is further complicated 
by Montaigne’s exclamation in An Apology for Raymond Sebond,  Que sais-je? 
(What do I know?); his argument proceeding much like the parlour game 
described above, from one extreme to another: Montaigne does not know 
nothing, nor does he know everything, and therefore Montaigne must 
question whether he knows what he does know and in turn whether he does 
in fact not know what he does not know.13 The declaration ‘I know not what’ 
is  an attempt by Montaigne to capture some of the momentum that initially 
saw the two become friends. In doing so it reasserts Montaigne’s conclusion 
that, “our friendship has no other model than itself.”14 
Montaigne’s recourse to the rhetorical questioning of his knowledge is 
not a claim to an illiteracy of his friendship but is instead the means by which 
he may fathom the cumulative particularities of a complex exchange that 
composes a friendship. As Montaigne recounts in On educating children of his 
own writing:  
Yet I know myself how valiantly I strive to measure up to 
my stolen wares and to match myself to them equal to equal, not 
without some rash hope of throwing dust in the eyes of critics who 
would pick them out (though more thanks to the skill with which I 
apply them than to my skill in discovering them or to any strengths 
12  I will use je ne sais quoi broadly in the affi rmative to refer to “something that is experienced but cannot be explained 
[...]a certain something, that is experienced as immediately present while remaining forever alien to explanation, something 
really inexplicable and inexplicably real” and not in its negative operation where it refers to “a non-entity, a mere word 
empty of sense and reference.” A taxonomy of the various historical occurrences and how they differ from one another in 
their use and lexical force can be found in, Scholar, The Je-Ne-Sais-Quoi in Early Modern Europe, 33-39. 
 13  “Montainge’s famous Que sais-je ? (What do I know?) constitutes the skeptical relativist formulation of the paradox: I 
do not know nothing, I do not know everything, I know neither nothing … nor everything. Still, the interrogative phrasing 
destabilizes learned ignorance, and with it the position of a theoretical subject: I do not know whether I know what I know; 
I do not know whether I am ignorant of what I do not know.” Louis Marin,  Sublime Poussin, trans. C. Porter, (Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press, 1999), 217.
14  Montaigne as quoted by Scholar,  The Je-Ne-Sais-Quoi in Early Modern Europe, 270.
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of my own). Moreover I do not take on those old champions all at 
once, wrestling with them body to body: it is a matter of slight, 
repeated, tiny encounters.15
Montaigne does not try to hide his thefts; instead he brazenly tries them 
on in the guise of his own text. This passage from On educating children exceeds 
not only the intentions of Montaigne’s critics, but also his own authorial 
vision which is viewed self-consciously: “I have not, nor do I desire, enough 
authority to be believed. I feel too badly taught to teach others.”16  Montaigne 
likens such a methodology to the collection of nectar by bees from diff erent 
fl owers to make honey. In the mixing of the diff erent scents the bees make 
a honey that is all of their own, a substance for which they are not obliged 
to recount the origins. Montaigne’s own writing does not limit itself to 
the already said, but also proceeds by the self-propagating accumulation of 
misunderstandings that distinguishes itself in the indefi nable lexical character 
of the je ne sais quoi.
Montainge’s turn to the je ne sais quoi remains contingent on allowing a 
panoramic movement that allows him to discern the whole of his friendship; 
his open boat on which he suff ers his nausea recalling the fi rst use of a camera 
pan in Thomas Edison’s fi lm, The Return of the Lifeboat (1897). During the 
fi lming, the camera operator reframes a shot so as to keep the approaching 
lifeboat in frame as it comes ashore riding the crest of the breakers and in 
doing so draws our attention to the space outside the frame, to the action that 
occurs off  screen. The camera’s eye, no longer able to contain the inadvertent 
assemblage, (the movement of each artefact in the scene), fails in the labour 
to emulate the ship’s speed, and forces us to recognise the ineff able nautical 
advance of this open boat. The je ne sais quoi carries, in its incessant return 
15  Montaigne, “On educating children,”167.
16  Montaigne, “On educating children,”167.
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without terminus, without recognition and without deception, the possibility 
of a life shared between two shores.  From between a shore and a horizon, 
from between building and boat, an approach is discerned, approaching.
A Clinic for the Exhausted is composed of the production of this text and the 
design projects, both of which realise the PhD. Yet, it also resists establishing 
an order in production: that the projects are the outcome of a text, or that 
the text is established as a description of the projects. A Clinic for the Exhausted 
traverses the game of two opposites that is off ered up by Montaigne; building 
to ocean liner, Plato and Molière, Argan and Socrates, Roussel and Raggatt 
(to name a few that have been encountered) are themselves privy to the rules 
of Montaigne’s game as they navigate the complex interleaving of fi lmic, 
artistic, literary, philosophical and architectural practices, inhabiting the gaps 
that appear in even the most densely imagined of practices. By mobilising 
the will-to-invent this project bears a necessarily corriganesque body that 
admits to an encounter on more than one occasion with a Deleuzian spirit. 
The outcome of any practice and thus what governs the success (or failure) 
of any PhD undertaking including this one - a body of work – cannot be 
distinguished from the practice of said body, from a body that works. Akin 
to Montaigne’s boat, a body of work improvises the movements of a practice; 
whilst it is Montaigne’s nausea that assures him of his own body that works; 
the je ne sais quoi attended to an encounter with forces that may enable the 
body to put into practice strategies and approaches that may otherwise have 
been excluded in the imposition of the governance of said body that include, 
in the example of Montaigne’s friendship with La Boétie, the production of 
relations without explanation.  But the ability to verify the extent of this 
body’s approach is not diminished; rather the vitality of Montaigne’s parlor 
game attends to an audience’s encounter with the force of an immanent 
approach in A Clinic for the Exhausted.
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The following text will address how the sense of the terms ‘clinic’ and 
‘exhaustion’ is to be seized in so far as they are aligned with the title of this 
project, A Clinic for the Exhausted, and to what extent they have borne the 
research undertaken. With this text I wish to approach some of the methods 
which may enable us to encounter the forces of an immanent approach, thus 
the concluding remarks will intend to mobilise such methods within the 
compositional characteristics of A Clinic for the Exhausted. 
AN ITINERANT LIFE
In Illness as Metaphor, Susan Sontag explains that during the mid-eighteenth 
century illness became “the vehicle of excess,”17 in particular, tuberculosis 
“became a trope for new attitudes toward the self ”18 and was essential in 
“promoting the self as an image.”19 Sontag mentions the German romantic 
Novalis who suggested that what was really interesting was a sickness “which 
belongs to individualising.”20 During this period tuberculosis become the 
means by which the patient could gather their illness into an enquiry on the 
self. By the nineteenth century tuberculosis had developed a much diff erent 
image and was then “celebrated as the disease of born victims, of sensitive, 
passive people who are not quite life-loving enough to survive.”21 The 
suff erer of tuberculosis was claimed to have already been exhausted by life 
without having lived it. They were “a dropout, a wanderer in endless search 
of the healthy place,”22 in search of an environment that could help ‘dryout’ 
their lungs.  The tuberculoid patient’s health became synonymous with the 
process of individualising, for it they were ever to claim health, they  would 
17   Susan Sontag, Illness as Metaphor, (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 49.
18   Sontag, Illness as Metaphor, 32.
19   Sontag, Illness as Metaphor, 33.
20   Sontag, Illness as Metaphor, 35.
21   Sontag, Illness as Metaphor, 29.
22   Sontag, Illness as Metaphor, 37
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have to fi nd a healthy place, a place that could therefore contain the patient 
and permit them a life. 
The passage of tuberculosis through its historical tropes is marked 
out by how each individual patient remained tethered to their individual 
symptomatology. Not only are the circumstances of a disease correlated by 
their collapse into the multiplicity of symptoms that fail to privilege one 
trope over another,  but the infected patient becomes heteronymous with the 
pathology of disease itself.  As Foucault states in The Birth of the Clinic, written 
at approximately the same time as his study on Raymond Roussel:
For classifi catory medicine, presence in an organ is never 
absolutely necessary to defi ne a disease: this disease may travel from 
one point of localization to another, reach other bodily surfaces, while 
remaining identical in nature. The space of the body and the space of 
the disease possess enough latitude to slide away from one another. 
[….] These movements, which are accompanied by symptomatic 
changes, may occur in time in a single individual; they may also be 
found by examining a series of individuals with diff erent link points: 
in its visceral form, spasm is encountered, above all, in lymphatic 
subjects, while in its cerebral form it is encountered more among 
sanguine temperaments. But in any case, the essential pathological 
confi guration is not altered. The organs are the concrete supports 
of the disease; they never constitute its indispensable conditions. 
The system of points that defi nes the relations of the disease to the 
organism  is neither constant or necessary. They do not possess a 
common previously defi ned space.23
Montaigne’s adoption of the je ne sais quoi to attend to the unaccountable 
23   Michel Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception, trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith (London: 
Vintage Books, 1994),10.
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appearance of his nausea claims with its use the provisional space of the 
convalescent; a patient that succumbs to a space without specifi city. In so doing 
the phrase also attends to the vitality of the patient borne across the extent 
of a space that is exceptional in that this space admits to no intrinsic feature 
that could distinguishable it and thus cut short the patients convalescing. The 
convalescent is a patient that endures a life borne by what continually diff ers, 
that begets the impossibility of Montaigne’s return to shore. Despite the 
discernible diff erences between the image of a boat and that of a patient, their 
acquaintance is necessary in that what must in some way take place turns aside 
the expanse between so as to keep this experiment going. By surveying the 
assemblage of a boat and the foggy lungs of a tuberculosis patient, this project 
realises, what was only an instant ago unfathomable, a practice that saturates 
the material life of both boat and suff ering patient and which  harbors a shared 
felt force obliging us to go that much further.  
WHAT IS OUR SHARED 
EXPERIENCE OF EXHAUSTION
Jan Verwoert in his essay Exhaustion and Exuberance: Ways to Defy 
the Pressure to Perform, identifi es in the convalescent’s ceaseless pursuit of 
health the possibility to contest the demand to perform. Verwoert claims 
exhaustion as the instrument with which socio-political capital persuades 
you to constantly perform well beyond your abilities and that, through the 
violence of an incessant crisis and the poverty of expectation, entails you 
saying “I can” to each and every demand made on you. The suggestion that 
one can’t work, that one cannot go on performing the task asked of them, 
certainly interrupts the economy of expectation generated by the demand, 
but the demand will eventually be affi  rmed, because an “I can’t”  also entails 
an awareness that one can: that one can say “I can’t”.  To deny the mutability 
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of the “I can’t” and the “I can” for an ulterior end – productivity - is to fail 
to see that they are couched in the shared experience of each other. Drawn 
in to the vicinity of each other, an exhaustive “I can’t” and an exuberant “I 
can” are off ered up as a deliberate squandering of one’s artistic, monetary, or 
intellectual capital, opening ourselves up to the unexpected appropriation by 
others within the provisionality of the community that the “I can” and “I 
can’t” gather. It means that those in the midst of appropriation infer a debt 
to someone else. This is not a debt that could form the outlines of a new 
contingent economy, or a return of the threat of economic or social ruin. The 
debt accorded recognises that one’s own practice is always in some way, shape 
or form, transformed by another who has enabled you to practice in the way 
that you do.  Verwoert acknowledges in the appropriation of a debt to others 
the diffi  culty and importance of care, on the  basis that care is a “surplus 
that can never be justifi ed”24 and is always an “unconditional demand.”25 He 
considers care as an ideal approach with which to structure an assemblage of 
exhaustion and exuberance on. Importantly, he identifi es that the premise of 
care invested in debt does not in any way diminish the prospect of saying no, 
or “I can’t”. 
The state of convalescence is ventured by Verwoert as lying within the 
latency of permitting time for oneself, a space in which one is made aware 
of the necessity to care for oneself. This does not necessarily mean stopping 
work altogether, rather it describes what can be forged inspite of the demand 
to perform in a particular manner and whereby a prescribed end would 
entail an assimilation back into the system that initially made the demand 
to perform.  Verwoert identifi es the pitfalls of a cycle of exuberance and 
24   Verwoert, “Exhaustion and Exuberance: Ways to Defy the Pressure to Perform,”103.
25   Jan Verwoert, “Exhaustion and Exuberance: Ways to Defy the Pressure to Perform,” Dot Dot Dot, No.15, (Oct-Nov 2007), 
90-112, 103. See also the collected essays, Jan Verwoert, Tell Me What You Want, What You Really, Really Want, ed. Vanessa 
Ohlraun, (Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2010), 13-73.
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exhaustion prevalent in the mixture of political, economic and cultural 
revolutions that confess to attending to a community that has been 
disappointed by a failed regime, only to exhaust the initial exuberant claims 
of diff erence that distinguished them as other to the previous regime. To 
enable the passage beyond exhaustion, Verwoert maintains, may also mean 
pushing yourself so that “you simply incapacitate yourself to a degree that 
no-one can possibly still expect anything of you.”26  In considering the 
dynamics of serial revolutions, Verwoert asks us to suspend the process at 
the point of exhaustion. It is here he argues where the moment of latency, 
a state of convalescence, enables us to be fully aware of the one thing we 
all share in, the experience of exhaustion. By escaping the strictures that 
would mandate how and when we perform, the state of convalescence and 
model of exhaustion do not, as has already been argued, inhibit our ability to 
actively go against the grain. It is rather the practices of the convalescent that 
carve out through the means of exhaustion a space where we may dedicate 
ourselves to others and, to the potentiality of a Life. 
This text will now examine the gestures by which exhaustion assumes the 
dimensions of a practice of care, before focusing the text on how improvising 
an equivalence of care suggests the space of the Clinic.
ON EXHAUSTION  
In his essay The Exhausted, Gilles Deleuze pursues “the formless or 
the unformulated;”27 that which answers the demand to choose, with a 
preference not to choose. Deleuze’s essay ascertain that there is no longer any 
possible answer, because the inclusive disjunction that is a preference not to 
26   Verwoert, “Exhaustion and Exuberance: Ways to Defy the Pressure to Perform,”108.
27   Gilles Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, trans. Daniel W. Smith & Michael A. Greco, (Minneapolis: University of Min-
nesota Press, 1997), 154.
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choose “exhausts the whole of the possible.”28 For Deleuze, exhaustion has 
nothing to do with tiredness, exhaustion precedes the individualising of a 
thing. Tiredness, Deleuze suggests, would have us choose between things, 
between names or actions, construing a collection of objects and subjects. 
Exhaustion is instead,  the radical sense of plentitude in the momentary state 
of living the very condition of being without subjects or objects. As Deleuze 
writes: “only an exhausted person can exhaust the possible, because he has 
renounced all need, preference, goal or signifi cation.”29 Deleuze suggests that 
this procedure is taken up through three languages. 
The fi rst language seeks to exhaust the possible by discovering every 
permutation and combination that a selected number of gestures permit. 
Deleuze illustrates this language via an examination of Samuel Beckett’s play 
Quad. Quad describes the movement of four fi gures who trace lines that lie 
between four points of a square, drawing out through their movement every 
confi guration of lines and point, but without their progress allowing  the 
fi gures to come into direct contact. This means that as the fi gures cut across 
each others path along the diagonals from corner to corner they are forced 
to side step each other, avoiding contact and as a consequence the point of 
intersection that marks the centre of the square.  Language two  of Deleuze’s 
taxonomy of exhaustion is enumerated in the instance of the failure of each 
fi gure to reach the centre. He argues that the centre delineates a gesture’s 
potential to reach the limit of a gesture itself. Deleuze insists that this is 
further demonstrated in Beckett’s TV play Ghost Trio, in which a series of 
objects are shown in close-up. Guided by a woman’s voice as the camera cuts 
from one to the other, each image suggests that on seeing only a portion of 
the object we are now aware of the whole - a door, a window, a pallet -  even 
though the full extent of each remains obscured by the close vision of the 
28   Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, 152.
29   Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, 154.
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camera. Traversing between these three images is the play’s protagonist, a man 
whose character traits remains non specifi c, he is singularly a man, but also, a 
formless concept of a man, echoed in his return to a slumped position at the 
conclusion of any passage he undertakes. Near the end of the play, the man 
looks at a refl ection of himself in a mirror that had been excluded from the 
initial description of the room. The narrator is startled by this action as it 
exposes her voice’s redundancy in the control of the man’s movements. The 
narrator’s surprise recurs when the camera takes an interest in the mirror, and 
she is surprised by the sudden refl ection of the protagonist’s face detached 
from the confi nes of the room. The mirror marks an unseemly encounter of 
a face fl oating in another space; but as Deleuze argues:
The limit of the series does not lie at the infi nity of the terms but 
can be anywhere in the fl ow: between two terms, between two voices 
or the variations of a single choice in a point that is already reached 
well before one knows that the series is exhausted, and well before 
one learns that there is no longer any possibility or any story, and that 
there has not been one for a long time.30 
Thus the mirror characterises the threshold of the third language 
enumerated by Deleuze as rendering both image and space. The image is what 
returns, as in the case of the man’s face in the mirror,  but always incomplete, 
as though his portrait was slightly larger than the frame in which it stands, 
or slightly decomposed, detached from its initial ground in the room and cut 
from the body of the man, “like the smile without a cat in Lewis Carroll.”31 
The image’s deterioration can not be determined by the tracing of its parts, 
because what follows does not return the appearance of the series in its entirety. 
The image then spans the atonal model of silence, the sudden inability to 
burden what appears with a name that we may know it by. Simultaneously, 
30   Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, 157-158.
31   Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, 168.
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it is also the fragmentation of space. The mirror marks the man’s awareness 
of the space of his being, and also,  in the partial disclosure of his face, a space 
beyond the frame of the mirror. The frame not only cuts a partial image of 
the man in his space, but off ers a totally Other space detached from the space 
that the man inhabits. In the process, the man’s face is disfi gured, that is, the 
Other man, his double in the process of the man’s recognition of his refl ection 
eff aces his own. What the mirror off ers is a face for the character. As a result, 
space is not so much a specifi c space, it is “any-space-whatever.”32 Deleuze 
argues that space is not represented by an ensemble of things that inhabit 
space, but rather, the image is what points towards a space. Deleuze suggests 
that the man’s face gestures towards both a space and character, both of which 
are intimated as beyond the action of the play. 
The third TV play by Beckett that Deleuze examines is entitled …but 
the clouds… , and is conceived as an arrangement of things - door, closet, 
sanctum. However, each thing does not diff erentiate the space through the 
use of real objects like Ghost Trio’s mirror but are brought  about through 
spatial gestures that open the west as a door to look onto the open road, 
the east to the space of a closet, and the north to a sanctum designated by 
a desk that is not there. The sanctum is not a physical space, composed of 
windows and doors, but a mental space. All of these gestures point towards 
a directional space beyond: the door opens to a road, the closet  where the 
character swaps his clothes and the sanctum to which the character can 
withdraw. Space is illuminated, outlined by a narrating voice and carved by 
directional movements of the character from within the dark surrounds. For 
Beckett, space is brought about within a “mental existence.”33 Thus, through 
a collection of established points of view that fade in and out of one another 
the audience is led from one mental space to another, traversing the black void 
32   Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, 160.
33   Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, 169.
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that surrounds each space. The spaces are not evoked by the naming of them – 
they do not appear under a select idiom. The female face that is conjured and 
fi lls the screen disappears in the same breath of its invocation, its image always 
to appear moving away from its origin. The image does not supply a story 
– it does not contain a beginning, middle and end - nor does the image have 
a content of its own that is, anymore than the mirror of Ghost Trio eff aces 
what is in front of it. The image remains silent.
Beckett’s silence is not the lack of sound, but rather a voice that is 
impersonal, that does not belong to any one and is unable to name itself 
or others. The impersonal voice registers the thickness of utterances that 
constitutes the noise of language, a sound that reveals no particular sound, and 
thus no particular language. It is only in the madness of such a proposition that 
the image emerges, in the pre-individual silence of nothing. Subsequently, for 
the gestures of the exhausted to come to fruition, both space and image must 
reach their limit. Nevertheless, as already indicated in the invocation of …but 
the clouds…  the image’s temporality does not extend beyond its emergence. 
The appearance of an image can never be the conclusion of a gesture; it is 
not something whose location can be pinpointed and knowingly evoked at a 
moment’s notice. As Beckett’s protagonist realises it is more likely that it does 
not appear, and even when it does, we continue our intonations, “because we 
are never sure we have succeeded in making an image.”34  
Deleuze concludes his episodic structure of exhaustion with  Beckett’s 
Nacht und Traume. Beckett’s play centres on a male fi gure affl  icted with the 
inability to speak, hear, move or sleep.  Though he fi nds himself unable to 
sleep, he can still dream of himself wrested from his affl  ictions, in the refl ected 
image of his ghostly double that manifests itself next to him. No language is 
employed in the conjuring of his Other, all that the audience can hear is at 
34   Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, 161.
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fi rst the humming followed by the singing of Franz Schubert’s lied or song, 
Nacht und Traume, which gives the play its title, its intonations returning the 
audience back to the image of a dream and a solipistic realisation. For Deleuze 
the truly exhausted person is the insomniac who dreams of insomnia: “in 
the dream of insomnia, it is a question not of realising the impossible but of 
exhausting the possible.”35 The insomniac character must fabricate his dream, 
he must dream himself dreaming if he is to conjure the image of his double. 
Beckett’s insomniac participates in the ‘how’ by which the exhausted 
dispenses with, enumerates, emphasises and accentuates language. It is an 
approach that is applicable to A Clinic for the Exhausted; an indivisible polysemy 
made material through a chain of fi gurations ascending and descending 
outwards as a collection of tidal sensations that facilitates the emergence of 
the exhausted in the madness of the proposition. The insomniac is who off ers 
an approach in an approach that exhausts all approaches.
THE CLINIC: AN AMBILOQUY 
The clinician traced a patient’s symptoms out in their entirety so that 
within the intimate unity of an illness’s divergent movements they could 
claim to have laid out the course of the patient’s physical exhaustion. It is 
the clinician who is apprehended and drawn out in the duration of the gait 
of the fi gures who pace out the permutations of movement in Quad.  As 
Foucault writes:
The formation of the clinical method was bound up with the 
emergence of the doctor’s gaze into the fi eld of signs and symptoms. 
The recognition of its constituent rights involved the eff acement of their 
absolute distinction and the postulate that henceforth the signifi er (sign 
and symptom) would be entirely transparent for the signifi ed, which 
35   Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, 171.
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would appear, without concealment or residue, in its most pristine reality, 
and that the essence of the signifi ed – the heart of the disease – would be 
entirely exhausted in the intelligible syntax of the signifi er.36
As the clinician’s gaze interrogates the temperament of the tuberculosis 
patient they realise the patient’s illness in the individualising act which 
conditions a community of exiles: a gesture towards another space. It is across 
the duration of any one place that the tuberculoid suff erer’s illness is sustained, 
in the provisional state of convalescence that embraces the patient’s life.  Health 
is what would eff ace the image of their illness, but it is also what pervades and 
sustains the convalescing patient because it is health that frames their stay, but 
it is also the frame that cuts, that sends them on their perpetual displacement 
from one space to another; an illness indistinguishable from a climate, an 
illness that erupts in the midst of the patient’s compound. The image of 
hypochondria off ered in the opening of this thesis dispenses with the clear cut 
evaluation of what is an exemplary health or illness and determines how the 
state of convalescence and the movement of exiles resist being distinguished 
from each other; that the hypochondriac will always remain unsatisfi ed when 
either is off ered as a conclusion. In the narrating voice of  …but the clouds… we 
can discern the etiology of hypochondria that takes place between the clinician 
and the patient who remain always in sight of each other.   
 The clinician’s eyes appear as if they were the ghostly hands tending 
to the dreamt fi gure in Nacht und Traume, and that, within the contingent 
circumstances of this clinic, discover the fi gure of the suff erer who dreams 
himself somewhere else, whose affl  iction fi nds attention in the violence of 
another space, a place that is spaced out, or paced out if we may remember 
Argan’s curative gait, in his exile from one convalescing state to another. The 
tuberculosis suff erer would seem to affi  rm Maurice Blanchot’s belief that:
36   Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception, 91.
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Night, the essence of night, does not let us sleep. In the night no 
refuge is to be found in sleep. And if you fail sleep, exhaustion fi nally 
sickens you, and this sickness prevents sleeping; it is expressed by 
insomnia, by the impossibility of making sleep a free zone, a clear and 
true resolution. In the night one cannot sleep.37
The distinction between illness as an image of selfh ood and an image that 
dissolves the individual, is mirrored in the gestures of Elkins’ description for a 
distinction been an image as Subject and an image as Anti-Subject.38 For Elkins 
an image can be determined to have a ‘Subject’ if it “declares or is taken to 
declare, a single narrative, theme, or genre”39 often the title of the image is 
enough to declare the structure of the image’s meaning, even if that meaning 
remains open to its extension. An ‘Anti-Subject’ is an image that “begins 
with a determinate subject then becomes a cipher” a palimpsest that prompts 
a “retreat from the obvious, unambiguous primary meaning.”40 While the 
terms remain distinct and are specifi c to the context within which Elkins 
argues them, Subject and Anti-Subject encompass, in the reality of image 
making, the possibility of an ambiguous application. Thus, as Elkins goes on 
to argue,  an image that has “a single meaning can be so quietly articulated and 
so bewildering rich that it can be diffi  cult to name” and congruently “a fl ight 
from meaning can produce a nebula of partly cognized possibilities.”41 Elkins 
names the ambiguous discourse between these two extremes as an ‘ambiloquy,’ 
a term which he applies to  “a work that declares a single subject, and then 
dissolves into a partly illegible orchestration of multiple meanings, provoking 
37   Maurice Blanchot, The Space of Literature, trans. A. Smock, (Lincoln & London: University of Nebraska Press, 1982), 266-
267, italics my emphasis. In making his own assertions regarding exhaustion Deleuze refers to Blanchot’s conception, however, 
in his notes refrains from quoting this paragraph in its entirety. Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, 171, 206, note 85.
38   For a detailed analysis of these two terms, as well as the term ‘Not-Subject’, refer to Chapter 5, On Monstrously Ambigu-
ous Paintings in,  Elkins, Why are our Pictures Puzzles? On the modern Origins of Pictorial Complexity, specifi cally 126-130.
39   Elkins, Why are our Pictures Puzzles? On the modern Origins of Pictorial Complexity, 128. 
40   Elkins, Why are our Pictures Puzzles? On the modern Origins of Pictorial Complexity, 129.
41   Elkins, Why are our Pictures Puzzles? On the modern Origins of Pictorial Complexity, 141.
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and then confounding any determined interpretation.”42 The dissolution of 
any particular grammar into the inconsistency of grammar, informs what 
Elkins determines as the  ambiloquy’s governing principle: that there can be 
“no grammar in the ambiloquy.”43  
 The ambiloquy is off ered as a way of addressing the degree with which this 
project embraces the assertion made by Foucault, (stated above),  that the clinic 
was a universal relationship of mankind with itself: 
It is in the clinic, it was said, that medicine found its possibility of 
origin. At the dawn of mankind, prior to every vain belief, every system, 
medicine in its entirety consisted of an immediate relationship between 
sickness and that cure that alleviated it. This relationship was one of 
instinct and sensibility, rather than of experience; it was established 
by the individual from himself to himself, before it was caught up in 
a social network: ‘The patient’s sensibility tells him whether this or 
that position makes him more comfortable or torments him’. It is this 
relationship, established without the mediation of knowledge, that 
is observed by the healthy man; and this observation itself is not an 
option for future knowledge; it is not even an act of awareness (prise 
de conscience); it is performed immediately and blindly; ‘A secret voice 
tells us here: contemplate nature’; multiplied by itself, transmitted 
from one to another, it becomes a general form of consciousness of 
which each individual is both subject and object; ‘Everyone, without 
distinction, practiced this medicine … each person’s experience were 
communicated to others … and this knowledge passed from father to 
children’. Before it became a corpus of knowledge (un savior), the clinic 
was a universal relationship of mankind with itself. 44
42   Elkins, Why are our Pictures Puzzles? On the modern Origins of Pictorial Complexity, 145.
43   Elkins, Why are our Pictures Puzzles? On the modern Origins of Pictorial Complexity,147.
44   Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception, 55.
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Care cannot be organised into a top down approach, as doing so would 
fail to recognise the circumstance by which care takes place in the Clinic, a space 
that makes a claim to the particularities of the community, and the initial pre-
individuating void that enveloped the community as a whole. The grammar 
of care is realised as an ambiloquy because care is that which can declare the 
extent of its undertaking, at the same times it is claimed by an abstract mass 
whose voice carves a space left open beside one’s bedside for the realisation of 
the totality of human endeavours.45     
 
STRADDLING THE THRESHOLD 
OF NOT-KNOWING
The clinic lies between the particularities of Montaigne’s incoming break 
and the generality of the ocean surface and simultaneously moves away from 
a single origin, towards a middling of them all. It sustains the radical practice 
of care that enables this endeavour to gestures towards the horizon of the 
impossible. To apprehend the conditions of the horizon requires conjuring a 
panoramic movement that is distinguished in Marcel Duchamp’s Door: 11 rue 
Larrey (1927). Duchamp’s door gestures towards the parenthesis of Roussel’s 
tropological space, never simply open or closed. Beyond one door always lies 
another, and thus the threshold that the horizon off ers is replete with hinges; 
a diagram that might arguably be imagined by Russian Architect Konstantin 
Melnikov’s triple functioning door of the same year: never simply opened 
and closed, but with the potential to claim a new condition in excess of the 
45    In order for audience to comprehend some of the narration, they need to be made aware that the ‘sick-bay’, the 
part of a man-of-war where the ill seamen was placed, and what served in lieu of a hospital on land, was located adjacent 
to the sleeping quarters of the watchmen. All that separated the watchmen’s hammocks from the ‘sick-bay’ was a thin 
perforated screen. In lieu of this project’s impending confrontation with the space of the clinic, as a space located adjacent 
to the bed of the ill, the approach of the ship is always towards the ‘sick-bay’, the space that may confi rm the extent of 
an approach in A Clinic for the Exhausted. See, Herman Melville, White Jacket or The World in a Man-of-War, (London: John 
Lehmann, 1952), 309.
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door.46 Confronting this complex of thresholds requires us knowing that:
What defi nes the act of medical knowledge in its concrete form 
is not, therefore, the encounter between doctor and patient, nor is it 
the confrontation of a body of knowledge and a perception: it is the 
systematic intersection of two series of information, each homogeneous 
but alien to each other – two series that embrace an infi nite set of separate 
events, but whose intersection reveals, in its isolable dependence, the 
individual fact. A sagittal fi gure of knowledge. 47
The progression of doors describe a series of culminations, of disruptive 
transformations, sutures that occur in the alignment of uneven edges of one 
door with another; their  hinges attending to the durational force of a threshold 
without origin or end: exhaustion is hence understood as an encounter with 
the open and closed as the movement of exile and the contingency of and as 
the condition of a state of convalescence. Thus a horizon of the impossible 
is imagined, a mettisage of still surfaces that swing not from  the edges of an 
immense door frame but from subtle imperceptible deformations that carry 
through an infi nite number of planes, describing them as though they were 
entirely made of contours;  geometric lines that describe the topography of 
no where in particular. This gesture discloses the practice of care at the limit-
46  Duchamp’s door was located in his Paris studio, and  is a single door leaf that operates across two door frames located 
between studio and the bedroom, and the studio and the bathroom. The frames are set ninety degrees to each other, so 
that the door leaf pivots from the shared edge of both frames. As the door is opened its swing carries the door from a 
one frame to the other. Melnikov’s door is located in the Melnikov House, and is a door located at the bottom of the stairs 
used to navigate the two cylindrical volumes that describe the house.  The door operates much like the door on Duchamp’s 
studio, by carrying a door leaf through a series of frames, but goes further by providing three noted points of operation: 
opened against the entry hall wall it allows free entry to the entire house; located in the fi rst frame it shares with another 
leaf it closes the entry hall off from the remainder of the house, and; in the fi nal position, again shared with another door 
leaf, it permits passage from the entry hall to the stairwell, but closes off the ground fl oor. In turn, the other door leafs 
that it shares the frames with at each successive point, establishes an array of open and closed states. See, Juhani Pallasmaa 
& Andrei Gozak, The Melnikov House, trans. Catherine Cooke, (London:Academy Editions, 1996), 23. Also,  Dalibor Veseley, 
Architecture and Surrealism, Architecture Design, (March/April 1978).
47   Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception, 30.
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horizon of the clinic: an invitation to address those who cannot be arrested 
by any contour.
  Daniel W. Smith in his introduction to Deleuze’s Essays Critical and 
Clinical explains that an address directed to those missing from the pantheon 
of contemporary practices does not ask after the return of those who are 
already known, a return of the same, of those who have taken leave of the 
shore only to disembark some while later on the same shore. It is a matter of 
“contributing to the invention of a people who are missing,”48 asking after 
those modes of existence that have yet to emerge. This does not exclude 
those who may already exist but conceive of themselves as missing from the 
cacophony of utterances that make a demand for a life.  It is, in each case, 
“an utterance that expresses the impossibility of living under domination,”49 
that resists the demand to perform, to choose, or to condition the fi eld 
of possibilities in such a way that one could off er no contradiction to the 
arrangement held out in front of you or, that would draw a close to other 
sensations around which a community may emerge.
The extraordinary task of this PhD has been to ask after how we might 
care for those who will remain missing.  Certainly the mutable ambiloquy, and 
the chimerical je ne sais quoi have been sought out for their elliptical ability 
to reach toward those who cannot be asked after by name, but neither term 
can encapsulate in their entirety those who wield the clinic’s horizon as a 
veil; those who perpetuate inspite of the demand to practice otherwise; “an 
exhausted community, or a community of the exhausted.”50 
48   Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, xlii.
49   Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, xliv.
50   Verwoert,  “Exhaustion and Exuberance: Ways to Defy the Pressure to Perform,” 110.
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An attempt will now be made to cast an audience into the constellation of 
the clinic’s gilt and gemmed edifi ce; the sixth and fi nal text which embraces, 
without apology, the principles of the clinic, and manifests this PhD’s 
ineff able undertaking.
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An
Eme r a l d  S e pu l c h r e
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A TORTOISE
Duc Jean des Esseintes’ ritualistic self imposed exile away from the grotesque 
and senseless bourgeois world of the city, in Joris-Karl Huysman’s decadent 
novel A Rebours (1884),   illustrates the folding-in of the outside that composes 
the space of the ship from the surface of the ocean.  Disgusted by the bourgeois 
excesses of Paris and the noble set he has been born into, Esseintes shuts himself 
away in a house in the country to forge an existence in the experimentation 
and contemplation of aesthetic and learned disciplines. One of Esseintes’ 
experiments, his unfortunate tortoise, (a description of which can be seen 
to fall under the shadow of Jorge Luis Borges’ curious taxonomy of animals 
appropriated from a certain Chinese Encyclopedia1 ), provides an exemplary 
allegorical diagram of the ocean fold with which this text can pursue its own 
senseless search for reason. The tortoise forms a wreck at the depths of Esseintes’ 
self enforced lazaretto, but is also what might furnish this project here with a 
Narrenschiff 2  or a ship of fools, a contrivance that impels Essenties’ experiment 
to go that little further.  The rationale behind this texts appropriation of the 
tortoise is prescribed by Esseintes’ own experiment, by which he vainly attempts 
to enliven the splendor of an oriental rug by forcing its navigation by something 
drab, a lumbering inelegant tortoise he purchases  for the task. Esseintes, unable 
to reconcile the tortoise’s lugubrious hues with the purpose he intended has each 
scale on its shell superfi cially and superfl uously decorated, fi rst in gold, and then 
in gemstones so that the rug’s threads may be subdued by the grander and richer 
1     Foucault uses this passage from Luis Borge’s “The Analytical Language of John Wilkins’”to illustrate the possibility of 
new systems of classifi cation and validity, but also to confront the limits of our own systems of coherence and sense making. 
Refer,  Michel Foucault, The Order of Things (London & New York: Routledge, 2006), xvi. 
2     Narrenschiff  or the ship of fools, existed as European medieval boats that were often entrusted with the insane 
who had been removed to the outskirts of a city. They were often accessed as an easy and perhaps only form of transport 
between cities that could offer spiritual or medical treatment.  Refer,  Michel Foucault, The History of Madness, trans. J Murphy 
& J. Khalfa, (London & New York: Routledge, 2006), 8-12.
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object of the tortoise. Resplendent with Esseintes’ senseless disavowal of the 
outside, the tortoises’ gold and bejeweled scales refl ect the elusive luminosity 
of a night sky, the oriental rug framing an opening in Esseintes’ citadel. Given 
over to this oriental surface, the tortoise becomes a peculiarly vexed vessel, 
the validity of its enumerations and its emergence within the fold of its exiled 
interior corroborated by the bourgeois fancy of an outside. Unable to draw 
air under the weight of its shell the tortoise fails to live out its monstrous life 
in Esseintes’ monstrous experiment. It is only after Esseintes’ accounts the 
results of a series of further experiments, including the tortures of a removed 
tooth and the consumption of a symphony of liquors, that he notes the lifeless 
carapace of the tortoise in the corner of the room; his observation off ering no 
further need to refl ect on it.
Esseintes’ tortoise is an unknown species that remains uncategorisable, its 
monstrousness revealing its terrifying existence because while it may never 
speak it is able to proclaim its existence;3 an etymological search of the word 
‘proclaim’ derives the Latin proclamare, meaning ‘to cry out.’4  Any admission 
into the world is thus caught up in an infantile endeavour to confess a 
presence, to be heard. Esseintes’ experiment presents a case in which a cry is 
heard and thus a form can be adopted, at once terrifying because the form is 
monstrous but more so because the cry challenges its own formless state via 
the dissenting voice of a monstrous reason, that the cry must be echoed from 
an adjacent form, that its force must be drawn from something and from somewhere. 
Esseintes’ experiment exposes the means for expression not by an excess of 
3     As Jacques Derrida foretold at the end of his essay “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourses of the Human Sciences,” 
it is only at the very limit of signifi cation that we can hope to confront our contemporenaeity. This contemporenaeity is 
identifi ed within what Derrida notes as “the yet un-nameable which is proclaiming itself and which can do so, as is necessary 
whenever a birth is in the offi ng, only under the species of the nonspecies, in the formless, mute, infant, and terrifying form 
of monstrosity.” Jacques Derrida, “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences” in, Writing and Difference, 
trans. Alan Bass, (London: Routledge, 2005), 351-370; 370.
4     “proclaim, v.”. OED Online. June 2011. Oxford University Press. http://www.oed.com.ezproxy.lib.rmit.edu.au/view/Entry
/151837?rskey=vsKIbf&result=2 (accessed June 28, 2011).
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signifi cation, but rather because of a latency in a dissenting voice, in excess of a 
voice. This writing experiment will thus attempt to throw a voice.
A voice is anticipated by the pitching and rolling of Edison’s lifeboat as 
it traverses its precarious passage beneath a sky characterised by the fl ight of 
birds and above a wreck that would lie amid the ocean’s vast depth. But, the 
lifeboat off ered by this text cannot be assured of its ability to fl oat. The degree 
to which the horizon secures the suturing of ocean depth and sky, describes 
the lifeboat’s spectral being. That is, the lifeboat cannot be sought outright, 
as though pricking one’s ears or opening one’s eyes could alone confront 
the horizon’s aleatory existence. Perhaps in prolonging the appearance of a 
lifeboat in this text we could describe a myriad of oily glimmers that animate 
the variegated surface of its approach but, the horizon’s elusiveness forbids 
any assurances of any conjecture. The lifeboat beseeches the unfathomable 
space between horizon and offi  ng, but does not leave a mark, its demand on 
the space only assured by its self-eff acing advance. The boat is roused and a 
life held forth, by its own voice, in a gesture that heralds the very utterance 
of the word ‘lifeboat’.
Formerly the word test was Latin for a medieval clay vessel used to verify 
precious metals, and was related to the Latin word for shell, testa, from which 
we derive the Latin for tortoise, testudo.5 Perhaps then it is only our good 
fortune that our vessel, a lifeboat, procures Esseintes’ tortoise shell, for it is the 
lifeboat, under its own breath, that assays itself. The tortoise shell is upturned 
by the prospect of a lifeboat, releasing a cry that appeals to itself without 
reduction, inasmuch as it exceeds who or what would curtail it’s freedom 
5     Michel Serres reveals the origins of ‘test’ as Latin for “an ancient beaker or resistant earthen pot used for assays or 
for testing of gold.”  Michel Serres, The Troubadour of Knowledge, trans. S. F. Glaser & W. Paulson, (Ann Arbor : The University 
of Michigan Press, 1997), 79.  As the OED points out, testum, or an earthen bowl was the collateral form of testa, a pot or 
shell, from which the word testudo Latin for ‘tortoise’ derived its origin.
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to disclose itself. It is a voice that cuts off  its own retreat, its fi nal return; a 
voice that exceeds the question of its existence: not a utopic conclusion, but 
in whose fi nality is poised a question in turn, a voice indebted to an existence 
secured in an immanent life.6 The tortoise conjoined with its precious armour 
poses as a gilded troubadour, who holds forth an account of the viscous 
fl uidity of its voyaging,  whose song discloses as sort-of-evidence of a lifeboat, 
a voice that accounts for all who fi nd themselves at sea.
Without complaint Esseintes’ tortoise is turned on its back, the plastron 
that once pressed against the ground now prone to the sky. A faint ring of gold 
is visible as it skims the surface of the ocean, the shells convex mass of glittering 
gems a cosmic kaleidoscope for the fl ight of who knows what beneath the 
waves. Assembled upon exclamations of buon fortuna, the tortoise becoming 
lifeboat, the turning over and through of Esseintes privileged experiment, 
realises the prophetic cries of buon viaggio that accompany its impromptu turn 
as a gilded instrument of an impromptu minstrel.  Fatherless, motherless, 
brotherless, sisterless, a voice realises a traveler rowing against the vast inertia 
of an expression that gathers in the univocity of the muttering and murmur 
of the cosmic swell, echoed and further amplifi ed in the sonorous thorax of 
the tortoise’s carapace.  A gilt edge, the maddening persistence of the ocean’s 
horizontal surface, reveals a spectral eff ect on the horizon, that etches the 
contours of a shell-bird,7 what through the atmospheric mirage of expression 
6     Maurice Blanchot quoting Rabbi Nachman of Breslau who commanded “It is forbidden to be old!” suggests that we can 
understand the intention behind this statement as “one is forbidden to reject being renewed, forbidden to confi ne oneself to 
an answer that would no longer pose the question – in the end (but there is no end) writing only to erase what has been 
written, or more precisely writing it by erasure itself, keeping exhaustion and the inexhaustible together : the DISAPPEARANCE 
that is never worn out.” However, Blanchot contends that Breslau avails himself still to the possibility of an ending. Blanchot 
insists that the “always yet to be born, birth in debt to itself,” is a chance which obscures itself so that it cannot be put 
to use. Maurice Blanchot, A Voice from Elsewhere, trans. C. Mandell, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007), 24-25.
7     The term ‘shell-bird’ is from D.H. Lawrence’s collection of poems Tortoises, specifi cally from the following stanza from 
the poem ‘Baby Tortoise’: “Nay, tiny shell-bird,| What a huge vast inanimate it is, that you must row against,| What an 
incalculable inertia.” The use of the contraction shell-bird is to gather the forces of the boat, the upturned tortoise shell, 
with the uplift of Building Eight as it takes off according to Raggatt’s account. It is also to realise Lawrence’s vast inanimate 
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and reveals an apparition on the horizon unobstructed by a shapeless fog: a 
domed carapace mistaken for a hat tied to a green coat whose tattered fringe 
stains the edge of the ocean. The coat does not describe, nor does the gilded 
hat distinguish our shell-bird. Nevertheless one may, perhaps, ascertain that 
they had been purchased together by some discerning gentlemen, or by two, 
whose taste followed a single path. The green over coat shadows a tortoise 
without the certainty of land, a tortoise in extremis, as the silhouette of a 
tortoise shell mid-fl ight in the calm of the ocean and in excess of the folds of 
an ocean-ship; a mock-turtle fl ung into the inertia of a horizon, an oscillating 
datum that marks the potential of an ocean’s expanse. The shell-bird emerges 
as a pregnant green bend.8
as the space of the clinic, and the incalculable inertia that the question of a life must take on the horizon of the clinic. It 
is worth noting that the paragraph’s imagery stems largely from a reading of this collection, and which therefore remains 
too large and dense to provide all locations of partial or full references as they are used in the paragraph.  While some 
may fi nd this academically abhorrent, I provide this footnote for those who wish to illuminate themselves, and ask that they 
refer to, D.H. Lawrence, Tortoises, (New York: Thomas Seltzer, 1921).
8     As Nancy states, the image does not fi nd its origin in the sky, rather “it proceeds from it, it is of a celestial essence, 
and it contains the sky within itself.” The sky is the light of the image, is the image or the sky appropriated for the image. 
Further, “the image that contains the horizon also overfl ows it and spreads itself out in it, like the resonances of a harmony, 
like the halo of a painting.” It is the distortion of the sun as its circular form become elliptical against the presence of the 
horizon or the mirage that sustains the golden light of the sun after it has gone. The green ray is an optical phenomenon 
that is exhibited as the last rays of the sun pass through the denser air and are ‘bent’ procuring momentarily a green fl ash 
in the last moments of the sun disappearing behind the horizon, green and blue light waves curving more than other colour 
frequencies. Jules Verne made popular this phenomenon in his novel The Green Ray (1882) in which Miss. Helena Campbell, 
who is to be married to Mr. Aristobulus Ursiclos by the wishes of her uncle’s Sam and Sib, goes in search of the green ray in 
the hope of effecting its mythical powers that are said to reveal not only the desire of another, but the truth of one’s own 
heart. The Green Ray, perhaps, agrees with Nancy’s ascertain that “the intimate is expressed in it [the light that is the sky]” 
and that “the image touches me, and, thus touched and drawn by it and into it, I get involved, not to say mixed up in it.” 
The protagonist Miss Campbell, at the very last moment, misses the opportunity to see the green fl ash as she is preoccupied 
by the eyes of her saviour Oliver Samuel who has been revealed through his heroic actions as her true love. Subsequently, 
the green ray as a phenomenon does not offer itself as an exemplary concept that reveals or actualises a pre-ordained 
potentiality on the part of Miss Campbell, but rather, the green ray is written in the very gestures of Miss Campbell’s not 
seeing the green ray, that is, the green ray is the experience of potentiality. Refer, Jean-Luc Nancy, The Ground of the Image, 
trans. J. Fort, (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005), 6-7; on potentiality see:, Giorgio Agamben, Potentialities: Collected 
Essays in Philosophy, ed. & trans. D. Heller-Roazen, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 216-217. For the original see, 
Jules Verne, The Green Ray, (Holicong, PA: Wildside Press, 2003).
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At the threshold of an impending collapse of life and boat, the middle 
region is resigned to the exceptional, to a gesture that enables the phrase je ne 
sais quoi to operate within the obligations of language. The expression je ne sais 
quoi is not burdened by attributions that would distinguish it as either interior 
or exterior to an acceptable mode of expression, and which could then be 
evidenced within a structured body of knowledge. The phrase further evades 
any simplifi cation that would interpret it as either subject to individual 
knowledge by deriving the terms by which it makes sense from a previous 
encounter with the unknown, indescribable, or ill defi ned. An account that 
would ascertain the dimensions of the je ne sais quoi would fail to go beyond 
a preconceived idea, as per a likeness, of what it may be and where it may fi t 
by fi nding an equivalence amidst accepted forms of expression. The elusive 
scale by which the phrase encompasses the whole of its potential litany of like 
fi gures cannot be broken down into its constituted elements or measured by 
its neologic actions; it is a phrase that determines more than the sum of its 
parts but does not accord them a unity. Thus, to seek a source in the plurality 
of ends and beginnings of a boundless sense would only refl ect the demise 
of Esseintes’ tortoise: the failure of a sedentary life to propagate its own 
amorphous potential, to labour under the pleasure of a leaden sea. 
The sagittal plane of the horizon that separates and brings into 
correspondence – a horizon that is both an axis and a pedestal – a shipwrecked 
depth and the luminous heavens, ascertains the tortoise shell’s shifting 
untoward movement in the middle. The gilt radiance that springs from its 
golden surface penetrates the depths, illuminating Foucault’s discarded 
heterotopic ship,9 as the dark watery hues off er the exposed underside of the 
tortoise’s scales a confrontation with the cosmic shimmer of the plane above. 
The multiple lines that turn around this hull mark the extravagant folding 
over, in and out of a fi gure that is expressed in an encounter with the Isle 
9     Michel Foucault,  “Of Other Spaces,” trans. J. Miskowiec, Diactics, Vol 16, No. 1 (Spring 1986).
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of Tools, in the Renaissance writer Rabelais’ satirical narrative Patagruel and 
Gargantua. The Isle is where monstrous trees grow decorated in all manner of 
tools and weapons that, on dropping and striking the ground, are instinctively 
sheathed by the long grass. In odd cases these surprising trees sprout tools 
that are a composite of diff erent known implements, for which purpose and 
situation remain obscured. On the protagonists’ taking their leave from the 
Isle, the narrator takes note of the peculiarity of the island: 
As we returned to our ships, I spied behind I know not what bush, I 
know not what people doing I know not what together, and I know not how 
either, for they were sharpening I know not what tools, which they had 
I know not where, and in I know not what manner.10
Tied to the movement of a luminous ‘turn of phrase’ that evokes Leon 
Battista Alberti’s concept of circumscription (circonscrizione) defi ned as the study 
of the ‘turning of the outline’ (l’attorniare dell’orlo),11 the baroque ship is a litany 
of half-formed and half-felt movements that evokes the untoward motion 
of Montaigne’s nausea; a gilded relic that lies at the bottom of des Esseintes’ 
ocean fold caught up in the genesis of creatures of the deep and exhibited 
alongside Victor Hugo’s “pieces of darkness [that] undergo unknown 
polarizations, come to life, compose nobody knows what [on-ne-sait-quelle] 
form and soul with the miasma and then head off  as larvae through vitality.”12 
10    See,  Francois Rabelais, Gargantua & Patagruel, Book 5, Chapter 9, A Landing on Tool Island, as quoted in, Richard 
Scholar, The Je-Ne-Sais-Quoi in Early Modern Europe, (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 267.  Italics my 
emphasis.
11     As James Elkins states: ‘Alberti’s orlo – as distinct from edges, contorni, and other concepts etc – should be nearly 
invisible because it represents that invisible datum of sight, the visual ray that gives us edges of things.’ The orlo defi nes 
an openness to the actions of the artist beyond the surface of the mark and the defi nite mark, that captures with it, the 
modal functioning of the representations of light (splendor as the brightest, umbra as the ground colour, and lumen as an 
inbetween) However, as Elkins shows, the hierarchical evaluation of the modes of light while in themselves are fi xed, can be 
reproduced with the ‘loaded brush technique’ that creates a greater variety of tone through the thickening of paint that 
homogenises the distinct tonal range of splendor, umbra and lumen. See,  James Elkins, On Pictures and the Words that Fail 
Them (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 30-42.
12     Victor Hugo, Les Travailleurs de la mer (1866) as quoted in, Richard Scholar, The Je-Ne-Sais-Quoi in Early Modern 
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The shell-bird is transposed onto the mobility of the ocean swell just as the 
baroque ship is a voyager of the sea; a restless swimmer fl ung, in full regalia, 
to the middling of the ocean swell, to compose, nobody knows what. The 
vestiges of hat and coat are cast forward to turn over and over, the shell-
bird’s silhouette discerned as nothing more than a shimmering green edge 
coiled around the peaks and crest of the open ocean. The iron carapace of 
the baroque ship - seemingly gilt in the light of the setting sun it describes 
the contours of a hat - fails to follow the rolling movements of the rags it is 
tied to. Instead, it remains where it is, to tread the depths, abandoned by the 
lolloping troubadour, to perhaps, once again, capture the centre of a virtuoso 
encounter that can exacerbate the pathogenesis of Esseintes’ unfortunate 
tortoise. 
This text makes a claim on Foucault’s initial principles of the ship as “the 
greatest reserve of the imagination” and as the “heterotopia par excellence”13 
and,  implicates the tortoise’s shell in the transgressive act of the ocean surface 
with the ship and its species of space as a conceptually aff ective womb of 
Foucault’s ocean-ship. The subsequent upturning of Esseintes’ abandoned 
tortoise is not an attempt to transcend the space of Foucault’s ship, or to make 
the ship a fi nal entity from which to procure all models of the unthinkable. 
The upturning is an attempt to found the heterotopic space of the ship on a 
stochastic reproduction of the initial fold of the ocean, rendering any fi gure 
formless and indecipherable within the layered transparency of an ocean-
ship construction sfumato’d mid-horizon.  The hull of the baroque ship is 
the outcome of a deceitful refi guring of the adjacent surfaces in which the 
initial tortoise found itself enveloped; a hull emblazoned with gemstones, 
paradoxical cysts that describe Esseintes’ abhorrent desires in a gypsy tortoise.
The baroque ship is the sum of the tortoise’s horizon. The shell-bird is what 
Europe, (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 280-281.
13     Foucault,  “Of Other Spaces,” 27.
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is expelled in a gravitas exclamation, a moment, when the golden touch of the 
sun excites a yawn from the tortoise’s abandoned vestiges;14an illuminated 
fl ash that secures our  approaches perpendicular fl ight bearing the tides 
horizontal advance.15  
Privy to the whispers of Pyramus and Thisbe’s, and at the mercy of 
Deleuze’s frothing and fretting, the baroque ship  procures as its model the 
Greek island of Delos whose trembling form disturbs the thick opiate of fog. 
The baroque ship usurps the gilded remains of Esseintes’ failed encounter that 
aff orded the unfortunate tortoise its experience at the limits of an outside, 
and transgresses the passage in exile of Foucault’s ocean-ship; an outline 
that describes a tortoise shell being rowed slowly forward. The shell-bird 
describes what slips out between Foucault’s wrecked ship and an Apollonian 
fl ight along the horizon, a golden mirage that dances across the ocean surface, 
oars turning in their stirrups.16
By interrupting the interiority of the ship by virtue of it being an outside 
that turns in on itself along the line that navigates the passage between a double 
14     “The touch of sun excites you, | And the long ages, and the lingering chill | Make you pause to yawn.” D.H. 
Lawrence, Tortoises, 10.
15     This line goes by several names, a line of fl ight, line of becoming, line of escape and a line of deterritorialization. 
The line is what carries two objects into proximity as an assemblage, but it does not, as a line that would connect them, 
offer a solution to their coming together but only a general causality. The line effects a deterritorialization that marks a 
passage from the plane of heterogeneity (of transcendence, of organisation), where the two objects are distinguished,  to 
the plane of consistency (of immanence) whereby they enter into composition. Deleuze and Guattari as an example point 
to an orchid that appears as if it is a wasp so that it may attract an actual and specifi c wasp to complete the orchid’s 
pollination and the dissemination of the orchid’s own pollen. The wasp takes the orchid to be an actual wasp and seeks 
to mate with it, but in doing so mates with the orchid. In the case of the orchid the mating is successful. Both wasp and 
orchid fi nd themselves in such a proximity that what distinguishes them as an orchid and wasp no longer apply: “A line of 
becoming is not defi ned by points that it connects, or by points that compose it; on the contrary, it passes between points, 
it comes up through the middle, it runs perpendicular to the points fi rst perceived, transversally to the localizable relation 
to distant or contiguous points.” Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. 
Brian Massumi, (London & New York: Continuum, 2004), 323. 
16    “Rowing slowly forward. | Whither away, small bird?” Lawrence, Tortoises,10.
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image, the shell-bird secures a pure horizon, depriving any claimant of the 
ability to seek, once again, a space for the tortoise in the folding of an outside. 
The shell-bird that slips out from the golden mirage of an indistinguishable 
number of folds, the baroque ship conceived of a tortoise shell immersed 
in the golden light of a troubled sky, and presents an absolutely unique and 
vivid exclamation that claims nothing but itself.17 The shell-bird is but a green 
silhouette against a fi ery horizon, an outline that should not be confused 
with the walls of Paradise and its hope of redemption, but a solvent hope. 
Ordained by the appearance of a golden mirage the shell-bird is a green that 
is singularly intense.18
17     Agamben states that a being cannot be reduced to a morally deterministic variant of what is and is not abhorrent, 
and that would impart, a latent divine will regarding the being.  Rather, the beings value can only be determined by the 
immanence of its life, as Agamben avows, “the taking-place of the entities, their innermost exteriority.” Giorgio Agamben, The 
Coming Community, trans. M. Hardt, (Minneapolis & London: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 14.  Agamben’s comment 
is refl ected in the footsteps of the baby tortoise, as its initial momentum is overtaken by that of Lucretius’ clinamen: How 
vivid your travelling seems now, in the troubled sunshine | Stoic, Ulyssean atom; | Suddenly hasty, reckless, on high toes. 
Lawrence, Tortoises, 12.  
18     As Jules Verne writes of the green ray phenomenon:“it will be ‘green,’ but a most wonderful green, a green which 
no artist could ever obtain on his palette, a green which neither the varied tints of vegetation nor the shades of the most 
limpid sea could ever produce the like! If there be green in Paradise, it cannot but be of this shade, which most surely is 
the true green of Hope!”  Verne’s hope without Paradise gestures towards Nietzsche’s ‘being as a debt to God’, that, in turn 
is promoted by Gilles Deleuze.  Deleuze fi nds in the coded moral order of religion, a system that offers an unattainable life 
of solvency through an obedience to the hierarchical structures put into place by religion as representative of God, to whom 
religion offers access through the regulating power of reckoning that assembles a dominance over all actions and gestures. 
For Deleuze religion is an example of a transcendent life model, that in this case determines the good that positions someone 
closer to god and possible redemption and identifi es the evil which would seek to undermine not only this passage but also 
the work of the decoding body of religion that orchestrates the status quo. In opposition to a transcendent model of life 
that would seek to distinguish objects and subjects, Deleuze proposes the concept of a haecceity, a term that embodies an 
immanent model of life in an ethics that is the lived expression of the deterritorializing non-relational order, in the becoming 
that is conceived through a combinatorial rather than ordering gesture exemplifi ed in religion’s transcendent model. Refer 
to: Gilles Deleuze, “To Have Done with Judgement” in, Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, 126-136;  on the concept of a 
haecceity refer, Deleuze & Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 287-292.
 Hope is positioned by the work of Edmond and Corrigan, in proximity to a combinatorial architecture that 
considers the disorder and impropriety of the city and surrounding suburbs, the ‘diffi cult coded knowledge’,  as a relevant 
image with which to ‘live out’ an Australian architecture, in opposition to an architecture confi ned in a single sweeping 
gesture that would allocate its place fi rmly in the bush, or isolated on a red plane. Invariously, the descriptions of Building 
Eight as a ‘City of Hope’, a title fi rst aligned with Edmond and Corrigan’s Athan House (1987), and which lends itself, in 
plurality, to the title of Conrad Hamann’s monograph on Edmond and Corrigan,  epitomizes an architectural expression of 
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The intensity of the green is paralleled by Ulysses’ exchange with 
Polyphemus, when, called upon to identify himself he veiled and unveiled 
his identity by answering to ‘no man’. Ulysses, by way of his deceptive reply 
and his rogue action of blinding the Cyclops, decenters perception. Thus, 
this text  envisages the baroque ship as a ceaselessly moving piece of darkness 
that, fl oating before the fovea like so much cosmic dust, mars perception 
with a spectral green fl ash. The shell-bird marks the confrontation with the 
spectral intensities of the green fl ash, in the play of light across the retina 
realised at the edge of blindness. The passage of the baroque ship that draws 
out the threshold between the sky and the ocean is overwhelmed in a virtual 
fl ash of green; the shell-bird a measure of its own brilliance. The expediency 
with which such a hallucinatory datum is consummated, instantly the self 
eff acing action of the charred centre the mark of the Cyclops’ eye and the 
instrument that would prick it, is continually staged in the unfathomable 
and discordant meter of this text’s ocean score; endeavouring to liberate 
the nucleus of the horizon’s unimaginable contiguity and envisage an 
ocean that is unencumbered by depth, it is still able to realise the temporal 
modulations of the tides that touches on all sides, for this text has no one 
side.  A surface imparted with parallel lines that divide the constant into a 
series of traversable depths, and the unconquerable fl ight of violence that 
compels even the volunteer into no-man’s-land; the Cyclops is truly blinded 
not by the actions of a-man or no-man but rather, by the fl eeting glimpse of 
no-man’s-man.
this life.  Hope fi nds itself an exemplary methodology in the design studio’s Peter has taught at RMIT since 1979, in which, 
as Vivian Mitsogianni has already enumerated, Peter is very much in the background offering the students the opportunity 
to unfasten their opinions in the questioning of judgement and the will-to-invent and which, perhaps hopefully, engenders 
the student to an architecture without resolution in architecture, but, central to Deleuze’s claim and also Miss. Campbell’s 
passage in The Green Ray, to a life of continual invention.  See, Conrad Hamann, Cities of Hope: Australian Architecture and 
Design by Edmond and Corrigan, 1962-92,  (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1993),138; Vivian Mitsogianni, “The Laughter 
of Liberation/The Authority of Vision,” Gold Medalist - RAIA Gold Medalist 2003 Peter Corrigan: a life through architecture, 
Architecture Australia, Vol 92, No.2, (April/March 2003), 88-89. 
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I, PETER CORRIGAN
The early nineteenth century ‘broadsheet’, Foucault explains, served 
to amend certain murderous crimes alongside the reporting of important 
historical events so as to exaggerate the degree to which the unremarkable 
crimes could claim the same equivalency with the extraordinary historical 
events of the time. Foucault argues that it was the broadsheet that served 
as the frontier for the two side presentation of murder; on one side the 
irredeemable monstrosity of a criminal and on the other, the sanctioned and 
ordained killing during that other important historical event, war. It was this 
ambiguous simultaneity that described on the same sheet an unconscionable 
action and an acceptable action and, which allowed the broadsheet to 
determine a crime’s historical mileage. 
The broadsheet presented the murder and burial written from the point 
of view of a witness to the crime, a witness who remained nameless and 
without attribution. The description was followed by a verse, narrated in fi rst 
person by the murderer, and often set to an existing or well known refrain 
so as to enable the song to “travel from singer to singer” and thus everyone 
was “presumed able to sing it as his own crime by a lyrical fi ction.”19 The 
confessional refrain of the verse magnifi ed the crime to such an extent that 
every person who sang it ‘became’ the criminal, stood in for, and in place of the 
murderer, which resulted, via its recitation, in the ‘singer’ being charged with 
the crime. It was as though the verse perpetually put an entire community 
of singers in doubt, propelling the verse to an almost invisible and secret 
19     Michel Foucault, “Tales of Murder” in,  I, Pierre Riviere, having slaughtered my mother, my sister, and my brother…A 
Case of Parricide in the 19th Century, ed. Michael Foucault & trans. Frank Jellinek (Lincoln & London: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1975), 208.
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enciphering of a society of murderers.20  The refrain of murderer infi ltrates 
the refrain of a lover, as the line draws the troubadours into sight: taking a 
song not of your own declared as the truth, truer than any others, and which 
organises the historical conditions for its fl ight and reinterpretation beyond 
any one author.
 The murderous verse lines were organised in a particular format. In 
the fi rst lines we would hear the murderer confess their error plainly, as a 
matter of fact, before calling forth their own punishment. The murderer, as 
Foucault explains, “assumes for himself a law.”21 We then hear the murderer 
openly confesses to the heinousness of their crime, and the resulting horror 
which they install in themselves by way of their own disgusting nature. 
But, this horror does not allow for the horror others may feel, because “he 
makes no concession to his own monstrosity.”22 Finally, at the moment of 
the murderer’s impending execution the criminal calls forth justice and their 
own death.
Foucault recognises that the verse does not decide upon a moral verdict 
or conclusion begat by the community’s disgust because, “the speaker 
displays his murder for all to see, isolates himself in it, summons the law, and 
calls for both memory and execration.”23 Foucault’s argument is located in 
the confession of one Pierre Rivière who, having sought to release his father 
from years of domination, butchered his mother, brothers and sister with a 
20  Foucault’s society of murderers echoes the society of thieves which swarm the decks of a ship at sea. As Melville writes: 
“To enumerate all the minor pilferings on board a man-of-war would be endless. With some highly commendable exceptions, 
they rob from one another, and rob back again, till, in the matter of small things, a community of goods seems almost to 
be established; and at last, as a whole, they become relatively honest, by nearly every man becoming the reverse. It is in 
vain that the offi cers, by threats of condign punishment, endeavour to instill more virtuous principles into their crew; so 
thick is the mob, that not one thief in a thousand is detected.” Melville, White Jacket, 50.
21     Foucault, “Tales of Murder,” 208.
22     Foucault, “Tales of Murder,” 208.
23     Foucault, “Tales of Murder,” 208.
B K 2 | 4 5
sickle. During the confi nement leading up to his trial Rivière, at the request 
of the judge, wrote down how and why he had undertaken the crime. His 
confession emerged as the central paradox of his court case where it was 
argued that the heinousness of the crime committed meant that he must be 
found insane. It was counter argued that his confession, which had begun 
so matter of fact – I, Pierre Rivière, having slaughtered my mother, my sister and 
my brother…24 – pointed utmost to his sanity, the letter written in a style 
specifi c to no one in particular that is, attributable to any other person who 
could conceive of the facts without having done the deed and  thus, it was 
argued,  exposing the coldness by which Rivière undertook the killing. The 
fact that Rivière could write a confession only reinforced the argument 
that he was not insane, and moreover,  that the callousness of his account 
clearly demonstrated, without contravening the earlier statement, that he 
was a monster. Rivière’s confession parallels the broadsheet’s verses, but with 
Rivière instead improvising his own verse which he then reads aloud from, 
taking the place of anyone and everyone who might have taken his place.
The divestiture of Peter Corrigan’s name at the same time as it adhere 
itself to the passage of this text is done so in excess of his name – I, Peter 
Corrigan. His name can not articulate the various instances of Peter Corrigan 
that invariably proliferate throughout A Clinic for the Exhausted. His name, as 
it is distinguished by an alternate genealogy of Building Eight, is not a rubric 
for who or what in fact ‘Peter Corrigan the architect of Building Eight’, is; 
but one can not but be suspicious of his name, because it confi rms the ready 
availability of Building Eight. In both cases, Peter Corrigan and Building 
Eight are taken away as and when they occur, are withheld, not by some 
reticence of the author of this text, but by a hypercathexis that ministers to 
the undertaking of A Clinic for the Exhausted.  Identifying every collaborator, 
and apportioning their stake in a crime against either Peter Corrigan or 
24     Rivière’s account is reproduced in full as Chapter 3, “The Memoir” of,  Foucault, I, Pierre Riviere..., 53-121.
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Building Eight would fail to discern the suspicious activity that gathers in 
the streets below a window that fl ickers with light.  Raggatt is bound to a 
pseudonym, a witness to the crimes against Building Eight, and a victim of his 
own crime. A Clinic for the Exhausted imagines his letter as a sort of discursive 
broadsheet.
Raggatt does not and cannot attest to the scale of the potential 
perceptions that the name Peter Corrigan gathers on the horizon of his 
vision. The horizon does not designate Peter Corrigan the architect, the 
theatre designer, the costume designer, the educator, or the many predicates 
that would at once exclude his naming and could ascertain the truth of any 
utterance and thus an immediate ability to conceive of a legitimate economy 
of perceptions in Raggatt’s letter. The horizon from a distance approaches, 
a speed that describes the imperceptible intimacy of the furthest extents 
of Raggatt’s perception.  Peter Corrigan is the consequence of what is put 
into distance, a gesture that conceives everything on the horizon and that 
realises the horizon as an indiscernible palimpsest of contours that reiterate 
Raggatt’s initial appeal to Peter Corrigan. Thus Peter Corrigan is bizarrely 
instantaneous, a divine fi gure rendered through a time immemorial sfumato’d 
layering that likens itself to Elkins’ description of Christ portrayed in 
Michelangleo’s sketch Christ on the Cross: “wrapped in a thickened air made 
of faint lines, and those lines spread out and dissipate into blank paper as if 
the fi gure of Christ were trembling in a tub of water and sending tiny ripples 
out to each other.”25 To eff ect Elkins’ description above, Peter Corrigan is 
forced to overcome his name and his pseudonym, and in doing so escapes 
any arrest within categories that would want to carry his name. He does so 
not by stepping out of the conditioning of his name, or substituting one 
condition for another. Rather, from a distance  Peter Corrigan is heard a call 
beckoning towards the shell-bird, desiring an impossible touch.  
25     Elkins, On Pictures and the Words that Fail Them, 72-73. For a detailed analysis of this work, refer 69-77, 279-284.
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Exploiting Elkins’ image of Christ nearly drowned, this text discovers 
Peter Corrigan in the remoteness of a bath tub, a name that yields to the 
movement of the ocean without a ship and a ship without an ocean, and is 
struck by seasickness. Displaced at the cost of Corrigan’s particulars the tub 
simultaneously assumes the folded surface of ocean and ship and is framed 
with a horizon line that fi lls the tub to overfl owing. Ship and ocean pass 
entirely into the image of Peter Corrigan. This text imagines a change in 
fortune; the ship capsized as a consequence of Raggatt’s emphatic epistolary 
gesture casting an audience out, so that they too may embark upon the 
waves in the immobile passage of a bathtub’s becoming-lifeboat. Both tub 
and lifeboat are not simply bound by their similarities, neither is the result 
of, or the representation of the other.  It is the tub that breaks the repose of 
ship and ocean and takes the horizon further out to sea. The pulling of the 
oars are present but not in an intelligible form. The offi  ng’s sweep of ocean 
and its aberrant eff ects are not prevented by the impetuous assurance that 
both ocean and ship have been thwarted. In an amusing exchange, it is Fate 
who interprets, in an intimate and strange sympathy with Montaigne, the 
operation of the lifeboat.
Commandeering a coat in the hope that it may catch a last gasp of wind 
and propel the bathtub in any direction, an audience is tied to the movements 
of tide, wind and waves.  It is only by chance  that the cast iron refuge, 
corresponding with the rolling of the waves, appears to strike the ever present 
horizon, a shore nonetheless, whereupon, it may be seen as an iron bound 
shadow or a pale grey carapace, foundering the boat apropos of a miraculous 
alignment. For, whoever is at the oars is forced to turn their head to see 
where they are going, an approach that is shored by the ever present vision 
of the horizon that marks the centre of the vision of a sun that contemplates 
the generous shallows that would welcome them ashore.
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Peter Corrigan’s appearance in A Clinic for the Exhausted is not  an accident 
nor is the navigation of Raggatt’s letter; to know how they are included 
requires the suspension of the laws of aesthetic or scholary evaluation that 
substantitate any claim in the emergence of a methodolgy that inturn borrows 
the attenuation of  said authority; it is to observe that an audience’s authorial 
evaluation includes varied, unfamiliar, if not unknowable provisions for 
comprehension.  The audience’s negotiation of A Clinic for the Exhasuted 
contests the defl ationary tendencies of a scholarly impasse that would exclude 
the ecliptic passage of Raggatt’s letter and the perceptual inattention to the 
appearance of Peter Corrigan’s name. What is at stake within this project’s 
shift in attention from the revelation  of the scholary, is the proliferation of 
an ambiguous position implicit in the uncounted and uncountable experience 
of the audience’s incomprehension. An attempt to map the verbosity of this 
text or the various illicit inclusions that are bound to the generosity of  A 
Clinic for the Exhausted, fail to cause Peter Corrigan to tremble further.  The 
text peaks and troughs, thickening its surface with contours till the frequency 
and density of the rhetorical devices and insurmountable subsumptions are 
indiscernible from a calm and fl at surface that gave Montaigne’s stomach such 
complaint, and to what could not be given form.26 
Representation of Building Eight as an exact copy in A Clinic for the 
Exhausted remains impossible as whomever demonstrates evidence of 
sameness succumbs to the coincidental movements – Raggatt’s drunkenness, 
Montaigne’s nausea, Deleuze’s indiff erence – immanent in its production. 
26     Our protagonist corresponds to the protagonist in Samuel Beckett’s radio play Embers (1957): “The protagonist, who 
we hear walking on pebbles close to the sea, evokes sound-memories that respond to his call. But soon they stop respond-
ing, the potentiality of the sonorous space being exhausted, and the sound of the sea engulfs everything.’”Deleuze, Essays 
Critical and Clinical, 205, note 61. Deleuze explains that the thickness of a surface, of the plane of composition, need not be 
understood as deep or pronounced, but that a composition is, quoting the painter Seurat, “the art of ploughing a surface” 
bringing to the surface independently of anything other than the surface itself: “one no longer covers over ; one raises, ac-
cumulates, piles up, goes through, stirs up, folds.” Deleuze & Guattari, What is Philosophy?, 194.
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To trace or diagram, or to speak or gesture in a way that could distinguish 
the tonalities of the gilded hull of A Clinic for the Exhausted an audience must 
borrow  the nausea of its condition. Images of Building Eight that arise 
in the wake of an approaching golden fog do not constitute the extent of 
A Clinic for the Exhausted; alone, it could never render the vividness of his 
baroque ship.27  Raggatt’s ‘eye’ remains a witness to Peter Corirgan’s bath time 
quivering, a movement consistent with Cornelius Castoriadis’ consideration 
of  the German word for ‘eyelid’, lider,  in the context of the epitaph twentieth 
century German poet Rainer Maria Rilke wrote for himself:
Rose, oh reiner Widerspruch, Lust
Niemandes Schlaf zu sein unter soviel Lidern
(Rose, O pure contradiction.
Joy of being no one’s sleep under so many lids)28 
Rilke gives ownership of the lids to no one eye– the lids belong to 
the shroud, the coffi  n, the earth, the life just led of the dead man and the 
people who knew him. A multiple of lids cover no one’s incumbent eyes – 
not nothing, but no one thing or person in particular. Through a path of 
perception strewn with covered eyes, no-one encounters the poem’s arbitrary 
expression, to never fi nd one eyelid that could encompass the eyes of so many. 
Instead, no-one is the dramatised potential of being every witness for every 
exception that may emerge.  Peter Corrigan is but no one in particular – not 
a logical image that would accept all titles at once, as though amassed they 
could forcefully seize Peter Corrigan and constitute who or what he is– but 
no one of them, not any of them, a no-man’s-man.29 
27     Deleuze rhetorically asks: ‘Why should the novelist believe he is obligated to explain the behavior of his characters 
[?]” then goes on to answer : “It is life that justifi es; it has no need of being justifi ed.’”Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, 81.
28    Cornelius Castoriadis, Figures of the Thinkable, trans. H. Arnold, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2007), 37.
29    Castoriadis illuminates this expression via the polysemy of Greek inscription leusse d’ homōs apeonta noōi pareonta 
bebaiōs,(Consider how the absent (neuter plural: absent things) are present with total certainty. Bebaios,  on unshakable 
foundations) focusing on the syntax of noōi, as the indirect object of nous meaning ‘thought’ or ‘mind’. Castoriadis’ continues 
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AN EPITHET IN VERSE 
It is only by stepping into the otherwise excluded middle that an audience 
may pass into A Clinic for the Exhausted, simultaneously gathering the wayward 
movements of the ocean into a felt force and, like the fl âneur, embark at a 
pace taken up by the baroque ship in its personifi ed voyage.30 Building Eight 
determines A Clinic for the Exhausted’s ‘rate of knots’, upturned it is no less 
embellished than that of Esseintes’ gilded tortoise. Against Building Eight 
a prudent score is composed, from which an epitaph for a long departed 
tortoise is transcribed.
The wake that circulates beyond Peter Corrigan serves to impose a 
gestural gait that is reconciled in his location, in amongst the wake of the 
tortoise’s passage. Esseintes’ gilded tortoise establishes a poor ship in Building 
Eight. Nevertheless, Building Eight does not replicate or copy the gestures 
that circulate behind it – it does not copy the discourse or assumptions that 
embellished the John Andrews’ Student Union Building beneath the colours 
and forms of a glorious stadtkrone.31 Any expectation that  A Clinic for the 
the semantic exploration of derivative terms to noos –  or “the ability to make present to oneself with total certainty what 
is not there” and apeon the inscription for ‘what is not there’. Nous, is understood to collect both terms, noos and apeon, 
making “objects present even when they are physically absent,” connecting it  not only to memory but also imagination. 
Citing the diffi culty of a singular interpretation of the noun noōi, Castoriadis states: ‘it is by means of the nous that the 
absent becomes present; it is locative: they become present in the nous: it is “ethic” ( “for the sake of ”): the absent become 
present “for” the nous; it is the dative of the object: the “make itself present” applies to the nous; and it is of course 
eminently subjective: things absent are present “to” the nous, not in the sense of a place, but of a subject before whom the 
absent becomes present.’  Castoriadis, Figures of the Thinkable, 31.
30     “At its exaggerated height, the fl aneur was said to pace himself behind the fashionable amble of a pet tortoise.” Rob 
Shields, “Fancy Footwork: Walter Benjamin’s Notes on Flaneurie”  in, The Flaneur, ed. K. Tester, (London: Routledge, 1994), 65.
31     Conrad Hamann identifi es several parallels between German expressionist architecture and that of Edmond and 
Corrigan’s, one of those being the stadtkrone, or ‘urban crown’,  “which envisaged urban life symbolically summarized in and 
illuminated by a central urban institution that is resolved into a form dominated either by the crystalline or by movement, 
or by both.” Hamann, Cities of Hope, 11. This is further elaborated by Peter Kohane, whose ‘terraced mountains’ fosters 
Howard Raggatt’s initial  image of Building Eight as the wall of the biblical city of Jerusalem. See, Peter Kohane, “ Clothing 
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Exhausted follows or extends the agenda that is suspended between Building 
Eight and its deictic centre gives way to A Clinic for the Exhausted’s ambiguous 
image of Building Eight. The stadtkrone condemns Building Eight to the 
incessant roaming of the shell-bird, ensconced in the portrait of a gilded city 
lying on its back.32   The tortoise imagines the distant gleam of a port-city 
drowned in a city, turns out the stadtkrone, in turn a hat; Building Eight, in 
the depth of a reverie and transgressed by a horizon, a half convincing corona 
muralis. Corrigan’s advance, in spite of himself, assails the See33 of Raggatt, 
crowning his horizon with a dense atmospheric corona navalis. The stadtkrone’s 
erroneous orbit gathers the confused glimpses of a bird fl ying below into a 
miscreant plumage for Building Eight, a carapace that turns about Raggatt’s 
waist, a crown worn through, to yield an astonishing mitre.34  All those hats 
represent a tidy little capital. The hat exchanges its gentlemen owners who, 
bathed in perpetual sweat fret about the elusiveness of rules and conclusions, 
for the bare head of a very serious individual; a conjurer who, pulling things 
from his hat performs, bereft of any other name, a hat trick. A Clinic for the 
Exhausted asks: where did you get such a hat? Two gentlemen, removing their 
hats to wipe the sweat from their brows, is nothing more than a pseudonym 
cutting up the same old hat.35 But what are the worth of initials if they 
the Institution” in, Schaik & Bertram, Building Eight: Edmond and Corrigan at RMIT, Vol. 1, 50-57.
32     Melville describes the man-of-war as a city afl oat, the ships features describing the layout of a park that fronts a 
palace, a walled garrison town, or a suspect house whose basement describes an infi nite depth fi lled with ugly creatures. He 
also describes the ships as like “the lodging houses in Paris, turned upside down.” Melville is echoed in the following quote 
from Raymond Queneau: “The roofs of Paris, lying on their backs, with their little paws in the air.” Melville, White Jacket, 
82. Raymond Queneau as quoted in Georges Perec, Species of Spaces and Other Pieces, ed. & trans. J. Sturrock, (London: 
Penguin Books, 1999), 60.
33     Should be understood as “The seat, chair, or throne of a bishop in his church.” “see, n.1”. OED Online. June 2011. 
Oxford University Press. http://www.oed.com.ezproxy.lib.rmit.edu.au/view/Entry/174747?rskey=5gXv8I&result=1&isAdvanced
=false (accessed June 28, 2011).
34     A mitre is an ornate headdress worn by a bishop, with its origins in an ancient Grecian term that referred to a 
headband, and also a piece of armour worn around the waist. A mitre is also a form of join which is derived from the 
joining of sails. “mitre | miter, n.1”. OED Online. June 2011. Oxford University Press. http://www.oed.com.ezproxy.lib.rmit.
edu.au/view/Entry/120308?rskey=DVfqMn&result=1&isAdvanced=false (accessed June 28, 2011).
35     Gustave Flaubert, Bouvard and Pecuchet, trans. M. Polizzotti, (United States of America: Dalkey Archive, 2005), 3.
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resemble so many others? Taken out of a pair of hats, a ship offi  cer’s uniform: 
Lieutenant, Captain, and Admiral - a commotion then, a little gasp - all are 
suitors and swindlers who, with a touch of the hat, (a tipping of the hat), 
reveal themselves a tiny bit cut, lame because they can only smell the sea, their 
hat cast from the ocean, and with eyes blinded by the sight of gold.   
Raggatt’s letter chronicles the ocean liner’s stationary advance, the hat’s 
rent, the infi rmity of the horizon’s pensive being between ocean and sky. 
Raggatt’s letter is an earnest valise that anticipates Building Eight’s impending 
passage. Building Eight has no knowledge of whether it is moving away or 
towards the horizon, or both simultaneously.  Raggatt, witness to the wake 
of Building Eight that projects before it, remains blind to the deviations it 
encounters. He can only survey the horizon line in the knowledge of what is 
at stake, as a fl eet in being, knowing the violence and cost of a fi nal encounter. 
It is the tortoise that is the collaborateur, that gives almost everything away. 
It reveals to Building Eight its singular digression without recourse to the 
particularities that bear its future narrative. It is only when the ocean liner 
accepts its ‘aimless state’ and Building Eights ‘takes to the open sea’ that they 
may realise a collective expression beyond the amalgamation of their distinct 
forms. The baroque ship thus impedes their reconciliation in the paternal 
authority of Peter Corrigan and a voyage without recourse to the particulars 
of Building Eight or ocean liner. 
This text’s employment of Esseintes’ tortoise is grounded in the 
capriciousness of the deity of fortune Tyche who, born of the ocean, gathers 
every movement and every sound that constitutes its alchemical passage of 
Raggatt’s letter upon a gilded and gemmed pyre. The emergence of the shell-
bird is however eminently more that the subtle mingling of the tortoise’s 
gemstones. The shell-bird is what is issues forth by this text extolling the 
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virtue of Tyche, driven by neither want nor necessity, steering the shadow 
of a stake or pole to once again blind Chronos.36  The baroque ship is, with 
Prometheus glaring from its shadow, what touches the shell-bird’s fl ame in 
passing; The fl ame leaves a hallmark on the baroque ship which is acutely 
aware of the shell-bird’s vocal enquiry. The shell-bird is a blind hope,37 
launched, to break in its formidableness, across the deck of a vessel yet to 
come, a gilded ark that would throw off  the trappings of its ocean home. It 
off ers both parties the opportunity of a passage in a ritornello that proceeds 
from the middle out: a wake that accompanies the virtual passage of death; 
that concedes a wake behind in the reticulated water of an approach; and 
realises a wake that casts the ropes of good fortune before taking leave. It is 
a collective enunciation, a wake that keeps watch by turns; to turn out, to be 
rid off  and to expose, advancing the shell-bird’s eulogy for the tortoise. The 
tortoise is a troubadour who sings of the ocean’s fl uid praxis, raises his voice 
36    According to the OED, “steer” has its etymology in “Old English stéor (also stýr) strong feminine, action of guiding or 
governing (also, correction, punishment); a neuter *stéor rudder is inferred from the comb. stéoresmansteersman n. The im-
mediate Germanic cognates are: Old Frisian stiure, Middle Low German stûre (whence late Middle High German stiure, modern 
German steuer), Middle Dutch stûre, stiere (modern Dutch stuur), Old Norse stýri neuter, rudder, stern ( < Germanic type 
*steurjo-m); Old High German stiura strong feminine, rudder, stern, also (and probably originally) staff ( < Germanic type 
*steurjo); a different ablaut grade of the root (*steu-) is found in Old Norse staur-r pole, stake (compare Greek σταυρός 
cross).” The notion is of a stiff, upright pillar or post used in steering. Included in the familiar emblems of Tyce’s was a 
ships rudder. See, “steer, n.2”. OED Online. June 2011. Oxford University Press. http://www.oed.com.ezproxy.lib.rmit.edu.au/
view/Entry/189619?rskey=TMASPq&result=2&isAdvanced=false (accessed June 28, 2011).
37     “Prometheus: Indeed my friends feel pity at the sight of me | Chorus: Did your offence perhaps go further than 
you have said? | Prometheus: Yes: I caused men no longer to foresee their death. | Chorus: What cure did you discover 
for their misery? | Prometheus: I planted fi rmly in their hearths blind hopefulness. | Chorus: Your gift brought them great 
blessing. “[PV 238-263] Castoriadis’ translation effects a dramatic change in existing translations which count the fi rst line 
as ‘the foreseeing of death’. Earlier translations contradict Prometheus’ lines after, not least of which is that they ‘saw to no 
avail’.  As Castoriadis argues, what Prometheus gives to mortals, as fi re,  is not the ability to predict their death, but rather 
to understand the ontology of death as an expression of their mortality. However, the humanity before the fl ame, to those 
who wandered the earth not seeing and not hearing, though they had eyes and ears, and who had abandoned themselves 
to confusion and purposelessness dwelling beneath the ground, would have been crushed under the weight of knowing such 
mortality and are given, consequently, a ‘blind hope’. It is a hope that is “relative to what anthrōpos does and is able to 
do in his life” constituted by “the knowledge of death and the potential of a prattein/poiein, making-doing/creating […] 
not as a gradual process, but as a sudden passage from beforehand to afterward as the consequence of the decision and 
action of [Prometheus].”  See, Castoriadis, Figures of the Thinkable, 9-11.
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to the cacophony of the sea, to realise, adrift on its parched waves, other 
voyagers who might share in its vocation, other companions in distress. His 
is a ballad which tells, in a single breath, of their fi rst meeting…near my lips, 
on my lips, turning on my lips… sound edging forward, to pick a sailor off  the 
sea and to send them all spinning. The sailor relies on the candour of the 
watchman to comprehend, under a single green eyelid, the parting of ship 
and ocean. The watchman’s panoramic sight does not resist the turning of 
the horizon, it is without punctuation, goes on turning but is punctuated by 
the infi nite, by the duration of a single yes, the troubadour’s language of yes. 
“Yes I said yes I will Yes.”38 
The punctuating call of ‘yes’ is the moment that the sailor, under a 
seemingly self-infl icted duress, allows himself to sink to the bottom of the 
open boat, tired by the turning of the oars. Overwhelmed by a verbose 
passage, the interjection marks a period of recovery, the ‘yes’ giving consent 
to conjugate with others also at rest. Whether by instinct or observation, the 
corresponding description of the sailor’s biding renders his uniform a pearl 
grey, for an imperfect pallor, a shell of celadon, is what is obtained by a 
consumptive as their vestiges. But, a return is in the offi  ng, for a convalescent 
turns his attention elsewhere; the ‘yes’ is what passes before him. An event 
that hangs motionless over the water, the image of a man leaning over one 
side of a boat swearing softly to the sea; a voice that is thrown by the ocean’s 
own breath.
38     As Simon Gaunt and Sarah Kay point out, “the term Occitan [medieval literary language] accords with the broad 
subdivision of medieval Romance languages according to the word for ‘yes’, a subdivision recognised in the Middles Ages: in 
the North of France, the word oïl (now oui) gave rise to the langue d’oïl, in Italy there was the langue de si, and in the 
Midi the langue d’oc.” Simon Gaunt & Sarah Kay, eds. The Troubadours: An Introduction, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), 2. The quoted phrase comes from James Joyce’s Ullysses and Molly Bloom’s famous soliloquy. My intention here 
is to draw a relationship between the struggle of Bloom’s conscious as she fi nally gives in to her desire, with the moment 
before Building Eight as ocean liner in Raggatt’s letter takes off, “never to return but waiving, to everyone and calling, yes 
yes yes”. Furthermore, I am compelled to ask after the indeterminate interpretive task of the troubadour that are inextri-
cably woven through a language of yes, and which forges a proximate passage in the culminative moments of this thesis.
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Raised to the spectacle of a horizon, the patient’s crutches fall back, his 
vestiges shimmer with the full sun upon them, his hat verging on a cast iron 
black. But his is a carapace that will not corrode.  By virtue of his dexterity, 
by the degree of his tossing and writhing implicated in the embrocating of 
the waves that buff  its surface to a radiant gold, the carapace is assured,  not 
least by the Erythrai’s refrain.  The coat and ocean constitute a watery quarrel. 
Each resists domination, not by violence, or confrontation but avails itself to 
senseless attack, an inundation of incisions that at once splits in two too many 
times, and simultaneously closes the space between. It is an instantaneous 
division, a cleaving together. Floundering against the swell that gurgles about 
him, the sailor is obliged to keep his head up so that, borne up or down, 
even a stifl ed cry, marred by the rolling movements of a liquefi ed ground, is 
awakened by a golden touch. The ocean going troubadour reveals the same 
steady voice of Menmon;  a voice catapulted backwards, not as an echo of 
another, but a voice that meets the setting sun.39 Achille’s breath warms the 
shell of a tortoise.
OF EXCESS: THE BAROQUE SHIP
Any defi ciency in this text being able to attest to the scale of an upturned 
tortoise shell as a gilded ship disenchanted with its ocean home (an argument 
that is not simply a transcription of what is known regarding the ocean, or 
39     In the early 80’s, Jean-Luc Nancy alongside Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe would preempt in part the work on community 
through their initial exploration of the term ‘with-drawing’ that expressed not a backing away but a retracing of the political 
stakes of a community. However, as Nancy contends, the failure to reconcile this term to community was  “evidence precisely 
of the impossibility of founding a politics upon a well understood community, just as it is impossible to defi ne a community 
from the starting point of a politics thought to be true or just.” See, Jean Luc Nancy, “The Confronted Community” trans. 
Amanda Macdonald in, Postcolonial Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (2003), 23-36, note 4. Nancy would contend however in relation to 
an essay on the sublime  “How would I trace any fi gure at all, if I did not anticipate its unity, or more precisely, if I did 
not anticipate myself, the one who presents this fi gure, as its unity? There is a kind of fore-sight or providence at the heart 
of reason”  Jean Luc-Nancy, “The Sublime Offering” in, Of the Sublime:Presence in Question, eds. Mark C. Taylor, Rodolphe 
Gasche, & trans. Jeffrey S. Librett, (State Univerity of New York Press, 1994), 25-53; 31.
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the misgivings of an author as he navigates an unmapped ocean interior) 
cannot be redeemed within a concluding statement that reveals its cause as 
the misapprehension of an image of a tortoise shell and an image of a ship 
resembling each other. In the author’s impending jostle to ascertain not 
only the dimension of their confrontation but also those pertaining to the 
original misconception’s happy surprise, the tortoise and ship are deformed. 
It is the creative uncertainty of their confrontation that establishes a text that 
is too unruly to be contained in the meter of a logical enquiry.  Erupting 
from outside the ship and ocean’s previously circumscribed existence is a text 
indiscernible from their amorphous dimensions in the rhythmic movement 
of the ocean swell.  Thus, the text’s metamorphosis encompasses the patterns 
and gestures employed in the ship and ocean’s fl irtatious minuet that gave 
cause to each slipping into the next bound to the continuous meter of 
their impropriety.  However, the text exceeds the capacity of the nautical 
movements of the ship and ocean’s spatial confrontation. It tears itself from 
the murmur of the ocean, a crack, revealed in the momentary release of a 
faint scream from an unfathomable horizon.
The  image of the tortoise that conversely occupies and advances this 
narrative does not ally itself  to a sequence of reposes that could be used to 
measure the sequential exchanges of the tortoise’s encounters. Nor from the 
image of the tortoise can their be discerned an ichnography that would plot 
the many uncanny alibis that claim to off er a true bearing on the tortoise’s 
mythos: as the progeny of a  Labroustian temple,40 and Herodotus’ city of 
40     The French architect Henri Labrouste in 1829 described through text and drawings the ancient Greek colony of 
Paestrum. Labrouste argued that the seafarers that begat the colony, having survived their journey, would have built the 
Temple of Neptune fi rst even though its architecture described the proportions and exhibited the detailed carving that 
expressed the popular Academy opinion on the natural and progressive refi nement of the Greek architectural orders, which 
would have seen the temple built later than initial colonisation. For a discussion on Labrouste in relation to Building Eight 
RMIT, refer to:  Peter Kohane, “Everday Life and Architectural Polychromy: Romanticism and the Buildings of Edmond & 
Corrigan” in, Schaik & Bertram, Building Eight: Edmond and Corrigan at RMIT, Vol. 1, 14-25.
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Ecbatana;41 the chrysoberyls, peridots, sapphires and other stones designating 
a cosmopolitan landscape of cities, the tortoise’s scales drawing feudal borders 
and  the gilded surface a continent refl ecting the rays of a sun that rises and 
sets beyond its embellished edge. Any image must acknowledge the turn from 
periplus to periplum that is conceived by way of the map told of in Jorge Luis 
Borges’ short story ‘On Exactitude in Science’ and that coincided point for 
point with the dimension of the empire it traced thereby covering a province 
in an entire map and thus becoming useless to all who would hope to use 
it; the peplos is thus what is left to assist us as we narrate our passage.  The 
baroque ship usurps the madman’s pseudonym as  “passenger par excellence, the 
prisoner of the passage”42 as an instrument with which to endow the horizon.43 
The hereditary vestiges, indiff erent to their previous owner, coincide with the 
swell that turns back onto itself, able to touch the very limit of their being, to 
confer the coat on a gentlemen, a no-man’s-man.44 Unfathomable in his excess, 
fi rst manipulating and then defying any conjecture regarding a conclusionary 
41     Herodotus writes of Ecbatana: “…he compelled the Medes to make one fortifi ed city and pay chief attention to 
this, having less regard to the other cities. And as the Medes obeyed him in this also, he built large and strong walls, those 
which are now called Agbatanna, [Ecbatana] standing in concentric circles on within the other. And this wall is so contrived 
that one circle is higher than the next by the height of the battlements alone. And to some extent, I suppose, the nature 
of the ground, seeing that it is on a hill, assists towards this end; but much more was it produced by art. The circles are 
in all seven in number, and within the last circle are the royal palace and the treasure houses. The largest of these walls is 
in size about equal to the circuit of the wall round Athens; and of the fi rst circle, the battlements are white, of the second 
black, of the third crimson, of the fourth blue, of the fi fth red: thus are the battlements of all the circles coloured with 
various tints, and the two last have their battlements overlaid one of them with silver and the other with gold.” Herodotus, 
The Histories, Intro. D. Lateiner, trans. G.C. Macaultay, (London: Penguin Books, 2004) Book 1:98. 39. Peter Kohane believes 
that Henri Labrouste would have had knowledge of these descriptions when undertaking the  polychromatic illustrations of 
his  imaginary ancient Greek city of Agrigentum. Kohane also notes Corrigan’s potential knowledge of both Labroute’s work, 
and Herodutus’s description after an interview with Corrigan in which Corrigan mentions the  letter from Howard Raggatt 
that interpreted Building Eight as a section of the wall of a  ‘New Jerusalem’. In the biblical account of  the ‘New Jerusa-
lem’, the city is composed of pure gold,  its twelve walls are made from jade set upon foundations adorned with precious 
stones and each wall is interrupted by a single gate made from a pearl. Refer,  Kohane, “Everyday Life and Architectural 
Polychromy: Romanticism and the Buildings of Edmond & Corrigan,” 21; And;  Kohane, “Clothing the Institution,” 55, note 17. 
42     Foucault, The History of Madness, 8-12.
43     “far off, so far, like a madness, under the horizon’s dawning rim.” Lawrence, Tortoises, 45.
44     “Traveller, | With your tail tucked a little on one side | Like a gentleman in a long-skirted coat”. Lawrence, 
Tortoises, 13.
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form, the shell-bird designates his exemplary articulation of an unmediated 
architectural potential, of a ship liberated from an ocean and an ocean liberated 
from a ship.
IN EXCESS: THE SHELL-BIRD
This text suggests that to be where we are is to have understand an 
accumulation of things seen, of voices heard, of places been. Grounded in 
the initial intimacy, the forcing of two carnal houses, of  Esseintes’ citadel 
and Foucault’s ship, our voyage constitutes a determined sedimentation, of a 
crack forced in vain. ‘Here’, without seeming to have been apprehended by the 
antiquarian giant Chronos, is an immaculate conception conceived in the froth 
and spittle of the waves. This text is here having abandoned land, not once, 
but twice,; a ‘here’ that drifts aimlessly; a ‘here’ indistinguishable from the 
imperceptible expanse in the offi  ng. But, the infi nite is not a backdrop to where 
this text is found,  a ‘here’ that could be the sum of the parts. Both life and boat 
enter into a sumless aggregate; are ‘here’ brought together from the multitude 
and emerge amongst the denizens of the sea.
Discerned thus far our approach to ‘here’ is strewn with absurd actions, and 
marred by lethal blows. A hatchet, now raised, irks the comfort of those who 
have made it here, and wish to continue. Do we digress from hospital, or from 
Institution? Here we cannot tell. Though an answer has been sought, and a clinic, 
of a kind, under the hubris of a ship of fools, is as much known. The cause of 
our affl  iction, whether the result of old age or pathological, remains obscured, 
though we are burdened by some end in mind. We, addressed as ‘no-man’s-man’ 
and who refuses to stir without his hat. Slow, perhaps dim-witted, the iron dome 
perched atop our head and a space described by a watery circumference, all belie 
an acrobatic agility that appeals to a Harlequin’s somersaults, cartwheels and 
back fl ips.  A crack, across the hat’s face, by some unnoticeable degree, indicates 
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an escape; having once belonged to someone with a much smaller skull. Taken 
to its limit, forced down to accommodate the larger, the sound of a voice calls 
by name this life,  though it is not immediately intelligible in every sentiment 
proff ered by this text. Having availed ourselves to the use of so many, each blow 
that cuts, bruises, and incapacitates, registers our horizon and gestures to the 
fl ight of birds,and the undertaking of an ocean genesis. 
But, the green coat is not forsaken. It is made useful by its scale, for unlike 
the hat, which is too small, the coat is too big. It fi nds itself spread the length of 
the carapace; a galliot obscuring the actions of the rest beyond its expanse; or in 
the peculiar image of a pharos, a wedding veil embroidered with unimaginable 
detail. Borges’ map lacked the necessary power of the tides to weave, to turn 
through the scarcely surveyable immensity of the ocean; geography invaded its 
expanse. But, as a single eye, the pharos illuminates, points to itself and exposes 
that which cannot be seen. The pharos sutures the seen and the shrouded, blinds 
itself with the iridescence of its foresight, a passage made without degrees of 
longitude and latitude, an emerald ray that issues forth through the dense fog. 
Fixed to this axis, the gentleman vaults the troughs and skim the peaks, his hat 
an indication of his gilt raiment. That is, it is the rest that are left at the mercy of 
the pharos’ keeper, to drift, sight unseen, into the infi nite. From the shadows of 
an approach grows a house with an emerald green hearth.45  
45     As Michael Frayn states  “Buildings are like snail-shells, the residue of last years growth, the record of last years 
traffi c” and that through this traffi c we construct a  “carapace of character” that we both identify with, and seek recognition 
for, irrelevant of the actual and deducible of our economy. I am indebted to van Schaik for this reference, which he credits 
in one of his ideograms entitled, “Perceptions: The Stories we tell ourselves, c. June 2008.  How we put ourselves in the place 
of being Architects’” Schaik intends, by his use of Frayn’s term ‘carapace of desire’, to identify the ambitious role architects 
take in the negotiation of both local and global frameworks. Michael Frayn, The Human Touch: our part in the creation of 
the universe, (England: Faber & Faber, 2006), 21, 234.
This PhD began in earnest by highlighting a life bound to 
an unbelievable passage of a building. Its intention was to 
attend to an architecture framed by the radical compositional forces of exhaustion 
directed towards the question of a life; a life that does not depend on succesive 
degrees of a life, or the inclination of a life burdened in moral servitude, or 
bound by the threat of exposure according to a particular cultural aff ray. A life is 
a life without proclivity, without the tools to realise the disclosure of a life. This 
research contends that the question of an exhaustion that combats that which 
would cleave a life from an architectural mandate, also concerns an unquestionable 
sharing out indistinguishable from our intensive eff ort to progress the assertion 
of a life embodied in the elsewhere of an architecture, in the passage of ocean 
liner and Building Eight from which this project departs.  
The structure of the PhD was an attempt to even the eye of an uneven ‘I’ 
whilst confronting the orthodoxy of a PhD undertaking, within the dimensions 
of A Clinic for the Exhausted. Thus it also risked obscuring the conditions of 
its own genealogy. Giorgio Agamben provides us which an outline of these 
conditions as it manifests itself at the limit of a creative endeavour: 
Holderlin wrote on the brink of madness: “I fear that I might end like 
the old Tantalus who received more from the Gods than he could take.” 
And “I may sat that Apollo struck me.” Or the note found in Van Gogh’s 
pocket on the day of his death: “We, as for my own work, I risk my life in 
it and my sanity has already half melted away in it.” Or, Rilke in a letter 
to Clara Rilke: “Works of art are always the product of a risk one has run, 
of an experience taken to its extreme limit, to the point where man can 
no longer go on.1 
 This dimension of A Clinic for the Exhausted began in the account of a letter 
that problematised the departure of Building Eight by furthering the theatrical 
temporality of Raggatt’s mouvance. Thus even here, in the conventional intimacy 
1   Girogio Agamben, “The Most Uncanny Thing” in, The Man Without Content, trans. Georgia Albert, (Stanford, California: Stanford 
University Press, 1999), 1-8;5.
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of an epilogue, the dimensions of this endeavour will remain indiscernible from 
what establishes A Clinic for the Exhausted.  Roussel has made us acutely aware 
that  any epilogue is made in the vicinity of an open possibility of resistance 
to the present conditions, including its closure. To all those awaiting a fi nal 
irreproachable conclusion that would withdraw from the nuances of language 
that have made an open demand on its audience, there has never been made 
available the provisions to sustain the terms of a fi nal answer without the project 
also challenged with a charge of apostasy.
In as much as a life is not what draws attention to itself in a particular life, 
so the petition to the space of a clinic is not what procures a particular clinic. 
A clinic straddles the threshold of the opening and closing of exhaustion that 
distinguishes the extraction of the architectural conditions of a life in this 
exegesis. The movement of the threshold of exhaustion impoverishes the 
mechanism with which the exegesis could be argued to concern an architecture 
in the corresponding realm of a clinic. An architecture apropros of a clinic is 
always in excess of the borders of a clinical architecture. It is an architecture 
that converges around a non-specifi c existence, constituted in the momentary 
confi gurations of a clinic that abruptly turns to address the question of any-
one-what-so-ever and who resides any-space-whatever. A clinic is an attempt 
to ascertain the complicity of everyone in the domain of a life. Each and every 
certainty of a life constitues the provisionality with which A Clinic for the 
Exhausted sustains an architecture across our undertaking. Thus, in the fi rst book 
of this PhD the hypochondriac was called upon to do other than determine an 
illness. Taking up the exemplary posture of the hypochondriac assured this text 
of the necessary means to straddle the interval between building and ship, and 
to argue via the pharmakon, that a clinic is inseparable from a terminal turning 
out, a gesture that determines the movement of exception that excludes no-one-
what-so-ever. 2
2   A clinic evokes a life that cannot be witnessed constituted by Agamben’s description of the Muselmann; the fi gure depicted by Primo Levi 
in his accounts of the camps during World War 2. Levi informs us that over time every camp inhabitant found themselves no longer able to 
discern the punishment of the SS guards from the extreme cold of their environment. But, the lassitude of the fi gure labelled derogatorily by 
the other camp inhabitants as a Muselmann constructs a political fi gure that cannot bear witness to the unwitnessable horror of the situation 
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I am aware, as the author of this text, that I have left the closing moments 
of this PhD to appeal to the audience that has been tasked with verifying my 
claim to an architecture in A Clinic for the Exhausted, and thus I am also aware 
that this could leave me open to an alleged scepticism as to the importance of 
the audience and their role in an undertaking that is premised on an unmeasured 
sharing out. But, it is also what I have left to do that permits me to do otherwise. 
My analogous remarks thus far should be understood within the frameworks of 
Montaigne’s use of the term je nais sais quois: what is carefully framed to omit 
the obvious demands to address a fi nal conclusionary confi guration, to instead 
write on it (much like the way almost all of Montainge’s essays are entitled, 
commencing with the preposition ‘on’). To write on the audience reveals no 
they fi nd themselves in. By applying the camp inhabitants indifference to the cane and the cold to the Muselmann’s state of apathy Agamben 
confers the Muselmann with an exceptional life: “Because of this, [the Muselmann’s indifference] the guard suddenly seems powerless before 
him, [the Muselmann] as if struck by the thought that the Muselmann’s behavior […] might perhaps be a silent form of resistance. Here a 
law that seeks to transform itself entirely into life fi nds itself confronted with a life that is absolutely indistinguishable from the law, and it 
is precisely this indiscernibility that threatens the lex animate of the camp.” [Agamben, 185]
Doubtless, apathy underscores the burden of a life that falls under domination, and that would offer a cynical attitude to the questioning 
of such a life: this project’s deference to the Muselmann’s indifference could surrender itself to the same fatigue, making the Muselmann a 
purely narrational device. But, my intention for the appropriated fi gure of the Muselmann is not to muddle the surrounding ethical designations 
of their lived experience with the gestures I have made thus far and those I intend to make further in the closing remarks of the project. 
Rather, A Clinic for the Exhausted proceeds on the basis that to encounter the Muselmann is to encounter an epistemological impasse that has 
the potential to become a site of alarming productivity if appropriately navigated. But more than that, the characteristics of the Muselmann 
constitutes an uncanny if not radical form of mutiny. To speak of mutiny requires that we fi rst recognise the inherent menace of its name, 
that it must go unnamed, that the threat of bearing witness to it might cast it into the air like a disease. As Eve Sedgwick explains, “the 
terms in which mutiny can be described must be confi ned to references that evoke recognizant knowledge in those who already possess it 
without igniting it in those who may not.” [Sedgwick, 101] 
The Muselmann appears at the threshold of the law, that which empowers the guard dishing out his sadistic violence designed to 
subjugate and therefore prevent at the level of the individual and the collective the prisoners appearing at the threshold of his authority, 
and yet, it is apparent that the fi gure of the Muselmann emerges from the same biopolitical machine. The Muselmann also posits an imperfect 
association with their initial impressment into the camp - a biographical detail wielded in the formal identifi cation of Jewish, homosexual or 
degenerate - and that exploits the separation of camp life and the inchoate experience realised by the Muselmann and is made inspite of 
their location at the junction between the unimaginable sadism of the guard, and their rejection by the other prisoners. But the performative 
conditions that establish the non-locatable at the juncture of two extremes is, in A Clinic for the Exhausted, less an outright aggrandisement 
of the Muselmann’s indifference to their situation, than a experimental prosthesis, an alternate armature of their performance; one that turns 
around within the confi nes of its own limits; an inexorable space undisclosed to itself and that demonstrates the immeasurable persistence 
of apathy correlative to the degree of exhaustion assumed by those in authority. Subsisting in the camp, and in the midst of the cold and 
the cane, the Muselmann realises an indiscerable life via the inadmissable profundity of exhaustion.  Refer to: Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: 
Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1998), 185; Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, 
Epistemology of the Closet, (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 2008), 100-104. 
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one profi le of any individual audience member. Like the periplus ventured in the 
invitation or the Isle of Tools, the on turns the audience towards a becoming-
landscape in the midst of an insurmountable existence, and thus to realise an 
audience’s becoming ocean-liner: as Herman Melville wrote, “a ship is a bit of 
terra-fi rma cut off  from the main.”3 My intention behind the examination of so 
many obtuse characterisations was to penetrate the diffi  culty of an instance of an 
audience: Molière enabled this research to realise that an audience is composed 
of those who cannot be turned out onto the street in their entirety, which in 
turn confered the project with an unremarkable audience born in spite of a 
Deleuzian virility,  an intimacy that does not exclude those who turn their backs 
on any or all of the action on stage, or off . Finally, Roussel bound an audience 
in the beautifully austere gesture of a mutiny that maintained the tremor of an 
existence. 
A Clinic for the Exhausted is thus an attempt to grasp the impossibility of an 
architecture having stolen the architect out from under a coat and a hat, and 
with which we could realise our legs as distant promontories left to the rising 
waters; as monuments to him, he who so awkwardly disposed through the 
text might now, right now, appear at the edge of this undertaking, ringing his 
calloused hands, searching with bloodshot eyes, and confessing... now, and at 
every juncture of this PhD, I must confess that the project has always been at risk 
of a confrontation with the privileged fi gure of Peter Corrigan. 
How then is an architecture manifested here in a document entitled A Clinic 
for the Exhausted? In reply I will have recourse to the answer Deleuze and Guattari 
give when they ask “How can a moment of the world be rendered durable or 
made to exist by itself ?”4 I submit that this question is pertinent not only to 
painting, music and writing, but to any creative endeavour, including the 
undertaking of an architecture. Deleuze and Guattari respond:
3   “... it is a state in itself; and the captain is its king.” Herman Melville, White Jacket or The World in a Man-of-War, (Londond: 
John Lehmann, 1952), 35. 
4   Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari, What is Philosophy?, trans. Hugh Tomlinson & Graham Burchill, (London & New York: Verso, 
1994), 172.
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Virginia Woolf provides an answer that is as valid for painting and 
music as it is for writing: “Saturate every atom,” “eliminate all waste, 
deadness, superfl uity,” everything that adheres to our current and lived 
perceptions, everything that nourishes the mediocre novelist; and keep 
only the saturation that gives us the percept. “It must include nonsense, 
fact, sordidity: but made transparent”; “I want to put practically 
everything in; yet to saturate.” Through having reached the percept as 
“the sacred source,” through having seen Life in the living or the Living 
in the lived, the novelist or painter returns breathless and with bloodshot 
eyes. They are athletes – not athletes who train their bodies and cultivate 
the lived, no matter how many writers have succumbed to the idea of sport 
as a way of heightening art and life, but bizarre athletes of the “fasting-
artist” type, or the “great Swimmer” who does not know how to swim”5 
Which is not to say that ‘the great swimmer who does not know how to 
swim’ is without provision for swimming, for this statement parallels the serial 
navigation of Jacotot, Rogoff  and kairos made by this PhD. Deleuze draws on 
the fi gure of the swimmer and the sea to articulate the relations that constitute 
learning. He writes: “To learn to swim is to conjugate the distinctive points 
of our bodies with the singular points of the objective Idea [the sea] in order 
to form a problematic fi eld.”6  The swimmer learns to swim, not outside the 
sea (not by learning the gestures of swimming on land), but in the diff erential 
relations of their body  in contact with the movement of the ocean: “This 
conjugation determines for us a threshold of consciousness at which our real 
acts are adjusted to our perceptions of the real relations, thereby providing a 
5   Deleuze & Guattari, What is Philosophy?, 172. The ‘great swimmer’ is a remark orientated towards the Becketian character of 
Franz Kafka’s short story The Great Swimmer. The swimmer, having successfully won a medal at the Olympics confesses, on returning 
home, that not only does he not know how to swim, but that he now fi nds himself at home in another country, where he does not 
understand a word that is said to him. The swimmer is able to ascertain that a sash hung around his neck is written with the title 
‘The Olympic Champion’, but admits that is is “written in a foreign language.”  It is, as Deleuze & Guattari write, “to be a sort of 
stranger within his own language.” Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari, Kafka: Towards a minor literature, trans. Dana Polan, (Minneapolis 
& London: The University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 26. For the text of The Great Swimmer refer to, Franz Kafka & Daniel Slager, 
“Fragments,” Grand Street, No. 56, (Spring, 1996), 117-122.
6   Gilles Deleuze, Difference & Repetition, trans Paul Patton, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 165.
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solution to the problem”7 Ronald Bogue, deciphering Deleuze and Guattari’s 
argument,  explains that  consciousness alone does not permit us a way in to the 
problem, because consciousness reinforces the  knowledge and the problem as a 
priori perceptions. Bogue goes on to suggest that it is only through “involuntary 
confrontation with something other does thought engage diff erence”  and “what 
provokes diff erence are signs,”8 paralleling Deleuze’s statement that “to learn is 
indeed to constitute the space of an encounter with signs.”9  The eff ect of signs 
can be understood as the sudden shock the body of the swimmer is faced with 
when fi rst entering the sea. The attendant case of Raggatt as he is faced with the 
prospect of Building Eight disappearing on his watch, was an opportunity to 
procure a pedagogical strategy that would enable everyone who does not know 
how to know to do so without an knowledge of how to do so; to operate at the 
limit of the swimmer’s domain. Far from lamenting a less than athletic prowess 
the drowning man is not exempted from the swimmer’s fl uid praxis, because it is 
the drowning man who cuts across the throng of existence.10
7   Deleuze, Difference & Repetition, 165
8   Ronald Bogue, “Search, Swim and See: Deleuze’s apprenticeship in signs and pedagogy of images,” Educational Philosophy and 
Theory, Vol. 36, (2004), 327-342. As Brogue notes in a footnote, Deleuze appears to be drawing the example of the swimmer from 
Henri Bergson, who uses the example of learning to swim to sustain a new habit. He writes: “If we had never seen a man swim, 
we might say that swimming is an impossible thing, inasmuch as, to learn to swim, we must begin by holding ourselves up in the 
water and, consequently, already know how to swim. Reasoning, in fact, always nails us down to the solid ground. But if, quite simply, 
I throw myself into the water without fear, I may keep myself up well enough at fi rst by merely struggling, and gradually adapt 
myself to the new environment: I shall thus have learnt to swim.” Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, trans. Arthur Mitchell, (London: 
Palgrave Macmillian, 2007), 124.
9   Deleuze, Difference & Repetition, 23
10   It is the fi gure of Riderhood in Herman Melvilles, Our Mutual Friend, that begins Deleuze’s examination of what constitutes a life as 
impersonal. The character of Riderhood having fallen into the river during a tussle, is brought to the shore half drowned. Crowding around 
him, those who previously cursed his name attend to him, seeing life as separate from there everyday experience of his maliciousness. As he 
is slowly revived all his horribleness returns, and the people return to seeing him for who he is. Deleuze recognizes the moment between 
his life and his death as the moment when “the life of an individual has given way to an impersonal and yet singular life that releases a 
pure event freed from the accidents of internal and external life, that is, from the subjectivity and objectivity of what happens: a “Homo 
tantum” with whom everyone empathizes and who attains a kind of beautitude.” Gilles Deleuze, “Immanence: A Life” in, Pure Immanence: 
Essays on A Life, trans Anne Boyman, (New York: Zone Books, 2005), 25-35; see, 28-29. Also, Giorgio Agamben, “Absolute Immanence” in, 
Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press), 220-240; On Our 
Mutual Friend see, 228-230; also, Daniel W. Smith’s introduction, “A Life of Pure Immanence”: Deleuze’s “Critique et Clinique” Project” in, 
Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, xiii-xiv.
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 Deleuze and Guattari argue that all becomings, “tend towards becoming-
imperceptible.”11 Becoming-imperceptible is the  over-coming of the organic 
life, with non-organic life “without cessation or condition”12  discerned by the 
three virtues of imperceptibility, indiscernibility, and impersonality. Following 
on from Virginia Woolf ’s desire to “saturate every atom”13  they contend that 
becoming-imperceptible requires us to “Saturate, eliminate, put everything in,”14 
so that what is can dissipate entirely into the world. Becoming-imperceptible is 
paramount to becoming-everybody and everything - everybody and everything 
unable to lay claim to a subjective or an objective end. Becoming-imperceptible 
thus entails “making the world a becoming,”15 entering into an immeasurable 
aggregation with the world. The authors’ relate this to the confession of 
Paul Morand’ protagonist in his novel Monsieur Zero: “I am a man who fl ees 
by swimming under water, and at whom all the world’s rifl es fi re ... I must no 
longer off er a target.”16  Such a life would describe a man whom “succeeds in 
getting drunk on pure water”17 or, as Deleuze notes of Beckett’s Murphy, “like 
a cork fl oating on a tempestuous ocean;”18  Thus the proximity of Raggatt’s 
enduring drunkenness along with the abandonded vestiges of Esseintes tortoise 
enables this text to grasp every untoward movement of the drowning man’s vital 
Oedema, a movement from which no-one is exempted. 
This epilogue argues that the problem of an architecture that cannot forsake 
the passage between ocean liner and Building Eight is foregrounded in the 
movements of the drowning man. Let us return the elements clinched in the 
closing moments of Book 2, and that are furnished by the following annotation:
On the death of the mollusk, the shell that serves as its house becomes 
11  Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi, (London & New York: Continuum, 
2004), 308.
12  Gilles Deleuze, “The Greatest Irish Film (Beckett’s “Film“)” in, Critical & Clinical, 23-26:26.
13  Deleuze & Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 309.
14  Deleuze & Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 309.
15  Deleuze & Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 309.
16  Deleuze & Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 308.
17  Deleuze & Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 315.
18  Deleuze, “The Greatest Irish Film (Beckett’s “Film“),” 26.
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the counterpoint of the hermit crab that turns it into its own habitat, 
thanks to its tail, which is not for swimming but is prehensile, enabling it 
to capture the empty shell.19  
The drowning man abounds unencumbered by the shores of Building 
Eight and ocean liner, balancing on the horizon in the exaggerated posture of 
the swimmer.  The green ray, the hearth at the heart of the drowning man’s 
becoming-imperceptible, grasps the tortoise to  interrogate the fl uid praxis of 
a man thrown overboard, (because it is the appearance of green that confi rms 
both the greatest curve and which entails the fold of our ocean surface). 
Simultaneously the green ray is the possibility of confessing in excess of the 
drowning man’s domain. And it is this confession that allows us to proff er, in 
spite of the principle of the convalescent’s perpetual displacement, a clinic as that 
which exempts without exception. This is what the confession of the remarkable 
fi gure of the drowning man discloses: a clinic converges on the threshold of 
exhaustion; exhaustion is that which is cut through and interleaved with the 
undertaking of an architecture; and what establishes an architecture in A Clinic 
for the Exhausted was making a life exceptional.
THE END
19  Deleuze & Guattari, What is Philosophy?, 185.
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